THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Britain on the Brink

EXECUTIVE POWER & OUR SECURITY
by Carnes Lord

Patterns of Intervention *by Samuel P. Huntington*

If Labour Wins *by Brian Walden*

Denis Healey: A Profile *by Stephen Haseler*

Afghanistan: The Strategy of Dismemberment *by Elie Krakowski*

Trade & Deterrence *by Henry R. Nau*

NOPEC—The Future of Oil *by S. Fred Singer*

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Executive Power & Our Security

Carnes Lord

THE EXPOSURE of the ill-conceived Iran operation and its link to the Nicaraguan *contras* has raised fundamental questions about the coherence of the Reagan administration's foreign policy and about the role of the president's National Security Adviser and the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Unfortunately, the opportunity to engage in a serious national debate on these issues is in danger of being wasted in a frenzy of partisan recrimination, media bloodlust, and ill-informed sermonizing. What is urgently needed is some perspective on the Reagan administration's long-standing approach to the management of national security and the reasons for its failure.

Everyone knows that Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980 as a sworn enemy of the federal bureaucracy and all its works. By common account, the Reagan presidency has been the most successful since at least that of Dwight D. Eisenhower, restoring a nearly lost faith in the presidency as an institution and in the ability of presidents to accomplish their political agenda. The president has used his leverage over agency budgets to curb runaway growth in federal expenditures; in spite of a failure to redeem early pledges to abolish entire agencies, he has made it profoundly unfashionable in all political quarters of the Congress to promote particular domestic policies through the instrumentality of an expanding and increasingly autonomous public sector. Furthermore, the Reagan White House appears to have learned the lessons of earlier Republican administrations and moved aggressively to expand the number of ideologically or politically certified executive appointees throughout the bureaucracy.

In the national security area the situation is rather different, but the overall picture has been of a White House certain of its purpose and in command of the necessary levers. When the administration entered office, it looked on the national security agencies as liberated allies rather than occupied enemy territory. Substantial increases in funding and personnel were sought for the military and the intelligence community, and an effort was made to secure their political rehabilitation after a decade or more of adversarial treatment by the Congress, the press, and (in the Carter years) the executive branch itself. Outward harmony between the national security bureaucracy and the president's executives has since prevailed. In terms of actual performance, there had been until recently no obvious foreign policy disasters, and—in Grenada in October 1983—a visible military success. A relatively orderly interagency machinery was put in place for the development of national security policy, suppressing at least the more visible manifestations of the bureaucratic struggles that contributed to the incoherence of American foreign policy during the Carter era.

In spite of all this, however, it is clear that the Reagan presidency has not in any fundamental sense cured the ills that have plagued the U.S. national security establish-

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ment since at least World War II. A closer look at the administration's performance in major areas of national security policy reveals persisting problems and few unambiguous achievements. These failings are in virtually all cases a reflection not of a reckless White House, but rather one that has never firmly grasped the reins of a rogue bureaucracy.

Despite the well-publicized warnings of its first secretary of state, the administration's reaction to the phenomenon of terrorism was late and ineffective. Terrorism was the source of the administration's greatest military humiliation, the bombing of the Marine contingent in Beirut in 1983—an episode that revealed not only severe deficiencies in military command and control, but an uncertain approach to the wider political-military situation in Lebanon. Subsequently, the United States has managed neither to enlist Syria in a serious effort to locate and free remaining American hostages in Lebanon, nor to deal with Syrian involvement in international terrorism. The Iran debacle has only further confirmed that the U.S. government remains deeply divided on strategy for dealing with terrorism and its sponsors, as well as operationally ill-equipped to carry out any such strategy.

In Latin America, while steadfast U.S. support for the government of El Salvador has paid respectable dividends, the U.S. military effort there has suffered from self-inflicted political constraints as well as deficiencies in doctrine and capabilities for counterinsurgency warfare. Administration policy toward Nicaragua has vacillated between accommodation and confrontation, and there remains little to show for some years of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement with the Nicaraguan resistance movement. The Caribbean Basin Initiative, the main U.S. diplomatic undertaking in the region, does not seem to have been followed up effectively, and the future of administration friends such as Seaga in Jamaica is not especially promising. Despite increased awareness of the seriousness of Mexico's political and economic problems, which could grow into one of the major challenges to U.S. national interests over the coming decades, little progress appears to have been made in devising a comprehensive policy toward that country.

In the area of intelligence, no evidence has come to light of the successful employment of the CIA's reconstituted capability for covert action. In Afghanistan, resistance leaders continue to complain of inadequacies in the supply of portable anti-air missiles and other munitions; these problems are widely believed to reflect opposition within State and CIA to a more active U.S. role in the country, in spite of a considerable amount of support for it in Congress. In Libya, apparent CIA efforts to work against the regime of Muammar Qaddafi have gone nowhere. In the area of counterintelligence, fierce resistance from the State Department has until recently stalled efforts to come to grips with the Soviet bloc intelligence presence in the United States; despite a series of well-publicized espionage disasters, the FBI and the CIA have been slow to cooperate in administration efforts to improve analytic and organizational capabilities for counterintelligence.

In one of the most critical sectors of national security policy, arms control, the disarray in administration policymaking is palpable and well-documented. Fundamental and persisting disagreements between the departments of State and Defense over approaches to U.S.-Soviet arms control questions have led to a situation marked by paralysis of normal bureaucratic procedures and spasmodic, ad hoc decision-making at the top. That the administration lacks a strategy linking arms control to U.S. defense planning was evident in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) joined the Nato defense ministers in questioning the president's proposal to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet nuclear-armed ballistic missiles within ten years. Incredible as it might seem, it later turned out that the JCS had not had an opportunity to analyze the military implications of the administration positions presented at Reykjavik.

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The Reykjavik summit also pointed up the hesitancies and inconsistencies that have tended to mark U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in general. Prior to Reykjavik, administration spokesmen pledged that any summit meeting would be "well-prepared" and would deal with the entire range of U.S.-Soviet issues, including regional matters such as Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Yet the U.S. side was manifestly unprepared for the negotiating session on arms control in which it allowed itself to become involved; and regional and human rights issues were wholly lost from sight in the course of the talks. The administration's failure—in spite of repeated expressions of presidential interest—to link regional issues (and Soviet arms control violations) to ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations is a general and persistent one, and symptomatic of the ascendancy of the State Department in administration policymaking in this critical area.

Finally, despite significant improvements in the nation's military posture since 1980, the systemic weaknesses of the U.S. defense establishment have increasingly drawn telling commentary and calls for reform from observers across the political spectrum. Even the Grenada action suffered, in the view of many critics, from interservice competition, command and communications failures, and inept planning. Widely acknowledged inadequacies in the areas of resource allocation, defense procurement, and strategic direction of the armed forces have recently led to congressional action to strengthen the JCS chairman and staff and to efforts to reform the defense acquisition process, improve strategic and resource planning, and improve the organization and management of capabilities for low intensity conflict. It is scarcely to the administration's credit that many of these reforms have been merely tolerated when not actively opposed by the Department of Defense and the White House.

HOW does one explain all this? It has to be recalled that the first Reagan administration came into power pledging to return to "cabinet government" after a decade of controversy over the role of the president's National Security Adviser and the powers of the presidency generally. Unlike other recent presidents who made such a promise, Reagan has kept it. He has remained committed to a system involving relatively autonomous cabinet departments and a White House staff of greatly reduced authority. This has been particularly evident in the national security area, where the departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have evolved into baronies headed by strong and long-tenured presidential appointees, while a succession of National Security Advisers (five in six years) has had to operate under a variety of personal handicaps and in a White House environment of indifference or positive hostility.

Despite the animus against bureaucracy in the nation at large, there is a persisting tendency both in and out of Washington to accept at face value the claims of the various national security agencies that they perform their tasks with professional competence and political neutrality. The military, with its unique operational requirements, highly specialized technical skills, and traditionally apolitical outlook, has the best claim in this regard, though ironically it has always been viewed as the bureaucracy most in need of political control. But the intelligence community likes to see itself as a repository of objective knowlege of international affairs, a sort of national university, to be preserved from any taint of association with the policies of the administration in power, and the State Department (more precisely, the Foreign Service) continues to cultivate an image of itself as an elite professional corps, uniquely qualified to conduct the nation's foreign relations.

These self-evaluations are echoed by academic and journalistic observers of American politics, though in selective and opportunistic fashion. Thus the White House will be deemed unable or unworthy to pass judgment on matters within the professional competence of the Department of State or the

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CIA when these organizations are pushing or supporting an attractive policy line (for example, when the CIA publishes estimates of decreased Soviet military spending). But by the same token, the president will be excoriated for failing to override the proclivities of career diplomats in politically charged areas such as Middle East policy, or of intelligence professionals when they undertake such activities as the mining of Nicaraguan harbors.

It should not be necessary to make the elementary point that the president, as the nation's highest elected official, has not only the right but the duty to ensure that the policies with which he has identified himself publicly are fully reflected in the operations of the executive branch of the government. In our constitutional scheme, there is no basis for federal agencies to act autonomously in derogation of the power of the president. Unfortunately, it has been the universal experience of those who have worked in and studied modern American government that bureaucratic behavior is driven by fundamental pathologies. Given this fact, it is natural to ask whether or to what extent the pathologies of bureaucracy can be treated by presidential action, since the president is uniquely positioned and empowered to affect what happens in the agencies that formally report to him.

That so little attention has been paid to the general issue of the proper scope of presidential power and action during the Reagan years is surprising only at first sight. Contemporary American conservatism remains profoundly ambivalent about the presidency as an institution. For many years, presidential power was viewed on all sides as the chosen instrument for the implementation of the liberal agenda in American politics. Even the ostensibly conservative Richard Nixon failed to employ the presidency in the service of conservative domestic or foreign policies; moreover, the abuses of presidential power committed in his name were at least as repugnant to many conservatives as they were to liberals. Ronald Reagan has clearly remained sensitive to the legacy of the "imperial presidency," and deliberately avoided both the appearance and the reality of an activist and commanding presidential role; conservatives have not attempted to challenge this stance. At the same time, liberals have long ceased viewing the presidency as their institution of choice. Congress, the media, the courts, and the bureaucracy have all proven more promising vehicles for the advancement of liberal policies. Paradoxically, the very success of the Reagan presidency has contributed to the prolongation of the crisis of presidential leadership that began with Watergate. Because liberals and conservatives alike have for their own reasons been satisfied with a limited presidency, and because that limited presidency has proven highly effective in a political sense, there have been few incentives on any side to reopen the question of the powers and role of the presidential office.

But there is little reason to expect this situation to persist under Reagan's successor, whether Democrat or Republican. For conservatives, the question will arise whether the conservative agenda, under a Republican president lacking Reagan's broad personal appeal, can make any further headway without the presidency itself being made institutionally stronger. For liberal Democrats, recovery of the presidency would pose new opportunities; with a Senate that is heavily if not predominantly Republican, an activist president might be necessary to capitalize fully on those opportunities. When consideration is given to current trends in the judicial branch, it is entirely conceivable that liberals will once again come to look favorably on measures to augment the power of the presidency.

A comprehensive discussion of the presidency today would have to devote considerable attention to recent developments in executive-congressional relations. There is no doubt that Congress is afflicted by pathologies at least as disabling as those of the executive branch. Overlapping and unclear committee jurisdictions, lack of overall discipline and leadership, proliferation of staffs, mishandling of sensitive information, micro-

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management, wholly unrealistic reporting requirements, and an incomprehensible and chaotic budget process are widely acknowledged problems. Equally troubling is the growing tendency for congressmen to assume essentially executive roles in critical foreign and defense policy areas such as nuclear force planning and arms control, and to ignore traditional constraints on independent dealing with foreign governments. It is almost certainly fair to say that the imbalance in the executive-congressional relationship that resulted from Watergate has not only not been corrected, but in important areas has worsened substantially.

Also of considerable relevance for understanding the limitations on presidential power today is the role of the national media. "Decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch"—such were the terms chosen by Alexander Hamilton to illustrate the characteristics of executive "energy." The bureaucracy and the Congress create problems in all of these areas, but secrecy is surely most threatened from the quarter of the media. Through the power they have asserted over the communication of information derived from or concerning the federal government, the media have become willy-nilly an important player in national politics. The extent to which this development has constrained and distorted policy-making within the executive branch itself is insufficiently understood. Again, the remarkable success of Ronald Reagan in dealing with the media has only served to conceal an intractable problem that challenges in a fundamental way the authority and effectiveness of the presidency as an institution.

Nevertheless, it can be argued that the challenges to the presidency posed by Congress and the media are second-order issues. What is truly fatal to presidential power is not so much Congress and the media by themselves, but Congress and the media in alliance with elements within the federal bureaucracy. This is particularly the case in the national security area, where the bureaucracy has a monopoly on the relevant information and primary responsibility for the development of policy. When important elements within the national security bureaucracy are out of step with the president's views or initiatives, they are strategically positioned to thwart him simply by premature or partial disclosure of sensitive information to similarly-minded congressional and media contacts. It will be said that such leaks are inevitable under any circumstances. Yet the fact is that the porousness of the American bureaucracy today is unique in the world, is almost certainly worse than it was ten years ago, and is much worse than it was prior to Watergate. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that leaks tend to come from relatively high levels within agencies. This suggests a serious breakdown in the effectiveness of presidential control over political appointees as well as the senior career bureaucracy.

IF ONE LOOKS at the history of the modern presidency, it is immediately evident that different presidents have had very different approaches to the problem of managing the bureaucracy. At first sight, these approaches seem to derive entirely from individual presidential styles. Yet there is also a certain logic to their development over time. Franklin Roosevelt employed a highly personalized approach that sought to maximize presidential control through fragmentation of bureaucratic authority and active encouragement of conflict between individuals and agencies with unclear or overlapping mandates. Eisenhower sought to create a system of presidential management modelled to some extent on military staff procedures, but the formal centralization of the interagency structure he effected did not and was not intended to limit in significant ways the prerogatives of individual agencies. Kennedy dismantled the Eisenhower-era interagency machinery, and returned to an informal and personalized approach relying on presidential advisers, ad hoc task forces, and a greater degree of operational involvement by the president himself; Lyndon Johnson's approach was similar. Richard Nixon sought to re-establish an orderly and centrally-man-

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aged interagency process, but with stronger policy leadership from the White House (thus synthesizing the best aspects of the Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson systems). For a variety of reasons, including Nixon's personal style and congressional resistance, his attempt to assert control over the bureaucracy was soon abandoned in favor of a unique White House-centered system operating largely independently of the agencies. The fiasco of Watergate served to discredit such an approach, which came to be identified with the "imperial presidency"; and there was a substantial devolution of authority to the bureaucracy under the Ford and Carter administrations. In the Carter period, the pendulum swung back in the direction of increased White House control, under the impact of a strong National Security Adviser and a president strongly committed to rational management and interested in the details of administration; but the institutional mechanisms to support such control were never developed or effectively operated. With the election of Ronald Reagan, an effort was made to develop formal and centralized interagency mechanisms. But it was decided at the same time to rely on political appointees in the agencies rather than a strong White House staff to ensure loyal implementation of the president's policies.

This very rapid and schematic survey of the presidential-bureaucratic relationship should suffice to make the fundamental point that, with the partial exception of a brief period under Richard Nixon, no modern president has even attempted to assume control over the bureaucracy through institutional means. The presidents most interested in exercising policy leadership have used their power in highly personal ways, and have sought to control the bureaucracy by essentially negative methods—by some combination of bureaucratic fragmentation and alliances with or penetrations of subordinate bureaucratic levels. By contrast, except for Nixon, the presidents most interested in institutional management have not cared to assert themselves strongly in a policymaking role.

It is not overly misleading to say that the Reagan approach represents fundamentally a return to the Eisenhower system of presidential governance. The principal difference is that the presidency of Ronald Reagan has a much more coherent ideological basis and strategic objectives that require more radical change in existing political attitudes and institutions. Accordingly, it was recognized from the beginning that presidential control of the bureaucracy would require special efforts. But it was thought to be sufficient to use the presidential appointment power for this purpose rather than a White House staff system. A question can be raised as to the real effectiveness of White House efforts to secure control of the agencies through political appointments—particularly in the national security area, where the foreign service and intelligence guilds now enjoy very considerable autonomy. But the more fundamental question is whether an administration with a political agenda as radical as that of the Reagan administration can afford to deny itself the advantages of a strong White House system exercising both positive leadership and negative control of the bureaucracy.

THERE CAN BE little doubt that the decision to forgo a strong White House staff and thus—or so it was assumed—avoid serious bureaucratic infighting between the president's men and the agencies reflected in considerable measure the personal style of Ronald Reagan. A preference for consensus as distinct from sharply defined options and personal confrontation seems characteristic of Reagan. Yet a strong preference for consensus is characteristic of most recent American presidents, and appears to go beyond personal predilection. It seems to be an authentic American cultural trait—a reflection of American management style and personal behavior generally.

But is management by consensus truly possible in the federal government, particularly in the case of national security agencies with long traditions of independence and mutual hostility? This question is closely

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akin to the question Henry Kissinger has posed concerning the efficacy of a foreign policy based on negotiation alone. Just as the use or threat of force may give nations incentives to negotiate, while their renunciation may encourage intransigence and make agreement impossible, management by consensus creates strong incentives for bureaucratic recalcitrance. It makes it more difficult to resolve issues at appropriate levels and encourages obstruction and delay. Where powerful agencies have conflicting positions, disputes may fester for extended periods of time before the president is able to take action to resolve them. Furthermore, such an approach tends to give great leeway to agencies in interpreting the meaning of decisions taken and the manner of implementing them. All of these factors work, paradoxically, to exacerbate bureaucratic conflict rather than to minimize it.

But is management by consensus after all really desirable? This question is usually posed in terms of the relative advantages of an interagency system that produces agreed recommendations and one that produces options for presidential deliberation. Overlooked in all this, however, is the possibility that the option that is most likely to satisfy the president is not likely to be offered up by any agency, whether by itself or in coalition with others. What is involved here is much more than a matter of technical formats and procedures. It is the fundamental question of whether there is a presidential perspective that is truly distinct from that of the agencies and their executives.

This is certainly the case. The president combines in his person the functions of national political leader, chief administrator of the national government, chief diplomat, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. No lower level of government is empowered or able to discharge more than one of these functions; and the function of political leadership is exercised by the president alone. The perspective of the president is a unique one, finally, because the president alone is in a position to integrate the various elements of national power and exercise strategic leadership of the nation.

Obvious as this idea may seem, it is very far from reflecting either the theory or the practice of the presidency in recent times. It can certainly be argued that the Reagan presidency has adopted a more strategic approach to domestic governance than its recent predecessors, and successfully asserted presidential leadership both of the domestic policy agencies and of the nation as a whole. In the national security area, however, the situation is different. As former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski observed prior to the current Iran-inspired troubles, the Reagan administration has failed to develop a "grand design" for dealing with the major foreign policy challenges facing it. According to him:

> This condition is due in part to the president's own style of leadership and in part to the continuing dilution of effective executive control over foreign policy in the American system as a whole. The president has not imposed a systematic top-down decision-making system either on the executive branch as a whole or on his associates. . . . Today, the decision-making process at the very top is institutionally more fragmented than at any point since World War II.

Henry Kissinger has recently referred in a similar vein to "the long-standing failure of the machinery for developing national strategy."

In view of the current congressional alarums over a strong and active National Security Council staff, it is especially ironic that Congress passed legislation last fall that explicitly recognizes the need for NSC leadership in the area of low intensity conflict—that is, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations and counterterrorism. Congress has shown increasing recognition of the endemic weakness of the national security establishment in political-military planning or strategy generally. A National Strategy Act also passed in 1986 requires the president to submit an annual report to Congress laying out the strategic rationale for his defense and foreign affairs budget requests. Most impor-

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tant, congressional efforts over the last several years to strengthen the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the JCS staff have been motivated in substantial part by recognition of the need for a more powerful institutional instrument for the development of national military strategy.

WHAT ROLE should the National Security Adviser and the NSC staff have in the management of national security? What has been said so far suggests that the recent debate over the NSC role has misconceived the real issue. Far from arguing an NSC staff grown overly powerful or out of control, the Iran operation pointed to the opposite problem—the inability of the White House to ensure effective implementation of its policies by the bureaucracy. Specifically, it indicated a lack of presidential confidence in the ability of the State Department to operate discreetly and in a direction uncongenial to its policy predilections (that is to say, its habitual pro-Arab tilt). Present and past discussions of the NSC role have generally reflected highly unrealistic assumptions about the national security bureaucracy; as a result, they have failed to identify critical fault-lines in national security policymaking that demand strong White House leadership. The key fault-line, as indicated above, is political-military affairs, especially arms control and low intensity conflict. Other fault-lines include strategic economics, space policy, emergency preparedness, and counterintelligence.

But the truly critical element that is missing from standard discussions of the NSC is the idea of strategy. The NSC role cannot be that of mere "coordination" of agency perspectives because the presidential office has a unique perspective that transcends the agencies. Given bureaucratic realities, the task of formulating national strategy can only be performed within the White House; it certainly cannot be performed by the Department of State. Contrary to the common view, therefore, the NSC must go beyond "coordination" to direct involvement in the business of all the national security communities—yet in a carefully delimited way. Because the sphere of national strategy belongs to the president alone, and at the same time affects in fundamental ways the business of every federal agency, the president inevitably stands in a relationship of potential conflict with the bureaucracy as a whole. At the same time, if he does the job that is properly his, the president cannot dispense with the bureaucracy. The short-lived experiment of the Nixon presidency with the White House as an operational alternative to the State Department failed deservedly. The president must be able to rely on the bureaucracy to translate into operational terms and into reality the strategy guidance it is his business to provide.

The central function of the NSC, then, should be strategic planning. This is by no means to suggest that the NSC should plan in a bureaucratic vacuum, but merely that it should have primary responsibility for the development of national strategy in cooperation with the appropriate agencies. However, such planning can only be effective if the NSC is given an authority commensurate with this responsibility. Precisely because of the inescapable tension between the NSC perspective and the perspective of the bureaucracy as a whole, the NSC needs to be armed with clear authority to manage the interagency policy process. Lack of such authority has been a major if underappreciated factor in many of the failures of omission or commission of the Reagan administration's national security policy. To a considerable extent, this reflects a failure on the part of the president himself and his immediate staff to view the NSC as a unique instrument of the presidency rather than as simply another national security agency. The NSC should not be allowed to dictate to other agencies, but neither should it be subject to the rule of bureaucratic consensus. There is no reason whatever why the NSC cannot and should not be granted full authority to run the national security policy process, including the chairmanship of key committees and control of the drafting of all presidential decision

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documents. What is more, the NSC must reserve to itself the right to bring before the president substantive policy options that go beyond anything proposed by particular agencies.

But what about an NSC operational role? It is probably safe to say that no one believes the NSC staff is a proper instrument for conducting diplomacy or covert action. If the analysis offered here is correct, however, the president will always have strong incentives to resort to his National Security Adviser for operational advice if not direct action on a range of controversial or bureaucratically intractable issues. It is almost certainly not desirable for the NSC to be extensively involved in operational matters. At the same time, it needs to be recognized that the NSC has certain necessary and proper operational functions that reflect the specific character and functions of the presidential office itself. These functions have been remarkably neglected in most discussions of the NSC role, and it is fair to say that their implementation has been unsystematic when not simply inadequate. They are:

- Routine staff support and information. This includes management of the flow of intelligence to the president and national-level record keeping and information management. Over the last several years, the arrival of the computer age at the NSC has revolutionized its capabilities in this area.
- Personnel management. Because of his unique access to sensitive diplomatic and intelligence information, the NSC Adviser is necessarily in the position of monitoring and assessing the job performance of senior officials throughout the national security bureaucracy. He should be granted explicit authority to do so and to make recommendations to the president concerning the disciplining of officials who are incompetent or who deliberately work against established national policy.
- Speechwriting. Presidential speeches are an important instrument of presidential leadership and national strategy. The NSC (working with the president's personal speechwriters) should have full control over the mechanics of preparing presidential speeches. By the same token, it should have authority to review major speeches by senior agency officials as to form, timing, and substance.
- Personal representation and negotiation. The NSC Adviser may properly be used as the president's representative in dealings with Congress, and—extraordinarily—in negotiations with foreign governments on sensitive diplomatic, military, or intelligence matters. It should be noted that this applies primarily to the Adviser himself rather than the NSC staff as a whole, since the Adviser's personal prestige and credibility is a key argument for such a role. To deny the president this option, given the current porosity and lack of discipline of the national security bureaucracy, is to deny him an instrumentality that is potentially critical for the carrying out of his constitutional responsibilities.
- Staff support for diplomatic requirements. The NSC should have full authority to manage the president's personal relations with foreign leaders. It should have the lead in all summit preparations, and should have policy and (where feasible and appropriate) operational responsibilities for all presidential communications to foreign leaders, including sensitive channels such as the U.S.-Soviet Direct Communications Link ("Hotline").
- Staff support for military requirements. The NSC has a number of vital functions in support of the president in his role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. It should have some oversight responsibility for the White House Military Office, particularly with respect to nuclear retaliatory options and procedures and presidential command, control, and communications for crisis and wartime. It should be centrally involved in government-wide planning for ensuring the continuity of governmental functions and national preparedness in emergencies and war. And it should be prepared to act as an essentially civilian wartime staff to the president.
- Crisis management. That this is preeminently a White House or NSC function

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has been recognized at least since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Where decisions must be made quickly and where disciplined coordination of different agencies is essential, only the president or a proximate representative can ensure that this will occur. Moreover, where the use of military force is imminent or possible, the president is directly involved in his capacity as commander-in-chief, and his relationship to the bureaucracy in general shifts toward a stance of command. The NSC should by the same token have commensurate authority concerning procedures for crisis management as well as the implementation of presidential decisions in crises.

WHAT are the implications of all this for the composition of the NSC staff and the status of the National Security Adviser?

A few points are essential. First, the National Security Adviser should not be—indeed, by the nature of his position he cannot be—a simple bureaucratic technician. He must have substantive competence in the discipline that is critical for the performance of the NSC's key function—namely, strategy. What is required here are not so much conventional academic credentials or government service as a genuinely strategic habit of mind. Second, the NSC Adviser must have or develop a direct and close relationship with the president. The NSC must view itself and be viewed as an extension of the president, not as simply another part of the bureaucracy. This means, among other things, that the Adviser must share the president's basic political outlook and view of the world, that he must have direct access to the president at all times, and that he must have authority to speak for and represent the president in dealing with the cabinet and with Congress. In particular, it is a fatal handicap for the Adviser to be visibly subordinate to a White House chief of staff—as has unfortunately been the rule under the current administration (the exception occurred during the tenure of NSC Adviser William Clark).

The NSC is not simply a part of the bureaucracy, yet it is surely a part of the bureaucracy in some sense. The NSC has a critical function to perform in managing the national security decision process for the bureaucracy as a whole. Accordingly, the NSC Adviser and his staff are in need of bureaucratic as well as strategic skills. It would be as wrong to staff the NSC with political appointees lacking bureaucratic experience as it would to staff it with bureaucrats lacking political sensitivity or strategic competence. Some mixture of the two is called for by the nature of the organization. Unfortunately, this issue has been clouded by the tendency of administration critics to blame all its problems on "ideologues" in the White House or the agencies—as if there is no difference in the job performance of conservatives who possess knowledge and experience in a particular area and those who do not. The notion that the NSC's ineffectiveness in recent years is owing to its dominance by ill-informed "ideologues" is in any case simply wrong. If anything, there has been a persistent failure to exercise effective civilian or political control of the staff through the appointment of sufficiently senior individuals with demonstrated expertise as well as loyalties and a breadth of outlook that transcend the bureaucracy. It should not be necessary to add that the requirement of "civilian control" applies to foreign service and intelligence personnel as well as military officers.

There has been sporadic discussion in recent years of the wisdom of making the National Security Adviser position subject to confirmation by the Senate. Insofar as the NSC performs a unique and vital institutional mission within the federal government, an argument for confirmation of the Adviser can certainly be made. As just indicated, however, the NSC can only function properly if it acts as an immediate extension of the president. Particularly in the current climate, any assertion of congressional prerogative concerning the staffing and organization of the NSC can only serve to weaken still further the president's already tenuous grip

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on the national security bureaucracy. Leaving aside the constitutional aspects of the issue, the burdens and restrictions that would inevitably be placed on an NSC that had become answerable to Congress as well as the president would, as a practical matter, deprive the organization of much of its utility.

There is, however, a constructive role for Congress to play with respect to the NSC. Congress should explicitly acknowledge the necessary and proper functions of the NSC, provide public and (where appropriate) legislative support for measures to strengthen the institutional character of the NSC staff, and consider changes in its own practices so as to facilitate rational decision-making in both branches in the all-important area of national strategy. Reform of this kind is not a partisan issue. Congress has demonstrated as much in its bipartisan effort over the last several years to strengthen the role of the JCS chairman and staff, as well as in the recently passed National Strategy Act. Strengthening the presidency as an institution may benefit the Republicans in the short run; but Democrats may draw comfort from the fact that a strong presidency is vital for maintaining control of bureaucracies—the military and the intelligence community—whose autonomy is a traditional cause of concern on the left. More generally, responsible observers of all political stripes recognize that a strong presidency is essential for maintaining the affection of allies and the respect of adversaries, as well as the support of the American public for measures that are never popular even when they are recognized as necessary.

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If Labour Wins

Brian Walden

THE American people must be growing accustomed to the ingratitude of their allies. New Zealand and Australia want a relationship with the U.S. that is basically one-sided, involving no real commitment to assist the Americans in return for American help if anything goes seriously wrong. But if informed opinion in the U.S. is smarting at rebuffs in the antipodes, that is nothing to what is coming if the Labour party wins the next general election in Britain (which must take place sometime before June 1988). Labour intends to pursue the policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament in its most outlandish form, not merely abandoning Britain's independent nuclear deterrent, but taking away battlefield nuclear weapons from the Rhine Army and compelling the U.S. to close its nuclear bases in Britain.

Many Americans of my acquaintance, including some who are influential in determining American foreign policy, do not seem to grasp the nature of the threat British unilateralism poses to the effective defense of Western Europe. To them it is unthinkable that any British government could have a defense policy they regard as simply crazy. They are only too eager to accept the private assurances of men like Mr. Denis Healey that unilateralism will not be carried into effect if Labour becomes the government. Mr. Healey is deceiving his American friends, because to some extent he is deceiving himself. He knows the position is worse than he says it is, but he does not grasp how completely the modern Labour party rejects his own view of the world. I state, unequivocally, that if Labour comes to power in Britain with an absolute majority in the House of Commons, Britain will go unilateralist and after a brief and meaningless "technical" dialogue will insist upon the closure of American nuclear bases on British soil.

To understand how such a situation could have come about, it is necessary to understand the British Labour party and the internal changes it has undergone in the last twenty years. American policymakers should get out of their heads images of Attlee, Gaitskell, Wilson, and Callaghan. These men have bequeathed no legacy to today's Labour party, which is not in the business of modifying or refining their pro-American stance, but, on the contrary, is opposed to it in all its fundamentals. Any mention of Gaitskell or Wilson's defense policy is guaranteed to evoke a storm of hisses and boos at a Labour party conference. If I could take an analogy from American history, it is like the reaction of the supporters of William Jennings Bryan to the name of Grover Cleveland. Just as

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Cleveland was repudiated by the Democratic party in 1896, so the Labour party of today rejects any attempt at multilateral nuclear disarmament in cooperation with the United States. Within the Labour party that policy is as dead as a doornail.

The rot set in during the 1960s as some of the larger trade unions, like the massive Transport and General Workers Union, swung to the left. The constituency Labour parties have been mainly left-wing since World War II. This is where the dedicated socialists and ferocious anti-Americans are to be found, but until the 1960s most trade unions supported the Labour party's right-wing leadership. As early as 1960 the Labour party conference voted for unilateral nuclear disarmament, but by twisting the arms of trade union leaders Hugh Gaitskell was able to get the vote reversed at the conference of 1961. The successful outcome of the Cuban missile crisis damped down unilateralist sentiment for a number of years, though the war in Vietnam stoked up anti-American feeling throughout Western Europe.

It was already apparent by the time Harold Wilson became leader of the Labour party in 1963 that the party was irrevocably divided between progressives, who accepted capitalism and supported Nato, and Marxists and quasi-Marxists who did not. A small group of us throughout the 1960s begged every leading personality in the Labour party to take some decisive action to resolve the situation. We warned that if nothing was done the drift to the left would accelerate and the moderates would eventually lose control of the Labour party. We received many smiles, some kind words, but no action whatsoever. Labour's leaders wanted government jobs and were prepared to gamble on holding their ramshackle coalition together long enough to gratify their personal ambitions. One senior figure told me, over an enjoyable dinner, that he agreed with my analysis of the state of the Labour party. What he proposed to do was hold every office he was offered and then, when his time ran out and he retired, to sever all connection with his former colleagues. I derived some wry amusement from watching him carry out his program to the letter.

It may well be that it was foolish to believe that the Labour party was capable of being reformed even if the will had existed to attempt the task. Gradually I came to realize that to talk of a moderate socialist party was a contradiction in terms. During the 1970s left-wingers of every stripe poured into the Labour party, and under their unremitting pressure the cowardly leadership permitted constitutional changes that handed the party over to the left. The parliamentary Labour party ceased to have the sole right to select the leader, and M.P.s became subject to re-selection by their local constituency Labour party. This latter change gave the constituency left-wingers all the power they needed to intimidate their Member of Parliament. Those few brave spirits who held out against the tide were either de-selected, or induced to retire. Michael Foot, a convinced unilateralist and left-wing socialist, became leader of the Labour party after the retirement of Jim Callaghan, defeating an astonished Denis Healey who had chosen to blind himself to everything that was happening around him.

With Michael Foot as leader, multilateral nuclear disarmament disappeared as an opinion held within the Labour party. The change to unilateralism was complete and amazingly rapid. It seemed as if one month half the parliamentary Labour party and half the trade unions were multilateralists and the next month it was impossible to find more than a pitiful handful who had stayed true to their convictions. Since Neil Kinnock replaced Michael Foot as leader, after the electoral disaster of 1983, all public resistance to unilateralism within the Labour party has ceased. Men like the deputy-leader, Roy Hattersley, who once assured me in a television interview that he could not serve in a unilateralist government, now never mention the subject at all. Some, like Denis Healey, the Gromyko of the Labour party, have stooped to pretending that they see great merit in unilateral disarmament, because of

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profound changes they claim to have detected in world events and American policy. When pressed to elaborate, they abuse President Reagan in the grossest terms, implying that he is a dangerous warmonger, who is deliberately provoking the USSR into a European nuclear war. Behind the back of their hand, they whisper to their old friends not to take anything they say on the subject too literally.

IT IS VITAL that Americans understand the true situation inside the British Labour party, because by doing so they will save themselves a lot of grief. It is pointless to try to talk the Labour leaders out of their commitment to unilateral nuclear disarmament. They are pledged to the hilt and the slightest wavering on the issue would be equivalent to signing their own political death warrants in the Labour party. Not that Neil Kinnock is motivated personally by any calculation of self-interest. He is a lifelong and most sincere unilateralist, who cannot understand the arguments against a British government pursuing such a course of action. A member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, he regards unilateral nuclear disarmament as a simple moral choice, and to have the power to carry it out and not to do so is for him unimaginable. Mr. Kinnock also happens to be a great hater of capitalism. Insofar as he draws any ethical distinction between the U.S. and the USSR, he inclines to the belief that the Russians can behave foolishly, whereas capitalist America is inherently motivated towards international evil. Surveying the Berlin Wall, he denounced the "stupidity" of its erection, but his attacks on American policy in Central America are suffused with genuine moral outrage.

It ought not be supposed that Mr. Kinnock is going to race to victory in the British general election because of his unilateralism. His defense policy is not popular with the voters, for there is considerable sensitivity in Britain to American reactions to British unilateral nuclear disarmament. Even some unilateralists are apprehensive about the effect the policy will have upon the American commitment to defend Western Europe. These doubts do not center on Britain giving up her own nuclear deterrent. It is recognized that the U.S. may not care overmuch whether Britain has an independent deterrent or not. But how can a British government expel American nuclear weapons bases in Britain and not undermine American nuclear strategy? And how can Britain cooperate meaningfully in Nato's land defense, which involves battlefield nuclear weapons, if British troops are not allowed to have them? The curious may want to know how the rank and file of the Labour party answer these questions. They do not bother to answer them, because the majority of Labour activists are neutralists, who would be delighted to see Britain leave Nato. This is not the official line of the Labour party, in part because even the Healeys and Hattersleys of this world might balk at it, but more importantly because most voters favor Nato and would be alarmed by any suggestion of leaving it.

It is often claimed that unilateralism taps into a deep strain of anti-Americanism in the British character. I believe that is a shallow judgment, which could mislead American policymakers if taken at face value. The true situation is far more complex and its separate threads need to be disentangled. Socialists are anti-American, not so much because they have studied the details of American global strategy and disagree fundamentally with it, but because the U.S. is seen by them as the most successful capitalist society and they are opposed to anything it does. The average Briton has no such ideological fixations. Americans are rather popular in Britain, where a common language and lifestyles that yearly become more similar act as a strong bond between the two peoples. Such anti-Americanism as exists is part of the general British reserve towards foreigners. One hears far more criticism of the French than of the Americans. Much of this anti-foreign feeling hardly rises above the level of cheerful banter. The British do not cherish deep hatreds towards any foreign nation, but have a long tradition of telling tasteless jokes about those

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unfortunate enough not to live on our tight little isle. The only new factor in the situation in recent years is that the British have been taught to regard President Reagan as an incompetent, unstable warmonger. But this anti-Reagan propaganda is common throughout Western Europe. The president's style does not appeal to Europeans and his virtues pass unnoticed. Europeans have a love of satire not shared by Americans, and President Reagan is portrayed as an ignorant cowboy pressing the nuclear button accidentally, while trying to take a nap. Though unpleasant, this kind of thing is not evidence of anti-Americanism, nor will it outlive the Reagan presidency.

The real problem in Britain and, in my opinion, everywhere else in Europe, certainly will outlast President Reagan's term of office. The problem has nothing to do with anti-Americanism and everything to do with generations. Europe has been at peace for forty years and the psychological consequences of this fact become more noticeable every year. In the first place, the gratitude that my generation felt towards the U.S. is not shared by our offspring. They were not part of that overwhelming sense of relief that swept Britain when we heard in 1941 that the Americans had come into the war on our side. As World War II recedes ever deeper into the background, so the kinship built upon a shared suffering loses its potency. The second consequence of a lengthy peace is that it becomes difficult to believe that the Soviet Union has warlike intentions in Europe. Naturally most people do not probe the subtleties of Soviet policy, and I am ashamed to say many of them do not care what the Russians do, as long as they do not do it in Western Europe. Here the global role of the U.S. conflicts with the perceptions of the majority of young Western Europeans. It is easy to see how the young can come to believe that the one threat to peace lies in the escalation of the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. Socialists in Britain often do not scruple to seize upon American comments that can be twisted to imply that the U.S. is planning to fight a limited nuclear war with the Soviet Union in Europe. Fear of the Russians dwindles a little every year and suspicion of the United States grows. Mr. Gorbachev understands this very well and is dedicated to not alarming Western Europe.

None of this should be taken to mean that the average British voter trusts the Soviet leadership, or feels any affection for communism. But the belief that there can be detente between the two armed camps is far stronger in Britain than in the U.S. This can lead to the view that it is the U.S. which is obstructing a deal. I do not believe that the majority hold this opinion, but there is always a danger that they can be persuaded to accept it. That is why American disarmament initiatives which take full account of European needs and political realities are so important. The best thing that could happen to the Nato alliance is that Prime Minister Thatcher, during her Moscow visit, should secure the outline of a deal from Mr. Gorbachev and that the Reagan administration should follow up this opening with enthusiasm. Mrs. Thatcher is America's best friend in Europe, and a diplomatic success for her will strengthen Nato and increase American popularity.

If Thatcher and Kinnock represent the difference between success and disaster for the Nato alliance, the middle ground in British politics should offer some mild encouragement to American policymakers. It is true that the Liberal party is wholly unreliable as far as nuclear weapons are concerned and voted for unilateralism at its 1986 conference. The Liberal leader, David Steel, managed to get this decision reversed, but only because he has an electoral pact with the Social Democrats. Fortunately, the Social Democratic party is well supplied with pro-Americans and supporters of multilateral disarmament, especially at its top level. The leader of the SDP, Dr. David Owen, is a former foreign secretary and an inveterate opponent of unilateralism. The Social Democratic leadership broke away from the Labour party at the beginning of the 1980s, in company with Roy Jenkins, the former president of the EEC.

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The Labour party's unilateralism and anti-Americanism were important contributory factors to the rupture. The Social Democrats are the true heirs of Attlee and Gaitskell and thus greatly value Britain's relationship with the U.S. They have proved to be poor campaigners in Labour areas and have made only an insignificant dent in the Labour vote. Ironically, they have had more appeal in Conservative districts, especially among Tories who find Mrs. Thatcher too capitalistic in her inclinations.

Though the Social Democrats give no indication that they are likely to replace Labour as the party of the left, their defection has undoubtedly impaired Labour's intellectual respectability. This is particularly true in foreign affairs, where Dr. Owen and Mr. Jenkins plainly dwarf Mr. Kinnock in both experience and expertise. The British voters are vaguely aware of this fact, though like voters the world over they tend to cast their vote in accordance with their opinions on domestic issues. The value of the Social Democrats is that if no single party has a majority in the next House of Commons, they can be relied upon to prevent Britain from being unilaterally disarmed. Almost certainly the Liberal party will follow this lead, if not from conviction, then as a matter of electoral expediency.

I WOULD give an entirely false impression to an American audience if I divorced the subject of unilateralism from the mighty struggle which is going on to make Britain an effective capitalist society. Logically there is no connection between the two matters, but in the minds of many British people they are intimately related. Margaret Thatcher has broken an inter-party consensus that had existed since 1945, which made Britain a strange hybrid society—partly capitalist and partly socialist. The attempt to resolve this contradiction has envenomed British politics and brought about stark distinctions in foreign and defense policy as well as in domestic affairs. The good news is that Mrs. Thatcher seems to be succeeding. The bad news is that voters usually prefer an amiable muddle to a clear choice. If the British voted for their preference in defense policy, there is not the slightest doubt that Mrs. Thatcher would win. But the resentments engendered by her radical actions in economic policy may defeat her. I think that is unlikely, but it is not something that anyone can afford to take for granted.

Put bluntly, the Anglo-American relationship and the future of Nato depend upon the result of the next British general election. This is not a battle between Republicans and Democrats, with a different emphasis here and a slight change of direction there. American political parties are broadly in agreement about the economic system and about defense policy. In Britain today, the political struggle is about the very nature of the society itself. Our general election will be a civil war without bullets. The common ground between the major parties has disappeared. As in all civil wars, there are plenty of good-natured folk who regret that things have come to such a pass and dream of the accord of yesteryear. But the conflict has become irrepressible and must be resolved.

So our American friends should not be deceived by the surface calm of British life. Though standards are changing, the British, in general, remain an undemonstrative people. Hearts are not worn on sleeves. But just beneath the skin, the British are steeling themselves to make one of the most important choices in their long history. Do not believe anybody who plays down the impact that choice will have on American foreign and defense policy. Either they are trying to fool you, or trying to fool themselves.

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Denis Healey: A Profile

Stephen Haseler

WITHIN A YEAR Britain may well have a Labour government. If it does, the prime minister will be Neil Kinnock, who would be holding the first ministerial position of his career. The foreign secretary, on the other hand, will be Denis Healey, a man of long experience in government with an international reputation as an expert on security questions. As defense secretary for six years in the 1960s, Healey was dealing with the likes of Robert McNamara and Henry Kissinger while Kinnock was still an undergraduate.

Given this discrepancy in experience and expertise, it is reasonable to assume that Healey would play the dominant role in implementing the foreign and defense policies of a new Labour government. And given the nature of those policies—the Labour party is committed to ending America's nuclear presence in Britain and to scrapping the British independent nuclear deterrent—how he would handle that role is of considerable interest to anyone concerned about Western security. In this respect there is much in his background and career—as well as in some of his recent utterances—that deserves careful scrutiny and that inspires less than complete confidence.

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Healey's political life—stretching as it does from the Oxford of the Spanish Civil War and Munich to the age of Reagan and Gorbachev—is marked by considerable ambiguity and by inadequately explained, through deftly handled, discontinuities and sharp shifts of direction. In the early period he was a man of the extreme left, first as a member of the British Communist party and then within the Labour party. In the late 1940s he veered suddenly to the right, becoming a conspicuous cold warrior and a defense expert firmly committed to Nato and deterrence. More recently, Healey's position shifted again. As his party moved to the left in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and as some of the leading moderates departed to form the new Social Democratic party, Healey stayed and—whether from conviction, opportunism, or indifference—accommodated himself to the change. Today, despite his career as one of the intellectual pillars of the Atlantic defense community, he appears to have made his peace with the ascendant nuclear disarmers in the British Labour party and is prepared to espouse and defend their policies. Even if he could change those policies significantly, there is reason to doubt that he would wish to do so.

Denis Healey was born in south London in 1917, but grew up in the north of England after his engineer father was appointed principal of a technical college in Yorkshire. He was a robust, bright boy. According to one account, he ac-

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quired a scar on the knuckle of his right hand by punching the head of a tormentor through the window of a school train. Later, as an undergraduate, he acquired the nickname "Pug," which suggests that his aggressive, overbearing style as a politician was adopted early. As to his brightness, Healey advanced along the accepted meritocratic route to success for exceptionally talented lower middle class boys of his day: a scholarship to Bradford Grammar School, followed in due course by a scholarship to Oxford, culminating in a first class degree (in Classical Greats) and an offer to stay on at the university as a research fellow.

Healey's chief academic interest at Oxford was the philosophy of art, but his prominence as an undergraduate derived more from his political interest and activity. In 1937 he joined the Communist party. He played a leading role in the university's left-wing political life, at a time when it was particularly intense. Of course, and as by now a sizable shelf of books serves to remind us, involvement in extreme radical politics was common in Oxford and Cambridge during the decade of depression and fascism. But the pattern that emerges from studies of the likes of Burgess, Philby, and Blunt does not fit Healey. He was not an upper class public school boy turning against his class and family, and there is nothing in either his background or personality to suggest that he suffered from a sense of social guilt. Nor is there anything to suggest an attraction to the clandestine; Healey's communism was open and manifested itself in active, competitive student politics. If there is anything at all in Healey's background that suggests alienation and thus a possible explanation of his attraction to the Communist party, it may be the fact that his father was Irish, from a family of Sinn Fein sympathizers. The Celtic fringes of the United Kingdom have always been greatly overrepresented in the British Communist party.

Healey himself later explained his communist spell thus: "I became a Marxist while I was at Oxford. I read all the basic books, but I never believed in it. It was more a reaction to Nazism than anything else." Yet while Healey's communist experience was quite different from that of the "climate of treason" people, it was considerably more than a mere flirtation. He became chairman of the Oxford University Labour Club while still a communist (these were the days of the Popular Front), and he met his future wife, Edna, in the party. Unlike that of many others, his commitment was strong enough to survive the initial shock of the Soviet invasion of Finland, in 1939. As the historian A.J.P. Taylor recalls those days:

> The University Labour Club, being at the time under Communist domination, opposed support for Finland and was duly disaffiliated by the national Labour Party. . . . Connoisseurs of personalities will be fascinated to learn that among the members of the expelled Labour Club was Denis Healey, and that the champions of democracy were Roy Jenkins and Tony Crosland.

Healey left the Communist party shortly after this and volunteered for the army. He had a distinguished war record, being mentioned in dispatches in Italy and awarded the Medal of the British Empire. He left the army with the rank of major in 1945.

WHILE STILL in the service, Healey was selected *in absentia* as a Labour candidate for the forthcoming general election and, still in uniform, he attended and spoke at the 1945 annual conference of the party in Blackpool. His speech caused a considerable stir at the time, and it still makes interesting reading. It offered an analysis of the war and the situation in Europe at its conclusion that was couched in purely class terms, a war of the rich against the people rather than of the Nazis against the democracies. He equated the wartime liberation movements against Nazi occupation with the struggle for socialism. He maintained, on the basis of what he claimed to have seen as a soldier, that "the upper classes in every country are selfish, depraved, dissolute, and decadent," and that they expected the British army to protect them "against the just wrath

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of the people who have been fighting underground against them for the past four years." (World War II had actually lasted six years and there had been an "underground" of some sort from the very beginning; the reference to "four years" seems to relate, perhaps revealingly, to the involuntary entry of the Soviet Union into the struggle.)

Major Healey carried his class analysis through to policy prescription. He urged that the Labour party should have "a clear foreign policy of its own, which is completely distinct from that of the Tory party." The crucial principle of that policy should be "to protect, assist, encourage, and aid in every way the Socialist revolution wherever it appears." Further—in a passage that, with impressive effrontery, rebuked party leader Clement Attlee for having suggested otherwise—Healey maintained that Labour members should not be "too pious and self-righteous" when "occasionally facts are brought to our notice that our comrades on the Continent are being extremist, that there is danger of a dictatorship of the Left wing being set up." Showing a sound grasp of situational ethics he continued: "If the Labour movement in Europe finds it necessary to introduce a greater degree of police supervision and more immediate and more drastic punishment for their opponents than we in this country would be prepared to tolerate, we must be prepared to understand their point of view."

Healey's 1945 speech seems to indicate that those Marxist "basic books" had influenced him more than he later acknowledged, and that while he had left the Communist party at the beginning of the war, he had moved no great distance from it by the war's end. Over the next few years he did move, though not at the same pace and with the same certainty on all issues.

As a result of the attention his speech attracted, Healey was appointed secretary of the Labour party's International Department in 1945. Harold Laski, the party's leading left-wing ideologue at the time, was one of his chief sponsors for the job. Bearing in mind that a recently victorious Britain had great prestige and influence in the world, and that Labour was soon to be the governing party, it was a job of considerable importance. Among other things, Healey was responsible for drafting party (as opposed to government) statements on foreign policy and for conducting Labour's relations with the socialist and social democratic parties of other countries.

In 1946–47 there was growing criticism on the left of the party of Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin's policy. He was criticized for being subservient to America, hostile to the Soviet Union, and unwilling to take the lead in creating a "third force" based on a European socialist alliance. When this criticism surfaced in *Keep Left*, a pamphlet written by a group of left-wing Labour MPs in 1947, it was Healey who wrote a reply on behalf of the party establishment. His counter-pamphlet *Cards on the Table* was a trenchant and effective defense of Bevin. It asserted that the deterioration in British-Soviet relations was the result of "a sustained and violent offensive against Britain by her Russian ally" and maintained that Moscow was aiming to isolate Britain morally as "a decadent reactionary power." Far from being a neutral actor in a Russian-U.S. conflict, "Britain was the main target of Russian hostility, of which, until a few months ago, America was an undecided spectator." Cooperation with the United States, Healey maintained, was based on pragmatic not ideological grounds.

Although Healey's words were tough, his performance as the liaison between the Labour party and the East European socialist parties during this period was more complicated and ambiguous. Partly, no doubt, this was due to the complexity and ambiguity of the facts themselves (it was often difficult to be sure who were the genuine social democrats and who were Moscow's men in disguise), but it also reflected a continuing inclination on Healey's part to give the Soviet Union the benefit of the doubt. There is an uncomfortable element of truth in Lajos Lederer's subsequent charge that "instead of pointing out that communist policy was to destroy socialism by alliance with it, it was

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official Transport House [i.e., Labour party] policy to support the Eastern European socialists' policy of alliance with the communists." Much later Healey himself explained that, "At first I had the feeling that the Russians had made an unfortunate mistake, and only needed to be told to be sensible. But it soon became apparent that the Soviet system was very different to what its prewar sympathizers had thought it to be."

Actually it was not as soon as all that. In the Poland of 1946, Healey backed the Cyrankiewicz faction (which was to fuse with the communists) rather than the anti-communist socialists. A year later, writing about Hungary in the left-wing journal *Tribune*, he gave credence to communist claims of the danger of "counterrevolution" in that country, claims that were used by the communists to urge unity of action between socialists and themselves. "In many ways," he wrote, "the conditions for [clerical reaction] are more favorable in Hungary today than they were in Austria in 1918"—a strange judgment that scarcely did justice to the efficiency of the Red Army, which utterly dominated the Hungarian scene.

It was not until the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 that Healey rid himself of illusion and uncertainty concerning what was happening in Eastern Europe. Perhaps even then the process was not quite complete. Years afterward he explained those events not as an inevitable consequence of the kind of regime that ruled in Moscow, but as aberrant behavior due to special circumstances: "Stalin was going mad at the time." In any event, 1948 marked a clear shift in Denis Healey's political course. He himself dates his emergence as "an Atlantic Community man" from that time. For more than thirty years that is what he continued to be: someone who accepted the cold war, the Western alliance under American leadership, and nuclear deterrence as facts of life, and who resolutely opposed left-wing neutralism and calls for unilateral nuclear disarmament. When an important volume of *New Fabian Essays* was published in 1952, Healey's contribution rejected the idea of a "socialist foreign policy" which he had specifically espoused at Blackpool in 1945.

THE 1950s saw Healey advance to a prominent position in the Labour party. In 1952 he left the backroom and became a member of parliament (he has represented the Yorkshire city of Leeds ever since). Already well known to party insiders, his reputation grew rapidly and before the end of the decade he was a member of Labour's shadow cabinet. In the bitter conflict between the left-wing Bevanites and the Gaitskellites on the right, which dominated the internal politics of the Labour party in the 1950s, Healey stood with the latter, though he was never quite of them. Unlike his Oxford contemporaries Roy Jenkins and Tony Crosland, he was not personally close to Gaitskell and did not have a taste for the cliquish, coterie politics that characterized the group. His biographers describe him as an unclubbable man, "listening to no one apart from his wife and his own intellect."

Rather like "the best and the brightest" who were soon to set the tone and pace of the Kennedy administration, the Gaitskellites were characterized by an intellectual confidence bordering on arrogance, a faith in brilliance and expertise rather than in experience and soundness of judgment, and a tendency to downgrade traditional political skills (which many of them lacked). By temperament they were essentially men of government, not (like most Bevanites) of opposition. They professed to find the more mundane aspects of party and parliamentary politics boring and enjoyed writing articles for intellectual journals (the recently founded, anti-communist *Encounter* was a favorite vehicle) more than they did attending the functions of what older and more sentimental Labour men called "the Movement."

Healey became the defense and foreign policy specialist of the Gaitskellites, and after Gaitskell became leader he was promoted to foreign policy spokesman in the shadow cab-

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inet. During this period Healey wrote and traveled extensively; by the early 1960s he probably had better connections in the American liberal establishment and in Europe than did any other Labour politician (he developed particularly close relations with Helmut Schmidt). By this time he had also established his credentials as a full member of the small group of Western experts in the arcane field of nuclear strategy.

The message Healey preached to the Labour party at this time was the message of realism and strategic necessity. He supported first use of nuclear weapons, American nuclear bases in Britain, and increased conventional defense for Nato. In a Fabian pamphlet, he attacked the neutralism propagated by a minority on the left as faulty "in its vision of the Soviet system as in some way Socialist," and as based essentially "on the argument that there is nothing to choose between a little of a bad thing and a great deal of a bad thing"—an early recognition of the fallacy of moral equivalence.

Once again, in practice Healey was not always as hawkish as his words. In 1960 Gaitskell faced a serious threat from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, when a combination of pacifists, neutralists, and fellow-travelers, given added moral authority by the leadership of Bertrand Russell, took over not only the streets but Labour's organization. When Gaitskell declined to compromise and vowed in his famous "fight, fight, and fight again" speech that he would split the party rather than change Labour policy, Healey was not at his side. Instead, and against everything that he had been preaching on defense, Healey sided with Gaitskell's rival Harold Wilson in pledging the party to the "irrevocable" abolition of the British bomb. The apparent justification for this *volte face* was the importance of maintaining party unity.

Gaitskell did not forgive Healey, and demoted him from foreign policy spokesman in the shadow cabinet. It seemed that as long as Gaitskell remained leader—at this time his ascendancy was absolute and he seemed certain to be the next prime minister—Healey would remain outside the inner circle of Labour leadership. Gaitskell's sudden death in 1963, however, catapulted Harold Wilson to the fore—and with him Denis Healey. When Wilson became prime minister in 1964, Healey became defense secretary, holding the post for the next six years.

Many British observers welcomed Healey's appointment as that of a sophisticated specialist who was sound on the issues. But some (including this author) were inclined to the view that, as his political background would almost certainly have disqualified him for a top civil service job in the ministry of defense, his appointment was inappropriate. It could not have been an easy decision for the prime minister to appoint a former communist to such a sensitive post, but Wilson so decided, although he lived with charges of double standards for some time afterwards.[1] Healey carved out a prom-

[1]Cabinet ministers in Britain have historically been subject to far less stringent security checks than their civil service subordinates; the greatest pressure for such checks, apparently, has come from American worries rather than domestic concern. An incident from the Attlee era, recounted in Chapman Pincher's *Inside Story*, is representative:

> On receipt of a note from Washington that the USA would discontinue providing any secret defense information if any of his ministers had ever been involved with Communism, [Attlee] called in the ministers who needed to be informed of it. They included John Strachey, the War Minister, who had previously been publicly associated with the Communist party, speaking regularly at Communist rallies, George Strauss, the Supply Minister, and Lord Pakenham (now Lord Longford), both of whom had once been associated with moves to improve cooperation between the Labour and Communist parties.
>
> Attlee read the American note, then snapped, "That doesn't apply to any of you does it?"
>
> Realizing that the question was rhetorical none of them replied.
>
> "Right. Then that settles it," the Prime Minister said and dismissed them from the room.

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inent role for himself during his six-year tenure in Whitehall. He was indeed "Atlantic Man" personified, welcome in Washington and Bonn, admired by East Coast liberals and German Social Democrats, sought after for international conferences and articles in leading journals of opinion, a pillar of the Bilderberg group and a founder of the influential Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He was considered the consummate Nato professional, on top of the facts, secure in his strategic grasp and reasoning.

But Healey's performance was not all of a piece. While he stood for a strong Western defense, the years of his watch saw a rapid shrinking of British foreign policy goals and strategic capabilities. Indeed, if his term had a single theme, it was the adjustment of Britain to a smaller world role. He effectively withdrew Britain from east of Suez by abandoning plans for a new aircraft carrier (a controversial decision that led to the resignation of his deputy Christopher Mayhew). He argued as early as 1966 for the withdrawal of British troops from the Persian Gulf, a policy overruled at the time by the Foreign Office, but accepted soon afterwards, with the result that an area of vital importance to the West was left a strategic vacuum. He also presided over a decline in British defense spending, helping to cut Britain's Nato contribution down to the levels which were to provoke angry American responses in the next decade. While some retrenchment in the overseas projection of British power was inevitable, decisions made during Healey's tenure strengthened rather than opposed the trend.

No defense minister can become the darling of the British grass-roots left, however, even one who does many of the things demanded by it, and Healey's staunch defense of Nato, together with his record from the 1950s, typecast him in internal party politics as "a man of the right." This characterization was reinforced when, after the years of the Heath government, he returned to high office in 1974 as chancellor of the exchequer during Wilson's second term in office. In this capacity he continued to oversee falling British defense spending, but the main event of his term in the eyes of many on the left was the 1976 decision to accept the economic discipline demanded in return for the largest IMF loan ever recorded. While the terms for the loan were not that hard—a more responsible monetary policy and some reductions in projected spending—they were seen by the left as a betrayal of the British Labour movement to the international financial community. The fact that it was Healey who guided the terms for the loan through the cabinet reinforced his image as a stone-faced man of the right.

But in truth, the Healey of the mid-1970s was already a more ambiguous figure than the Healey of the 1950s. Like all Labour leaders, he was caught in a changing party as year after year it slid further and further to the extreme left. Under Tony Benn's influence, the left wing of the party was pushing through constitutional changes; Trotskyite elements were taking over local Labour constituency parties; and Labour's nationalization and defense policies were increasingly radical. The poignant aspect of Healey's career in this period was his attempt to straddle the growing divide within the party. Instead of joining either the leftists or those who were opposing them, on issue after issue—the sort which led to the eventual split in 1981—Healey obfuscated and refused to take sides. The most divisive issue of all was the country's entry into the European Common Market, on which Healey dithered helplessly, switching sides on the question at least four times.

By the end of the miserable 1970s—a decade during which Britain was plagued by political strikes, historically high levels of inflation, racial divisions, and political polarization—Denis Healey had somehow escaped from his past yet again, having substantially erased his image as the "man from the Defense Ministry." It had been replaced, or at least overlaid, by an image of Denis the Loyal, the man who, in a crisis, put "the Movement" first—if necessary, it seemed to many, before conviction, intellectual consistency, or self-respect.

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Denis Healey had his chance to prove this fealty to British socialism in 1980. This was the first year of the Thatcher era, and Labour elected as its leader the unlikely figure of Michael Foot, a veteran Bevanite of romantic temperament and negligible political weight, the first near-pacifist to lead a major party since George Lansbury in the 1930s. Healey had a clear choice. He could start campaigning against the policies of Foot—a campaign that was taken up by others, many of whom eventually left Labour to form the new Social Democratic party—or he could serve on within a party that had become more leftist than the Italian Communist party.

Healey decided to stay. He appears not even to have been tempted by the prospect of leaving. Although the Social Democratic party was launched officially in the spring of 1981, preparations had been underway for two or three years; unlike Roy Hattersley and others who flirted with the idea of joining the SDP before deciding to stay with Labour, Healey's name was never mentioned as a possible founder or recruit. This despite the fact that the new party stood for those things he had once argued for in the realm of defense. He was rewarded for his decision by being elected deputy leader of the Labour party in 1981.

Some saw Healey as the standard bearer of the right in the party during these dark years for Labour (it lost the 1983 election by the largest margin since the war), but subsequent events show that to be a misreading. Staying with Labour involved making his peace with the British left and accepting their version of Britain's non-nuclear place in the world. As Foot gave way as leader to the even more leftist Kinnock, Healey was to accept, and even help construct, the new unilateralist doctrine. Labour's new defense policy declares that upon the election of a Labour government Britain will cease to be an independent nuclear power, that the cruise missiles at Greenham and Molesworth and the American Poseidon facilities at Holy Loch in Scotland will be removed, and that the F-111's at Upper Heyford and Lakenheath will be required to switch to non-nuclear roles. In other words, Britain will finally break with the postwar defense policy upon which Nato was founded.

Although Labour has been hurt electorally by this sweeping change in defense policy, and although some in Labour's leadership (like Peter Shore, John Smith, and Roy Hattersley) have made their doubts known, Healey has used his status as a defense expert to placate the fears of an anxious public and endorse the policy shift.

HEALEY'S RECENT change of heart on defense questions seems part of a broader shift in his worldview, particularly his attitudes to the two superpowers. Like the Labour left, he has lately been exhibiting an uninhibited anti-Americanism. He appears to harbor something approaching hatred for Reagan's America, and to retain a particular political animus towards the newly assertive American foreign policy of the post-Vietnam era. He has publicly criticized many of the president's senior advisers in terms that are familiar coming from the extreme left of the party, but unknown from previous shadow foreign ministers (the reference to Richard Perle as "a middle-ranking pipsqueak" conveys the tone). Healey now regularly derides a whole range of American policies in extravagant terms. The American raid on Libya, for example, was dismissed as "a comic strip approach, Rambo out to zap the baddies"; and the American Strategic Defense Initiative as "nothing more than an attempt by the USA to achieve a nuclear monopoly."

Healey's attitude toward the Reagan administration stands in stark contrast to his recent pronouncements on the Soviet Union, to which he has been a frequent visitor in the 1980s. Against his criticism of SDI may be put his belief that "the Soviet Union desires to end the arms race" and his complaint that "every time the Russians make a sensible proposal there is a knee-jerk negative reaction from Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan." Against his hostile characterization of leading

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figures in the Reagan administration we have this gushing assessment of the current Soviet leader:

> Gorbachev represents a complete break with the earlier generation, in personality as well as age. He is a man of exceptional charm with a relaxed, self-deprecating sense of humor. Emotions flicker over a face of unusual sensitivity like summer breezes on a pond. In discussion he was frank and flexible with a composure full of inner strength.

Nor is the newfound enthusiasm of Labour's shadow foreign minister for things Soviet restricted to personalities and defense policy. Asked by a Soviet interviewer for his impressions of Georgia, "this sun-kissed region in the Trans-Caucasus and one of our national republics," Healey thoughtfully replied that "the success of the nationality policy as originally laid down by Lenin is shown by the situation in Georgia"—cheering news for all the minority nations of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps most startling of all are Healey's new views on future relations between the British Labour and Soviet Communist parties. Improved state-to-state relations are one thing. Party-to-party relations are decidedly another and, for very good reasons, all factions within the Labour party (including the militant Trotskyites and excluding only the dedicated fellow-travelers) have always opposed institutional, party-to-party relationships with communist parties. Yet in an interview on Moscow World Service during a recent visit, Healey seemed sanguine about the possibilities:

> Q: How do you see the present state of contacts between the Labour Party and the Soviet Communist Party? Are we to anticipate the advancement of the contacts for our common work for peace and military detente?
>
> A: Yes. And I think this is the important thing. The Labour Party has never been anxious to develop an organizational relationship with the Soviet CP, because the history of the united front and popular front movements was not a happy one for the Labour Party in the 1930s and 1940s, but I think if we concentrate upon discussing together questions of common interest, particularly the question of peace and disarmament, we can make a good deal of progress.
>
> Mr. Kinnock and I, as you know, came here in November 1984 and we also entertained Secretary General Gorbachev before he became the Secretary General in December 1984. I've visited Moscow twice since then . . . on many of the important world issues we have very similar views.

All this represents a bizarre spectacle—and given Healey's position a very worrying one: The erstwhile Atlanticist and cold warrior, the sophisticated theorist of nuclear strategy, espousing views completely at variance with his mature life's work—views more akin to those he held as a young man in the early 1940s than at any time since.

How to explain Healey's career and the way he has ended up in the 1980s? What, if anything, does he stand for? One obvious way of interpreting him is as an unvarnished political opportunist. Certainly, throughout his career in the Labour party he has taken positions close to those held by whoever was in the ascendancy: Attlee and Bevin in the 1940s, Gaitskell in the 1950s, Wilson in the 1960s and 1970s, and Foot and Kinnock in the 1980s (the one minor deviation from this pattern was his opposition to Gaitskell over the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament issue in 1960). It is also true that Healey's strongest commitment to the Atlantic alliance coincided with the period of clear American supremacy, and that it has weakened as that supremacy has declined and vanished. According to this interpretation, then, Healey's current position merely reflects what makes sense in terms of his own interest in prevailing circumstances.

Another explanation on offer is that Denis Healey never really ceased to believe in the extreme left-wing view of things that he proclaimed openly until nearly his thirtieth year. He merely put it away in the closet while the political climate was unfavorable; now that the

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climate has changed, out it comes again. A particularly sinister version of this interpretation is presented by the authors of a generally friendly biography (Reed and Williams, *Denis Healey & the Politics of Power*). They attribute it to "a right-wing journalist critic of Healey and the Labour Party":

> Once upon a time, says the Fleet Street fable, a young man joined the Communist Party at university, and decided to bring his country to its knees by undermining its armed forces.
>
> The young man entered politics, and became Minister of Defence. Then, as chief of the country's armed forces he used a devious policy to weaken the nation's fighting ability. He said one thing, and did another. He spoke of "efficiency," and made drastic cuts. He stressed the need for "economy," and made more. He talked of "interdependence" and "rationalization" and further reduced the number of men under his command, and their equipment.
>
> Armed with the jargon of "feasibility studies" and "cost-benefit analysis" he chopped and pared to the bone. He cancelled aircraft and a submarine with nuclear missiles as soon as he came into office. He ordered replacements from America, but regrettably cancelled again. He spoke of the need for more men in the British Army of the Rhine while he withdrew them to reduce overseas spending. . . . More successfully than any spy he had reduced the country's ability to wage war to a point where it was defenceless.

After setting out this view at length, Reed and Williams dismiss it as "a neat piece of character assassination" depending on a selective use of facts, which leaves one puzzled as to why they chose to use it in the first place. Certainly it is a mind-boggling interpretation.

A third possible key to Healey's behavior is overriding loyalty to the Labour movement, a case of "my party right or wrong." Thus, just as he was prepared to break with Gaitskell and risk his future when he believed that the course being followed over unilateral nuclear disarmament would split the party, so now in the 1980s he is prepared to swallow unilateralism—and much else—for the sake of holding things together. It is perhaps worth noting that this sort of loyalty has usually been more characteristic of working class trade unionists than of middle class intellectuals.

Without access to much more information than is publicly available, it is not possible to decide whether any of these explanations—or combination of them, or any other interpretation—really fits the facts. Whatever the origins and causes of Healey's current positions, however, they matter less than the consequences of those positions should Healey once again occupy high office. For Britain, Nato, and the United States, those consequences could be serious indeed.

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Afghanistan & Beyond: The Strategy of Dismemberment

Elie Krakowski

THE SOVIET INVASION of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a vivid demonstration of how the Soviets now see themselves, how they see the outside world, and what they believe they can do to it. The invasion was Moscow's first *direct* use of force outside the Soviet bloc since World War II. For the first time since that war, Soviet forces invaded an independent, non-aligned, Third World state. The applicability of the "Brezhnev doctrine," by which Moscow had arrogated unto itself the right to intervene militarily in a "socialist" state, was apparently being extended beyond the Soviet bloc. The Soviet invasion thus marked the beginning of a new phase in Soviet foreign policy.

To understand fully the meaning of the invasion, it will be necessary first to examine the extent to which it was consonant with the history of Soviet policy towards Afghanistan. We will then look at the geopolitical significance of the invasion. Finally, we will argue that the tactics of the Soviets—in particular their building up of northern Afghanistan even as they destroy the southern parts—suggest a far-seeing strategy for dominating all of Southwest Asia. This would involve the incorporation (whether through annexation or otherwise) of the northern provinces of Afghanistan, the political destruction of Pakistan, and the creation of subservient rump-states between India and the newly-drawn border of the Soviet Union.

The 1979 invasion was the culmination of decades of Soviet policies aimed at achieving greater control of Afghanistan. Soviet influence in the country goes back to the period following the Bolshevik revolution. The first Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty was signed in 1921. But it was not until the 1950s, when Moscow began paying increasing attention to the Third World, that a more active and permanent Soviet role emerged. In 1955, in part as a result of American neglect, Kabul turned for assistance to the Soviet Union and accepted Moscow's long-standing offer of aid. It was at the initiative of then Prime Minister Daoud Khan that Soviet military assistance, including the training of Afghan officers in the USSR, was started.

Thereafter, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Moscow acquired a pre-eminence that was never threatened—or even challenged—

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by any outside powers. The United States never seriously attempted to develop significant influence in Kabul. Yet, for Moscow, that deepening relationship apparently was not sufficient; the groundwork for an ever more subservient Afghanistan was being laid. Moscow encouraged the development of a local communist movement and worked to ensure its dominance. In 1965 the Afghan Communist party—the PDPA—was created to take advantage of opportunities under a new constitution. When former Prime Minister Daoud seized power through a military coup in 1973, he relied for support on pro-Moscow army and air force officers and the Parcham ("Banner") faction of the Afghan Communist party. With his solid pro-Soviet credentials, Daoud appeared to be well suited to carry out Soviet wishes. Outwardly, his takeover presented a not too abrupt change, well in keeping with modern, "progressive" trends: It appeared to be a transition from an increasingly anachronistic form of government, monarchy, to the more popular republican form of rule, under a familiar nationalist leader. Moreover, since Daoud was both a cousin and a brother-in-law of the deposed king, the change was acceptable to the Afghan people, to whom it looked simply like a power struggle within the royal family. It all appeared made to order: Soviet control would be increased while the façade of independence remained intact.

Daoud, like the king before him, was keenly aware of the need for good relations with the Soviet Union. But, also like the king, he was first and foremost an Afghan. Both men thought that they could develop and maintain good relations with the USSR, as well as control their own local communists, while at the same time avoiding total dependence on, or control by, Moscow. In short, both thought they could use Moscow without being used themselves. Moscow's hopes for Daoud were to be quickly dashed. Internally, Daoud gradually eliminated his communist supporters from positions of influence. In foreign affairs, he sought to improve relations with neighboring states, as well as with other deeply religious Muslim countries. He began to send Afghan military officers to Egypt and India for training and, shortly before his overthrow, to Pakistan as well.

There is a striking parallel between the overthrow of the king in 1973 and the assassination of Daoud in 1978, aside from the involvement of the same pro-Soviet officers: In both cases, the Afghan leader's serious attempt to improve relations with neighboring states—in particular, Pakistan—was soon followed by his removal from power.

Having been disappointed twice with non-communists, the Soviets next relied on the Khalqi "masses" wing of the Afghan Communist party, which took power in the April 1978 coup. The Khalqis quickly proceeded to implement a Marxist program, down to the replacement of the traditional national flag with the communist red banner. As long as traditional societal patterns were left untouched, the Afghan people had remained by and large indifferent to the exact form of the central government. It was the attempt by a minority regime to alter drastically the Afghan way of life, and the brutality associated with this attempt, that finally provoked large-scale resistance.

Faced with such a clear-cut response to the attempt to impose Marxism in Afghanistan, Moscow had another option beside invasion; it could have backtracked and installed a pliable non-communist frontman as leader. Through such a step Moscow could have conveyed the idea that Islam and its associated traditions would no longer be targets—at least, not openly. But this would have gone against the oft-proclaimed Soviet principle of the irreversibility of the revolutionary process: it would have been an admission of failure. Instead, Moscow chose to send in large numbers of Soviet troops and to install Babrak Karmal. (Later, when Karmal proved inadequate, he was replaced by the KGB's man, Dr. Najibullah.) In other words, given a choice between control with communism or control without it, Moscow chose the former.

The Soviets no doubt expected that a

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massive show of force—70,000 to 80,000 in the initial invasion—would quickly destroy any opposition and induce submission. When this did not materialize, Moscow adopted a long-term strategy of outlasting the resistance through a terror campaign designed to co-opt, drive out, or kill the population—while at the same time minimizing international interest and attention and keeping the Soviet military commitment relatively limited in cost, numbers of men, and casualties.

WHAT IS the relative significance of Afghanistan, and of South Asia, within the larger context of Soviet foreign policy? It is generally recognized that the United States remains the primary target of Soviet policy, and that dividing Western Europe from the United States is a key Soviet objective. As seen by Moscow, the Soviet Union has two major strategic fronts—Western Europe on the one hand, the Far East and the Pacific on the other. On both fronts, however, things have remained frozen for some time now and seem unlikely to change in the near future; the ratio of opportunity to risk has been too insignificant to allow meaningful Soviet advances, or even attempts to alter the status quo more than peripherally. Opportunity must therefore be sought elsewhere.

Soviet attempts at expansion have focused on strategic chokepoints, and on perceived soft spots in Western and Third World positions. For example, in the Horn of Africa (which controls the strategic approaches to the Red Sea and Suez Canal and to much of the Indian Ocean) they have worked to establish new Soviet outposts or to outflank existing Western positions. In southern Africa (which commands major sea lanes) they have been active in a variety of ways, overt and covert—in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and Southwest Africa/Namibia, among others. They have been similarly active in Southeast Asia, through the Vietnamese. In Central America, they have been exploiting local conditions and an apparent lack of firm will in Washington for the ultimate purpose of distracting the United States and undermining its ability to cope with crisis situations elsewhere.

The Chinese, more so than the Americans, have always been perceptive about the where and the why of Soviet pressure points. Beijing's analysis starts from the premise that Moscow has a well-integrated geostrategic design whose ultimate objective is the worldwide triumph of Soviet communism. But since Moscow realizes that it cannot, for the foreseeable future, afford a direct confrontation with Washington, it has pursued an indirect approach that seeks to isolate the United States. As the Chinese have put it: "Soviet hegemonism needs at first to edge out the United States from the old Euro-Asian-African continent."

As the Chinese see it, the very existence of nuclear deterrence makes conventional forces "the only applicable military power against nuclear-armed enemies." (Although Moscow has been improving its naval forces significantly, the Chinese believe that these will continue to remain secondary to Soviet land power.) Moscow's superiority in conventional land forces is well known; but the effectiveness of conventional forces, unlike that of nuclear weapons, diminishes with distance. Given the above factors, as well as the conditions prevailing both in the West and on the Soviet-Chinese border that limit Soviet opportunity, the least expensive way for the Soviets to achieve their strategic objectives is by means of a "southward thrust strategy" which aims at: a) control of the oil resources in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf region; b) control of Southeast Asia and the Strait of Malacca, through which shipping to Japan and the Far East must pass; and c) control of southern Africa, the key to major sea lanes, and of the African East Coast along the Indian Ocean. Were the Soviet Union to achieve these objectives, Moscow would control the economic lifelines of both Europe and Japan, with predictable consequences for their international relationships.

The Chinese see the Vietnamese invasion

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of Cambodia, which occurred the year before the invasion of Afghanistan, in the context of Vietnamese colonization of the whole of Indochina and as being intimately connected to this overall Soviet design. Likewise the series of "friendship" treaties signed between Moscow and India, Vietnam, and Mongolia—all of which border on China. Moscow is seen as moving from north to south, while its Vietnamese proxy moves from east to west across Southeast Asia. Control of Afghanistan and Indochina are only the first two steps.

Pakistani analysis of the situation—at least insofar as it has been put forward by President Zia ul-Haq—seems to coincide with the Chinese view. In an interview published in the *Washington Post*, President Zia defined the nature of the Soviet threat in the South Asia region:

> If they [the Soviets] move here [Pakistan] over the bodies of Pakistanis, they are at the mouth of the Gulf, and whoever controls the Straits of Hormuz controls the Gulf. In one move they have threatened to secure the Straits of Hormuz, encircle Iran and tell the Chinese, "We are on your flank."

The Soviets clearly intend, he said, to follow the consolidation of their control in Afghanistan with the absorption of Pakistan into the Soviet empire. While taking some pains to indicate that he would not allow a Soviet invasion of his country—it would occur only "over the bodies of Pakistanis"—Zia pointed clearly to the main axis of the Soviet thrust.

For the West, the implications of further Soviet progress in the region are obvious. The threat to the security of the sea lanes, both in the Persian Gulf area and around South Africa, and to Western access to Middle Eastern oil would be significantly increased. Of even greater importance would be the opportunities for effective Soviet blackmail and intimidation. The political mileage Moscow might derive from a successful use of force in Afghanistan could diminish the need for actual denial of the sea lanes or direct Soviet control in the region. Were area states to be so intimidated, Western European access to the region might suddenly become limited by Soviet diktat. Moscow's objective of dividing Western Europe from the U.S. would then be significantly advanced.

Existing Soviet pressures on Iran, the result in part of the flanking movement achieved by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, would be immeasurably increased if Moscow gained control of Pakistan as well, whether directly or indirectly. Close Soviet ties with India already exist. The Moscow-Kabul-Islamabad-New Delhi axis would send a clear message to the Chinese.

It might be argued that Moscow would not pursue such a course because of the potential negative impact it would have on its Indian friends. According to this argument, eliminating Pakistan as an independent entity would deprive Moscow of a useful tool in developing ever-stronger ties with India; Moscow would no longer be able to exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan in order either to support India or play the peacemaker. Moreover, such a development—the argument goes—would alienate a now-friendly India, which would not particularly appreciate becoming a neighbor of the Soviet Union.

This argument, however, misses the essence of the Soviet approach. Soviet moves do not appear to be dictated by a desire to please India or even by a wish to avoid antagonizing New Delhi. Rather, they seem to be the result of opportunities that arise for fulfilling broad Soviet objectives. Finding themselves in control of Pakistan would clearly further those goals. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that in Moscow's calculus—as well as in reality, if one is to judge by current Indian behavior—Soviet control of Pakistan would produce a more, not less, compliant India. One could, of course, postulate all sorts of hypothetical moves to escape such consequences: New Delhi might try to achieve closer relations with both Washington and Beijing. But that is highly unlikely. Such a major gain would advance the Soviet strategy of encircling China. If such a gain occurred, and if Washington had

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allowed such a situation to develop, the strength of the Soviet position would make any such Indian efforts fruitless. In that case, neither Washington nor Beijing would look like a credible counterbalance.

The recent establishment of diplomatic relations with Moscow by both Oman and the United Arab Emirates may be a good indicator of the way in which those in the region perceive current trends and respond to them. No doubt there were several reasons for these diplomatic moves, but fear of things to come if they did not develop "good relations" with the Soviets—that is, appease them—must have been a dominant factor.

IT REMAINS to look at what Soviet policy in Afghanistan and the region has actually been since the invasion. To what degree is it an attempt merely to consolidate their control over Afghanistan? To what degree does it represent preparation to go beyond Afghanistan toward the possible dismemberment of Pakistan?

In the seven years since the invasion, Soviet policy has undergone some modifications and adjustment, but it has remained unchanged in its essence. Except for the period immediately following the invasion, when Moscow thought it would be able to crush the resistance swiftly, the basis of Soviet strategy has been a long-term, relatively limited commitment designed to minimize costs and casualties. The Soviet approach has had two basic components: to outlast the resistance and to keep international attention to a minimum.

The second component in Moscow's strategy should not be underestimated. Minimizing international attention to Afghanistan has been crucial to the successful pursuit of Soviet objectives. Outside attention to the war translates into active material and moral support for the resistance; and while the importance of material support is obvious, the value of less tangible kinds of support can be immense. Because the guerrilla character of the war, almost by definition, diminishes the importance of the purely military aspect, the psychological component plays a role that is perhaps equally significant.

Accordingly, the Soviets have attempted outright intimidation of independent journalists. This has included a threat, made publicly by the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan in 1984, to kill journalists venturing into Afghanistan. And they have made good on that threat; reporters have been chased and kidnapped and killed. The Soviets have also bombed clinics and hospitals—even when clearly marked with a red cross—in order to dissuade French and other voluntary medical and humanitarian organizations from operating inside Afghanistan, reporting their observations, and thus generating interest in the war among their compatriots and the world at large.

Moscow has used negotiations to the same end. The so-called "proximity talks" between Pakistan and the Soviet puppet regime in Kabul, held under United Nations auspices in Geneva since 1983, have been encouraged by the Soviet Union as a means of deceiving the West into thinking that a solution is attainable through negotiations alone. The objective is to make the outside world believe that some "minor" concessions on its part would resolve the problem, and that the West can therefore forget Afghanistan and return to business as usual. Underlying such an approach is a keen Soviet understanding that once democracies lose interest, "recommitting" themselves becomes a difficult, if not an impossible, proposition.

As for the military dimension of the struggle, the wearing down of the resistance has been pursued via a strategy of terror, which includes indiscriminate killing, chasing the population out of the country or at least into the cities where they can be better controlled, and co-opting the people. While the co-optation has not, on the whole, been very successful, the other methods have been more effective: Afghanistan's pre-war population has been reduced by fully one-third. There are some 4.5 to 5 million refugees in Pakistan and Iran (3.5 to 4 million of them in Pakistan alone, the world's largest refugee

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population). There are an additional 2 million internal refugees, most of whom have fled to Kabul and several other cities. And, although figures on Afghanistan have never been precise, it is possible that as much as 9 percent of the total pre-invasion population has been killed. The military effort has not been designed to seize and hold ground; instead, the Soviets have carried out periodic sweeps intended to keep the resistance off balance and to wear it out. This has entailed keeping Soviet forces in the major cities and a number of garrisons.

To use Mao's comparison of guerrillas supported by the population to fish swimming in water, the Soviet approach in Afghanistan has been gradually to empty the water out of the bowl, thereby killing the fish. Whereas at the beginning of the war the resistance could rely on the local population to provide it with food, the situation has now been reversed; in a number of areas, the population—if indeed it still remains—expects the resistance to provide it with the means of sustenance. (Depopulation, while in some respects a clearly disastrous development, does make it possible for the resistance to worry less about Soviet retaliation against the civilian population. With appropriate logistical improvements, the resistance could operate in areas heretofore avoided.)

Despite the continuing pressure brought to bear on it, the resistance, far from becoming demoralized, has become increasingly effective. It has been able to inflict high losses on the Soviets in both material and men. The Afghan puppet army on which the Soviets initially attempted to rely has, despite some improvements, remained largely incompetent and unreliable. The decision to rely on Soviet special forces (including *spetznaz*) as the key to Soviet counterinsurgency strategy, reflected in the large increase of such forces in Afghanistan since 1985, is no doubt a response to the growing resistance capabilities.

Moscow has also been paying careful attention to the underlying bases of long-term control. Early in the war, Soviet authorities in Afghanistan began to reshape the Afghan educational system along Soviet lines. The Afghan curriculum now strongly resembles that of the USSR. In order to increase divisions among Afghans along ethnic lines, thus facilitating control, the Soviets have introduced the use of local languages in the schools, replacing the Dari *lingua franca*. Russian has replaced all other foreign languages in the curriculum and has become requisite for advancement in Afghan society, as it is for non-Russian nationalities in the USSR. In part because of the Afghan public's resistance to these educational changes, Soviet authorities have undertaken what can only be described as extensive kidnappings of young children, forcibly sending them to the Soviet Union for "education" for periods of "at least ten years." According to resistance and other sources, between 1980 and 1985 more than 50,000 Afghans were sent to the Soviet Union for training. Of these, almost 24,000 were young people, and the majority of those—20,000—were children between the ages of four and eight. In addition to indoctrinating the Afghans, Moscow has been building up KHAD, the Afghan equivalent of the KGB. These measures reflect the single-minded Soviet devotion to the building of cadres who will ultimately—or so the Soviets hope—take over on behalf of their masters.

ALTHOUGH clearly seeking the pacification and control of Afghanistan in its entirety, Moscow has applied a differentiated, regional approach to the incorporation of Afghanistan within the Soviet empire. The north is viewed as distinct from the south and southwest, and different policies are applied to the two parts of the country.[1]

This distinction had already been established in Tsarist times when the Hindu Kush was described by Tsarist officials as the "natural" boundary between the Russian and

[1]The north is here understood to include the following provinces: Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, Samangan, Balkh (sometimes called Mazar), Jowzjan, Fariyab, and possibly Badghis—but not Herat.

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British empires. This view, then mere wishful thinking, now governs Soviet expansion. Topography, ethnicity, and natural resources all favor such a distinction. The northern region of Afghanistan is contiguous to Soviet territory and readily accessible; it is also flatter than the terrain further south and therefore easier to pacify. A large portion of the people in the north are of the same ethnic stock as the people in contiguous areas of Soviet Central Asia—Tajiks, Turkomans, and Uzbeks. This is not the case south of Hindu Kush, where the majority is ethnically linked to the Pushtuns of Pakistan. Moreover, most of Afghanistan's natural resources are found in the northern part of the country.

A strategy designed to restore Soviet control at the pre-invasion level, or even one intended to consolidate a more direct kind of Soviet power over the entire country, would aim at developing resources south of the Hindu Kush as well as north of it. Such a strategy would also seek to apply a more or less evenhanded approach to the key cities of the country. Instead, Moscow has sought both to exploit and to build up the northern region while wreaking havoc, destruction, and desolation on the rest of the country.

In the north, Moscow has promoted the development of the Amu Darya (Oxus) river

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separating the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Gas and electricity projects have been undertaken. Two dams have been built for irrigation purposes in the Kunduz and Herat areas, and several others are planned. The economic effort has also included the exploitation of natural resources and the construction of factories. These economic policies have gone hand in hand with actions aimed at the retention of the population. That this has been a matter of policy is evident from a number of indicators: Moscow has sought to "buy" the ethnic groups of the north by playing up to their strong sense of ethnic pride and encouraging the use of their mother tongues, heretofore given less prominence. Moscow constantly emphasizes the common traditions, culture, and languages shared by the northern ethnic groups and their "brethren" in Soviet Central Asia. There have been a significant number of exchanges of delegations—especially cultural—with Soviet Central Asia, particularly in the last two or three years. Soviet media in both Russian and Central Asian languages have frequently emphasized the high degree of "well-being" and "achievement" attained by the same ethnic groups "under Soviet sovereignty."

Soviet military operations in the north have for the most part been small-scale—in contrast to the sweeps in other areas—and have relied more heavily on KHAD and the regime's militias than on Soviet troops. In contrast to other areas, where villages are attacked seemingly at random in terror operations, in the north the Soviets appear to attack only *mujahedin* positions and those villages and cities which actively support the resistance. The ratio of police/militia to regular Afghan forces in the northern zone differs markedly from that in the rest of the country. In the north, there are only two Afghan army divisions, each with a limited strength of 3,000; the police forces, on the other hand, number about 30,000, and the Mohafiz (the locally raised militia—literally, "Protection") number 12,000 to 13,000, organized into eleven guards brigades. Whereas the army represents the Kabul regime, the guards brigades are equated with local control—and it appears that they are meant to provide the northern zone with a separate force.

Sayyed Nassim Shah, the Afghan who has headed the northern zone since 1983, reportedly spent sixteen years in Tashkent and Moscow for training before he was brought back to Afghanistan in 1982 and made a member of the Central Committee of the PDPA. As far as is known, no other Afghan official in any other part of the country has been given this kind of prominence. His unique position is further highlighted by the fact that at the November 1985 Afghan Communist party plenum, he was the only official singled out by name and praised by Babrak Karmal for his "effective leadership" in the pacification of the north. Another barometer of Soviet intentions is the changing fortunes of the Setem-i-Milli, an organization that has long sought the separation of northern Afghanistan from the rest of the country. Under the king and later under Daoud, the Setem-i-Milli demanded only regional autonomy within the Afghan state; now it is calling for complete separation from "Pushtun domination." Moreover, a number of members of Setem-i-Milli appear to be in the upper echelons of the northern zone Communist administrative structure.

SOVIET POLICY in the northern zone takes on even greater significance when it is compared with policies in the rest of the country and with actions directed across the border at Pakistan since 1985. In the rest of the country, Moscow has sought to destroy not only opposition to its rule but the very existence of the population and its means of subsistence. Such major cities as Herat in the west and Kandahar in the south have been subjected to attacks and heavy bombardment that have reduced significant portions of these cities to rubble. In 1985, a Swedish observer who visited Herat described it as looking like Hiroshima. In early 1986, a resistance commander in Kandahar told a German doctor that the pre-war pop-

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ulation of 250,000 had been reduced to about 35,000. Irrigation networks, crops, and villages have been destroyed, and the land depopulated and turned to desert.

These patterns suggest that in the north, Moscow is creating a gradual accretion to its Central Asian empire, while through the systematic devastation of the other major areas it is insuring that a weak vacuum will exist in the rest of the country. Rumors of Soviet plans to annex the north while creating a pseudo-state under the Kabul regime in the south were widespread as early as 1979, under the Taraki-Amin regime and months before the invasion. In 1980, the Soviets secretly annexed the Wakhan salient in northeastern Afghanistan, in the guise of "clarification of existing borders," thus giving the USSR a direct border with Pakistan. Wakhan and possibly parts of Takhar are reportedly administered directly, as Soviet territory, from Dushanbe.

Since 1985, the Soviets have significantly increased the level and intensity of their operations. The continuation of military operations during the winter months (already begun the year before) became more pronounced in 1985. Efforts to interdict resistance supply routes became less haphazard, much more frequent, and more intense in both ferocity and firepower. Military operations began to involve the frequent use of special forces (*spetznaz* and others). Indeed, 1985 saw a significant increase in the numbers of Soviet special-purpose forces in Afghanistan. Small-scale operations and night ambushes, often involving thirty to fifty men, increased significantly. Accompanying these shifts, there has been a greater emphasis on the training and use of Afghan communist commando forces; these, backed up by heavy Soviet air support and firepower, have been used with increasing frequency.

To the steady integration of northern Afghanistan within the Soviet system and to the destruction of the rest of the country, the expanded focus on Pakistan must be added as another essential element in the equation. In mid-September 1985, the Kabul regime held a *jirga*, or assembly, of the Pushtun border tribes—from *both* sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. That assembly marked the revival of the Pushtunistan/Baluchistan issue. The border between Afghanistan and what is now Pakistan—the Durand Line—was drawn through the territory of the Pushtun tribes and, to a lesser degree, of the Baluchi in 1893, splitting them up. It has constituted a source of periodic friction between Afghan and Pakistani governments since 1947.

Babrak Karmal, in a major address to the 1985 *jirga*, openly called for the reunification of the separated ethnic groups *under Afghan sovereignty*. His speech, directed at tribes stretching across both sides of the existing border, was a call for the subversion of Pakistan. The Pushtun and Baluchi territories not now within Afghanistan—i.e., the provinces of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier, more than half the territory of Pakistan—he referred to as "a part of sacred land . . . left in the hands of the British colonialists and their inheritors [read 'Pakistan']." Arguing for "reunification"—i.e., Afghan annexation—he stated that "it was the policy of divide and rule which subjected the Pushtuns and Baluchis to the domination of imperialism and reaction, and which disturbed their unity and freedom and brought them under suppression." Karmal asked the tribes to help defeat the Afghan resistance to Communist rule. "Pushtun and Baluchi brothers, unite," he exhorted them. "Wherever you live, defend the honor and dignity of the borders of your sacred land—the free, independent, and new revolutionary Afghanistan."

His appeal was neither gratuitous nor poetic license. Afghan subversion of Pakistan has begun to manifest itself in a number of ways. To the training of Baluchis and Pushtuns in Afghanistan for armed actions in Pakistan—which began several years earlier—were now added large-scale payments to tribal leaders in the border areas of Pakistan, as well as in Afghanistan, to buy their cooperation in interdicting Afghan resistance supply routes and to pay for terrorist acts in

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cities and towns in the border regions of Pakistan. The Afghan communist implementer of these subversion programs was none other than Dr. Najibullah, then the head of KHAD and since May 1986 the Soviet-picked puppet "ruler" of Afghanistan. These acts of subversion, using Pushtuns, Baluchis, and other tribes, have in turn been accompanied by steadily increasing military violations of Pakistani territory—hundreds of aerial incursions and bombing runs on Pakistani border towns, as well as cross-border artillery shelling. The total of such air violations in 1986 numbered more than 700 (compared to more than 200 in 1985), and artillery shellings totaled more than 150 (compared to about 25 in 1985). Air violations in January 1987 alone were several times higher than in the previous January.

SOVIET STRATEGY in the region has moved from being essentially concerned with the consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan itself (as was the case at the time of the invasion) to the insuring of favorable conditions for the further expansion of Moscow's influence in South Asia as a whole. Soviet strategy can be seen as consisting of two distinct but related steps: The first is the eventual absorption of the northern half of Afghanistan, whether through formal annexation or less formal means; the second is the creation of small, dependent buffer states between India and the Soviet empire.

Under such a scheme, Afghanistan as such would disappear—or, to use the Soviet lexicon, it would finally "reflect the national aspirations of the peoples" of the area. The Uzbeks, Tajiks, and others in the north would be "reunited" with their "brothers" in the Soviet Union, while the Pushtuns and Baluchis on both sides of the border would be united in their own states, "free" from the "domination of the imperialists." Since most of the Pushtuns and Baluchis are in Pakistan, the establishment of such "national entities" as "Pushtunistan" and "Independent Baluchistan" cannot be accomplished without the end of the Pakistani state.

It seems probable that the Soviets do not attach equal significance to each of these objectives, or to the steps involved in attaining them, at least not at this point. The absorption of northern Afghanistan should be seen as a core objective, while the creation of new, weak, and smaller buffer states (entailing the dismemberment of Pakistan) constitutes—for now—a secondary, less proximate objective.

Moscow's distinctly different policies regarding northern Afghanistan and the rest of the country make little sense outside of the larger Soviet design outlined above. The systematic destruction of cities, the depopulation of a belt of territory around the north, the exclusive development of resources in the north, the pronouncements by Karmal—these policies do not fit in well with a supposed Soviet intention to control all of Afghanistan but to go no further. These policies do, however, make a great deal of sense if the goal is the creation of weak buffer states from the Hindu Kush south to the Indian Ocean—states that would be almost entirely dependent on Moscow not only for development but for their very existence. The irredentist pressures being generated within the Pushtun communities in both Afghanistan and Pakistan would further heighten Pushtun dependency upon Moscow for the realization of these irredentist goals. (The Soviet government has been on record since at least 1955 as supporting Afghan demands for a plebiscite through which the Baluchis and Pushtuns of Pakistan would determine their political future, including the option of "rejoining" Afghanistan.)

The gradual approach followed by Moscow raises some interesting questions. Why should it not, for instance, attempt to incorporate all of Afghanistan? Why take a differentiated approach that builds the north and kills the south? Why not go about securing wider Soviet objectives in an even more open and blunt manner? The Soviet Union, conscious of charges that it seeks to establish a land route to the Persian Gulf and aware that there may well be significant opposition to moves in that direction, is attempting to

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arrive at this result without arousing firm opposition. Moscow is aware that even India would resent having the Soviet Union itself as a neighbor, and that too abrupt and direct an approach might jeopardize the relationship with New Delhi that the Soviets have established over a period of many years and at significant cost. (The argument advanced by some that Moscow and New Delhi might conspire to divide up Pakistan and launch coordinated military operations toward that end does not have much to support it. If such temptations ever existed on the Indian side, they must have dated to the period before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.)

The Soviet leadership is therefore laying the groundwork for the establishment of several smaller states that would appear to be the creation not of outside forces but of indigenous political aspirations—states that would be under total Soviet influence, while providing India and the rest of the world with the illusion of buffers between the Soviet empire, the Indian subcontinent, and the Indian Ocean.

It is important to realize that the above analysis is meant to point to trends in Soviet policy and intentions. It is not meant to be taken as a description of a predetermined, inevitable future. There are a number of factors militating against the success of such a Soviet approach. To begin with, Soviet success with regard to Afghanistan is far from assured. Continued improvements in resistance armaments, training, and capabilities can go a long way toward frustrating Soviet designs inside Afghanistan and even force a Soviet withdrawal. So can greater international media and diplomatic attention. In Pakistan, it is far from clear that Soviet efforts at subversion and at winning over the Pushtuns and the Baluchis to the Soviet way of seeing things can make significant headway. From all appearances, the majority of Pushtun and Baluchi see their future as being tied to Pakistan rather than to a Communist Afghan puppet. And, while Soviet attempts to buy off some of the tribal chiefs in Pakistani border areas are a nuisance, they do not materially change a way of doing business there that has traditionally proven inconclusive for those engaging in it. In the final analysis, however, whether or not the Soviets succeed in subverting the region will depend, in large part, upon how determined the other interested parties are in their resistance to Soviet designs. Karl Marx's observation regarding nineteenth-century Russian imperialism applies equally well, if not better, to twentieth-century Soviet imperialism: "The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing."

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Patterns of Intervention

America & the Soviets in the Third World

Samuel P. Huntington

THE United States and the Soviet Union have interests, influence, and involvements in the Third World. Over the years the interests of the two superpowers have changed and expanded. The overall influence of the superpowers in the Third World has declined. In part as a result of these two trends, the involvement of the superpowers in the Third World has increased significantly. Each superpower has to do more to produce the influence needed to promote its expanded interests.

Broadly speaking, the superpowers have three types of interests in the Third World.[1] First, each superpower has concrete interests. These may include access to raw materials, economic investment or presence, military bases and other facilities, the security of particular countries or regimes closely affiliated with the superpower. The concrete interests of the superpowers vary greatly from one country or region to another.

Second, the superpowers have general interests that they wish to promote in varying ways and degrees throughout the Third World. For the United States these have included promoting human rights and democratic forms of government, supporting economic growth and development of market economies, preventing aggression and the change of governments or territories by force, discouraging nuclear proliferation, minimizing political instability and violence. For the Soviet Union these include the promotion of "national liberation" and revolution, the development of class consciousness among workers and peasants, opposition to "imperialism," and, where appropriate, the formation of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties. The general interests of both superpowers tend to reflect the nature of their political, economic, and social systems. Hence, the general interests of the United States are pluralistic and diverse and may often conflict with one another, while those of the Soviet Union are projections of its centrally controlled political system and Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Third, both superpowers have what might be termed global security interests, which derive from the bipolar structure of world politics and the inherently competitive relationship they have with each other. Each is in a unique position to threaten the other

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[1]This breakdown of interests is drawn from a paper I co-authored with Brent Scowcroft, "American Vital Interests in Regions of Conflict: U.S. Foreign Policy Alternatives" (American Enterprise Institute: Washington, D.C., December 1981).

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and each has to assume that the other would do it harm if it could. Accordingly, each superpower has an interest in minimizing the power and influence of the other, even in geographical areas and with respect to issues where the superpower has no significant concrete interests.

To what extent have interests of all three kinds changed during the forty years of cold war? The global security interests of both superpowers have remained relatively constant. The intensity and principal locales of the competition have changed from time to time, but the underlying reality of competition has remained. Presumably the global security concerns that each power has with the other will continue so long as world politics remains essentially bipolar in structure and is so perceived by the relevant actors.

The general interests of the two countries have undergone modest but important changes. Different American administrations have given somewhat different priorities to the various American general interests and have accorded varying weights to general interests as opposed to global security interests. The most important single change came with the enunciation of the Reagan doctrine, which added a very new dimension to American global policy. Previously, U.S. emphasis had been on minimizing violence, terminating conflicts, and with a few exceptions (Guatemala, 1954; Cuba, 1961) generally acquiescing in and supporting the political status quo. As far as the Third World countries with Marxist-Leninist governments are concerned, however, the Reagan doctrine puts the U.S. in the position of promoting conflict rather than resolving it and of supporting insurgency rather than countering it. As enunciated and as applied in Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia, it represents a major new general interest of the United States manifested in four widely separated and very different parts of the world. This new general U.S. interest is in considerable measure a product of the ways in which the Soviet Union during the 1970s promoted its general interest in the conquest of power by Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties in Third World countries.

A major asymmetry has always existed and still exists between the superpowers with respect to their concrete interests in the Third World. American economic, political, diplomatic, and military involvement has always far exceeded that of the Soviet Union and hence the United States has had a variety of concrete interests: access to oil and other raw materials in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; the protection of existing investment and the opportunity for future investment in these regions and in Southeast Asia; the protection of military bases and facilities of military significance (such as the Panama Canal and the Philippine bases); and protection of the security of particular close friends and allies, such as the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt. The United States has made it clear that Soviet actions challenging some of those interests are extremely likely to provoke a response by American military forces. These challenges include the stationing of long-range missiles and the creation of Soviet bases in the Western hemisphere. They also include the most significant change in concrete American Third World interests in the past twenty-five years, the declaration by President Carter that: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." American statements, treaty commitments, and behavior suggest that U.S. military forces would be used to respond to a North Korean attack on South Korea, a Vietnamese attack on Thailand, Soviet intervention in Iran, an Iranian attack on Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, Nicaraguan attacks on Honduras or Costa Rica, and, very probably, a Soviet attack on Pakistan.

Compared to those of the United States, the concrete interests of the Soviet Union in the Third World have been limited. The Soviets

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do have some security and political interests, most notably in Cuba and Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, in the Gulf of Aden, but they have relatively few Third World economic interests. In terms of concrete interests, the Soviet Union is more a regional or middle level power, like Britain or France, than a superpower. It is a superpower only because its general interests clash so notably with those of the United States and because it defines itself as the global rival of the U.S.—the Marxist Avis to the capitalist Hertz—and is so perceived by major actors on the global scene.

Superpower influence in the Third World has declined as a result of economic growth, social mobilization, development of state institutions, and, most importantly, creation of stronger military forces in Third World countries. The process of state building includes the creation of a military establishment and the definition and, if necessary, defense of national boundaries. Closely related to state building is the development of communal consciousness among groups. Where such groups have their own states this may lead them into conflict with neighboring states. Where they do not, the result is often intense and at times prolonged civil conflict aiming at autonomy or secession. Economic development, increased literacy, urbanization all tend to enhance group consciousness. Economic development also makes it possible to create modern military capabilities; the development of the arms trade and defense industries are, in this respect, simply the military component of the broader process of economic development. Economic development also promotes social mobilization; political participation expands; and the amount of political power in the country increases significantly. Office and influence cease to be the prerogatives of a small oligarchy or military junta; increasingly they come to depend upon the ability of leaders to mobilize large numbers of people through nationalistic, ideological, communal, and religious appeals.

Military budgets and military forces have grown significantly more rapidly in developing than in developed countries; military expenditures in the former increased by roughly 400 percent between 1965 and 1985 and in the latter by about 48 percent. Between 1973 and 1983 the average annual growth rate for military expenditures was 2.7 percent for developed countries and 4.7 percent for less developed countries, although these rates reversed in the early 1980s. Military manpower grew about four times as fast in developing as in developed countries. During the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries accounted for three-quarters of the world's arms imports, growing at about 7 percent annually during the 1970s. At the same time, this decade saw major expansion of the arms production capabilities in many developing countries. Between 1960 and 1980, the number of developing countries producing military aircraft increased from six to sixteen, tanks and other armored vehicles from none to six, missiles from none to nine, and naval vessels from thirteen to twenty-five. Some developing countries, most notably Israel and Brazil, became major arms exporters.

The political and military development of Third World states tended to decrease superpower influence in the Third World. Other things remaining equal, it became more and more difficult for external forces to exercise influence. In 1954, with almost minuscule involvement by Allen Dulles, the United States had a major influence in shaping the course of politics in Iran. Twenty-five years later it was hard to conceive of any level of American involvement that would have produced comparable influence. Similarly, in 1960–61 both the United States and the Soviet Union with little effort could significantly affect the outcome of political struggles in Zaire. Twenty-five years later the involvement of both superpowers in southern Africa was far greater than it had been in 1961, yet their influence on the outcome of political battles there had not risen proportionately and, in many respects, was quite modest compared to what it had been a quarter century earlier in Zaire. The increasing difficulty the superpowers had in exercising influence in the Third World, combined with

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their mutual global security concerns, encouraged them to escalate their military involvement in the Third World.

THE INVOLVEMENT of the superpowers in the Third World did not increase steadily, but instead tended to be concentrated in surges alternating with more passive periods or even, as with the United States in the 1970s, periods of decline. Between 1946 and 1986 there were three American and two Soviet surges.

The first American surge into the Third World began in the immediate aftermath of World War II with the perception by American policymakers of the need to contain Soviet expansionist tendencies revealed in Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia. It was first manifested in the pressure brought in 1946 to force the Soviets to withdraw from Iran and in the Truman doctrine of the following year. The creation of the Sixth Fleet, U.S. involvement in the Korean war, the beginning of economic assistance to poor countries in 1949, the overthrow of one government in Guatemala and the restoration of another in Iran in 1954, and the formalization of security relationships with developing countries in the Rio, SEATO, and CENTO treaties were all further aspects of this surge. A critical component was the need to secure bomber and intelligence bases in Morocco, Ethiopia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Third World.

This initial American surge slackened somewhat in the later 1950s. Overlapping with it was the start of the first Soviet surge into the Third World with the arms sales to Egypt in 1955. This was followed by active Soviet involvement in the fighting in Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in the Congo crises in the early 1960s, in support of Sukarno and the Communist party of Indonesia until their defeat in 1965, and in the creation of the first Soviet client state, Cuba, in the Western hemisphere. On the diplomatic front, the Soviet Union moved to develop treaties and understandings with Third World governments. All of this reflected, of course, Khrushchev's seeming ebullience and enthusiasm for establishing the Soviet Union as the global equal of the United States. This first phase of Soviet expansion into the Third World—"premature globalism," as Zbigniew Brzezinski later labeled it—left many legacies but, in effect, came to a dramatic end with the Cuban missile crisis.

By this time, the second American surge was developing force. Unlike the first surge, it reflected a desire not just to contain the expansion of Soviet influence around the Eurasian perimeter but also, and more ambitiously, to shape the course of political and economic development in the Third World. The issue was defined as one of reform versus revolution, and the Alliance for Progress and the Green Berets became symbols of American involvement. The central feature of this surge was the establishment of the American military presence in Vietnam and the active U.S. involvement in the Indochina war. There were, however, other actions as well, most of them in Latin America, including the intervention in the Dominican Republic, the elimination of Guevara in Bolivia, and the destabilization of the Allende regime in Chile. Meanwhile the rate of the expansion of Soviet involvement had leveled off, and during the late 1960s and early 1970s the Soviets suffered estrangement from China, defeat in Indonesia, and expulsion from Egypt.

The trauma of Vietnam led to a declining and low American posture during most of the 1970s coinciding with the second Soviet surge into the Third World. In the early 1970s, Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and Atlantic Ocean increased dramatically. In the mid- and late-1970s, the Soviets demonstrated impressive airlift capabilities in their movement of Soviet and Cuban troops and supplies to Angola and Ethiopia. As Robert Legvold pointed out in 1979:

> in the Congolese civil war it could manage little more than a few trucks and 16 transport aircraft for Lumumba's forces; three years ago, in the Angolan civil war, it ferried in thousands of

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> tons of arms to the MPLA, not to mention more than 22,000 Cuban troops. In the Somali-Ethiopian war two years later it arrived with the Cubans, still more material, and a command structure in place.

Or, in Harry Gelman's words:

> Brezhnev in the 1970s added a long-missing Soviet combat increment to the political attack on Western interests in the Third World which Khrushchev between 1955 and 1964 had conducted with the use of subversion, propaganda, economic aid, threats, and weapons supply.

In 1972 Soviet arms deliveries to non-communist developing countries amounted to about $1.5 billion; in 1979 they were over $8 billion.

Burned in some measure by what it perceived as the fickleness of some of its earlier Third World friends, most notably Sadat, the Soviet Union in its second surge made major efforts to induce the appropriate countries to create Marxist-Leninist party systems, which would provide institutional stability supplemented, in some cases, by Soviet bloc security forces to provide some insurance against coups. In the 1960s there were only four self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist states in the Third World. By the 1980s there were sixteen. To the Soviets the emergence of these states was of crucial importance to the process of "revolutionary development." The culmination of the second Soviet surge came at the end of 1979, with the effort to use Soviet troops to impose a Marxist-Leninist regime on Afghanistan.

In the first half of the 1980s the Soviet second surge subsided as the Soviet Union attempted to digest its gains, went through a succession of leadership changes, and responded cautiously to rhetorical and other assertions of American power by the Reagan administration in the third American surge into the Third World. Military components in this surge included the assertion of American interests in the Persian Gulf (initially made by President Carter and reaffirmed by President Reagan), the gradual development of the military capabilities of the Rapid Deployment Force and subsequent Central Command, the invasion of Grenada, the bombing of Libya, and the unsuccessful efforts to use American forces to provide order in Lebanon. In addition, the administration asserted American interests in promoting democratic development in the Third World and played a limited although significant role in doing that in the Philippines and Haiti. Most significantly, the administration propounded the Reagan doctrine and provided support to anti-communist insurgents in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia. By 1985 it was the turn of one of Gorbachev's top associates to speak of "the new American globalism."

THIS SUCCESSION of three American and two Soviet surges into the Third World reveals several recurring patterns.

First, so far, Soviet and American surges have tended to alternate. When Soviet involvement in the Third World is expanding most rapidly, American involvement will be passive, or expanding more slowly, or even, as in the 1970s, declining. The same holds true in reverse.

Second, each surge was, in some measure, associated with consolidation of power by a new leader. In the American case, the leader is in power once he is in office and Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan lost no time in asserting American interests in the Third World. In the Soviet case, a new secretary general may still have to consolidate his power and hence, as with Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the inauguration of an active Third World policy may lag behind his arrival in office.

Third, the three surges before the most recent American one all ended in policy failures; the Cuban missile crisis and Afghanistan for the Soviets and the Vietnam war for the United States. Each of these failures was, in one way or another, a product of overextension, of attempting to do too much. In each case the superpower was compelled to confront and to accept the limits of its own power.

Fourth, each surge has seen an escalation

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The USSR in Third World Conflicts

Egypt, 1955	First overt arms agreement with a Third World client
Yemen vs. South Yemen, 1957–9	First military aid given to a country currently engaged in conflict
Sumatran rebellion, 1958	First military aid to a non-Communist country at war when the United States supported the opposing side with arms
Congo crisis, 1960	First Soviet military involvement in an African dispute First Soviet-assisted transport of Third World troops in a war zone
Laotian civil war, 1960–1	First direct Soviet supply of front-line troops in a Third World conflict
Yemeni civil war, 1962–9	First confirmed participation of Soviet fighter pilots in combat First case of Soviet advisers remaining in center of combat
Nigerian civil war, 1967–70	First large-scale Soviet military involvement in a sub-Saharan conflict
War of attrition, 1969–70	First known case of Soviet advisers manning SAM installations
October war, 1973	First massive Soviet resupply effort to a non-Communist belligerent in the course of full hostilities. First massive Soviet airlift of arms to a Third World country at war First deployment of Cuban troops in connection with a Soviet operation in a Third World conflict
Fall of Saigon, 1975	First major case of a Soviet-backed regime defeating a U.S. ally in war
Angolan civil war, 1975–6	First large-scale use of Cuban troops armed with Soviet arms in a Third World conflict First massive Soviet intervention in sub-Saharan Africa
Ogaden war, 1977–8	First instance of high-level Soviet commanders being directly involved in planning a Third World military operation
Civil war in Afghanistan, 1978	First participation by Soviet ground troops in a Third World conflict First Soviet invasion of a Third World country

The Trend of Soviet Military Involvement in Third World Conflicts[1]

Precedent	Yemen-Aden	Indonesia	Congo	Laos	Yemen	Nigeria	War of attrition	Vietnam	Yom Kippur	Angola	Ogaden war	Afghan civil war
Soviet ground troops												X
Soviet commanders											X	X
Cuban troops										X	X	X
Massive scale							X	X	X	X	X	X
Soviets in combat roles					X		X		X		X	X
Soviet advisers in war zone					X	?	X	X	X	?	X	X
Direct supply of troops on the front				X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Transport of troops			X	?	X		X		X	X	X	X
Arms shipments	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

[1]This table illustrates how a precedent, once set, tends to be repeated again and eventually to become the norm in future conflicts. These tables are from Bruce D. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980:* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 242–243, and are used with permission of the publisher.

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in the forms of superpower involvement in Third World conflicts. The pattern of Soviet escalation has been clearly spelled out by Bruce Porter. (See accompanying table and list.) Escalation has also occurred on the American side. What President Kennedy refused to do in the Caribbean in 1961, President Reagan did in 1983. U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war obviously marked a high point in the second surge, but that was, after all, still a military effort requested by a client state for defense against internal and external attack. The Reagan doctrine, on the other hand, represents a major new departure by providing assistance to insurgencies attempting to overthrow Soviet client governments. To date this assistance has, with some exceptions (e.g., the CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors), been limited to the provision of arms, training, supplies, and money. The dynamics of the previous surges, however, lead one to wonder whether U.S. support will remain limited to that and whether at some point U.S. or other allied military forces may not become involved in fighting along with the insurgents.

Fifth, as Francis Fukuyama has pointed out, Soviet surges into the Third World have tended to coincide with tendencies toward detente in Soviet-American relations. When those relations have become more antagonistic, the Soviets have tended to pull back and to make a point of avoiding "adventurism" in the Third World. The U.S. surges, on the other hand, have tended to coincide with periods of heightened tension and have, from the American point of view, been responses to Soviet expansionism. Detente, in short, gives the Soviets the chance to expand in the Third World; superpower antagonism gives Americans the stimulus and the domestic political support to counter them in the Third World.

Finally, each escalatory step in superpower involvement in the Third World has, so far, with the notable exception of the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba, come to be viewed as an accepted way of playing the game. This point has been well made by Bruce Porter with respect to Soviet behavior:

> By advancing incrementally and by carefully choosing the places and times of its development in Third World conflicts, the Soviet Union has substantially increased its latitude of action in the world. The cumulative effect has been an evolutionary erosion of the postwar international order, a gradual change in the nature of the game itself. Soviet behavior that was disturbing in 1955—the arms deal with Egypt—seemed routine within a decade; 20,000 Cuban troops in Africa appeared a profound new threat to the West in 1975, but in 1978 the deployment of an additional 15,000 in the Horn of Africa was downplayed by U.S. policymakers. What the USSR achieved in the Third World between 1973 and 1980 would have been totally unacceptable to the United States only a few years earlier; two decades earlier it might have led to war.

Since the cold war began with a much smaller Soviet than American presence in the Third World, the routinization of new patterns of involvement has been most marked on its side. In less dramatic form, however, this routinization also occurred on the American side, as the USSR signed major agreements with the United States while American planes were bombing a close ally, accepted the overthrow by U.S. military forces of a Marxist-Leninist regime in the Caribbean, and encouraged summits to proceed despite open U.S. support for insurgencies against Soviet clients.

The forms of superpower military involvement in the Third World have thus changed and for the most part escalated as it has become more difficult for the superpowers to influence what goes on in the Third World. Even with the escalation, however, Soviet willingness to commit its own military forces to defend its Third World interests has been limited. It deployed Soviet pilots in air defense missions in Yemen and Egypt and manned SAM batteries for the same purpose in Egypt and Syria. It provided Soviet command and staff, as well as logistical support, to the Cuban intervention in Ethiopia. And, of course, massive Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. The question remains, however:

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To what extent would the Soviet Union commit its own military forces to the defense of other concrete Soviet interests in the Third World? Would it have come to the defense of Cuba if the United States had invaded in 1961? That seems most unlikely. Would it come to Cuba's defense in response to an American invasion in the future? That is uncertain, although it clearly has no intention of attempting to defend Nicaragua. Would the Soviet Union have defended North Vietnam against American invasion between 1965 and 1973? Again, that seems most unlikely. The most probable commitments of Soviet forces in the Third World would be in response to a massive Israeli assault on Syria or in response to a disintegration in Iran that provided too many promising opportunities and potential threats to be ignored. All in all, however, the operational maxim of the Soviets seems to have been: no Soviet interest in the Third World is worth military conflict with the United States.

THE MODEL of alternating American and Soviet surges suggests that at some point in the near future the third American surge will taper off and a third Soviet surge will commence. The questions are: How and under what circumstances will the American surge end? What form, if any, will a new Soviet surge assume?

As we have pointed out, the three surges before the current one culminated in what were widely perceived as humiliation and defeat for their protagonists: Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan. Is the current American surge likely to come to a comparable end? This would quite conceivably be the case if circumstances developed in which the administration felt it necessary to dispatch U.S. troops to invade Nicaragua. Absent this event, a more likely scenario is that this surge, like the previous ones, will fade as a result of overextension, but with a whimper rather than a bang. The prospects for success in overthrowing the Marxist-Leninist governments currently or potentially the targets of the Reagan doctrine do not seem very high. In Afghanistan and Cambodia, the neighboring communist states have deployed massive forces to insure that the insurgencies do not succeed, and there is every reason to believe that they have the interest, the will, and the capability to prevent that success. These two wars clearly impose costs on the Soviet Union and Vietnam, yet they are costs that, from the point of view of the interests at stake, these governments are willing to bear. Nor, given the interests stemming from their geographical propinquity, are those governments likely to agree to any negotiated arrangement that does not assure them control over the political development of the neighboring country.

In Angola an insurgency based on one tribal group confronts a government based on another group and supported by 20,000 or more Cuban troops. This is, in large part, an inter-tribal or communal conflict not all that different from those going on in the Sudan, Zimbabwe, the Western Sahara, and elsewhere. As is so often the case in Third World wars, neither side seems to have the ability to win a decisive victory. American support will make it easier for Savimbi to continue the war but it will not enable him to win it; the same is true of Cuban support for the government side. At the same time, the hatreds that generated and are generated by the conflict, not to mention the Cuban and South African entanglements, rule out a negotiated solution. A similar situation would exist should the United States in the future provide support for the Eritrean rebels in Ethiopia.

The prospects of the Reagan doctrine yielding a victory are undoubtedly greater in Nicaragua than elsewhere. Yet here too, despite its economic disaster, the government appears to be consolidating its rule and controlling the political effects of the disillusionment and defection manifest in much of the population. To date no Marxist-Leninist regime has been replaced by a non-Marxist-Leninist regime as a result of internal insurgency. The argument has been made that the inherent organizational characteristics of such regimes give them an immunity to revolutionary overthrow that is denied to more

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narrowly based and less tightly structured authoritarian regimes. Nicaragua would seem to be an ideal place to test that proposition. If internal revolt can overthrow an indigenous Marxist-Leninist regime anywhere, it should happen in Nicaragua. If it does not happen there, such regimes may be as unsusceptible to revolutionary overthrow as Che Guevara once alleged democratic regimes to be.

The Reagan doctrine, as it has been practiced in the four cases to date, may thus die a lingering death as prospects for victory recede indefinitely into the future, disunity and disillusionment weaken the insurgents, and American public support for interminable and unpleasant guerrilla wars evaporates.

If the third American surge ends in this fashion, what, then, are the prospects for a new Soviet surge in the Third World? Mikhail Gorbachev appears to be giving first priority to domestic reform. Related to this is an apparent desire to arrive at some arms control agreements with the United States. Should these materialize, a new era of detente would be well under way. If past patterns hold true, improved relations with the U.S. plus Gorbachev's consolidation of power could lead to greater Soviet activity in the Third World. Soviet officials have already tied future increases in Soviet economic assistance to the Third World to a reduction in the tempo of the Soviet-American arms race. Detente will, in their view, enhance the prospects for revolution in the Third World. Or as one Soviet analyst put it: "Economic decolonization hardly seems possible in conditions of global confrontation, the exacerbation of conflict situations and the growth of international tension. Therefore, the primary task is overcoming the crisis of detente and establishing a stable climate of international cooperation." Gorbachev's first year in power saw significant increases in economic and military assistance to Nicaragua and in arms deliveries to North Korea, and intensified efforts to stimulate Pushtun and Baluchi disaffection in Pakistan. One key Gorbachev aide, Aleksandr Yakolev, has quite explicitly articulated Soviet desire to compete more vigorously with the U.S. in the Third World.

Presumably the first Soviet priority in a third surge will be the consolidation of the gains it achieved in its second surge, that is, assuring the continued Marxist-Leninist character of the states that so proclaimed themselves during the 1970s. Beyond this, however, the opportunities for the further expansion of Soviet involvement and influence are highest in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Here, apart from Israel, the American position rests on Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf sheikdoms, and Pakistan. No one of these is likely to evoke confident predictions concerning its future political stability. Over the decades Soviet forms of involvement in the Third World have clearly escalated. In some respects so have American ones, in military terms most notably in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area. This area is also the one place in the Third World where major concrete American and Soviet interests overlap and hence where Soviet and American forces are most likely to come into conflict. If a third Soviet surge materializes, Southwest Asia is where a Third World war could most easily lead to a third World War.

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Trade & Deterrence

Henry R. Nau

SINCE World War II, the United States and its allies have quarreled bitterly over East-West trade. During this period, U.S. policy has swung sharply from denial to detente and back to denial. Cold war policies initially denied both military and economic trade. Detente policies relaxed controls. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland, the United States returned to policies of denial, precipitating one of the most serious alliance disputes in the postwar era—over the Soviet gas pipeline and sales to Western Europe.

U.S. policy toward East-West trade may be swinging once again. Since 1985 U.S.-Soviet relations have improved, albeit modestly. Governmental and nongovernmental trade talks have resumed. The new Soviet leadership has introduced trade and economic reforms, sought affiliation with the major Western international economic institutions, and, in the eyes of some analysts, launched a strategy to acquire Western technology and capital—not only to secure the economic benefits, but also to weaken the Nato and U.S. military effort and widen differences between Europe and the United States.[1] U.S. government actions have recently abetted Soviet initiatives by offering to subsidize grain sales to the Soviet Union (which offer was brushed aside by the Kremlin) and, in early 1987, removing controls on energy equipment and technology sales to the Soviet Union.

Within the United States, the National Academy of Sciences released a study in January 1987 which warned that, after necessary efforts in recent years to enhance U.S. national security export controls, these controls "are in danger now of overcorrecting," costing American jobs and export sales without commensurate gains in security.[2] Congress is considering legislation that would sharply cut controlled items. And the Reagan administration itself announced measures in February 1987 to reexamine U.S. export controls in light of U.S. competitiveness needs.

Another sharp swing in U.S. East-West trade policy would not only be ill-advised, but would almost certainly occasion new misunderstandings and conflicts with the allies. To avoid such a swing, U.S. policy needs to be thought through anew and provided with a different theoretical foundation. Neither detente nor denial offers useful guidelines. Both approaches overemphasize the role of trade in U.S.-Soviet

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[1] See Henry S. Rowen, "Living With a Sick Bear" (*The National Interest*, Winter 1985/6).

[2] *Balancing the National Interest: U.S. National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Competition* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering and Institute of Medicine, January 1987).

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relations. We need a more discriminating policy, based on the logic of deterrence. Such a policy would consistently deny strategic trade with the Soviet Union to protect Western defense assets, while permitting non-subsidized, market-determined levels of non-strategic trade to foster communications and dialogue with the Soviet Union. To distinguish between strategic and non-strategic trade, such a policy requires both a more sophisticated concept of the relationship of trade to strategic conflict and a strengthened process of consultation and decision-making among the allies on all of the various dimensions of East-West trade policy—strategic, foreign policy, and economic.

Policies of denial and detente both overstate the role that economic relations can play in strategic conflict. Policies of denial emphasize fundamental and irreconcilable differences between the Soviet Union and the United States, including the way the two societies value and organize economic activities. Yet these same policies often assume that the Soviet Union, like the West, values economic exchanges so highly that their denial will produce significant changes in Soviet behavior. Policies of detente, by contrast, assume that economic exchanges can eventually overcome strategic differences, even though these differences sharply inhibit such exchanges from reaching significant levels.

The role of economic relations in strategic conflict is actually much more modest. For all of the Western countries, economic ties with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are a relatively small proportion of their total trade (see Table). While trade with the East may be of great importance to individual industrial sectors or firms, its potential consequences in strategic terms still remain small. Thus, these relations are primarily useful neither for waging strategic conflict (denial) nor for resolving it (detente) but rather in managing such conflict. In this sense, economic relations between East and West are a limited but nevertheless important part of deterrence. A brief review of postwar trade policies will help to clarify the deterrence perspective.

Overemphasizing Economics

PRIOR TO the late 1960s, the dominant view on East-West trade policy, particularly in the United States, was that economic relations offered another means for *waging* and perhaps ultimately *winning* the conflict over fundamental issues with the Soviet Union. This view, reflected in the Export Control legislation prior to 1969, called for an embargo of economic as well as military goods. Such a broad-based embargo, it was believed, could not only deny the Soviet Union the technologies needed for military development but more generally weaken the Soviet state by forcing it to face the cost of the inefficiencies of its own economic system. Over time, economic denial could be decisive in altering the physical, military, and economic balance in favor of the West. The fundamental conflict between East and West would then recede as the Soviet Union retreated abroad, or changed its basic system at home, or both.

Many European governments never embraced this view. Nevertheless, they cooperated with the United States in establishing controls on military-related trade with the East (through COCOM, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) as long as this process was carried on discreetly through informal and low-level technical arrangements. In the 1960s, however, European governments began to articulate an alternative view. They held that the cultivation of economic ties can help over time to *resolve* certain basic strategic and political conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially postwar conflicts in Central Europe. According to this view, economic activities provide for mutual benefits and contribute to a common stake in peaceful international relations. As such, these ties encourage a convergence of structures and expectations between East and West that ultimately removes or at least significantly ameliorates the central conflict between the two types of societies. As this conflict diminishes, resources formerly devoted to military

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Table

Major Western Countries Trade with the East, 1966–1984[1]

Exports (X) and Imports (I) as a percentage of World Exports and Imports[2]

Country	*1966*		*1972*		*1976*		*1980*		*1984*	
	X	I	X	I	X	I	X	I	X	I
France	4.6	3.5	4.1	3.2	5.8	3.5	4.0	3.9	3.2	3.7
Japan	6.2	7.5	5.2	5.8	6.9	4.3	2.8	1.5	1.8	1.3
United Kingdom	3.7	4.7	3.3	4.1	3.0	3.7	2.3	2.5	1.8	2.2
West Germany	6.0	5.9	7.0	5.9	8.4	6.6	6.5	6.2	5.4	7.0
United States	0.7	0.7	1.8	0.6	3.2	0.9	1.7	0.6	1.9	0.7

[1]Source: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, based on Series A, *Statistics of Foreign Trade*, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.

[2]From 1980, includes trade with USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Before 1980, includes trade with those countries plus Albania, the People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia, and Cuba. Imports are c.i.f. except for the United States, where they are f.o.b. Exports are all f.o.b.

ends can safely be diverted to economic and social purposes. Trade restrictions can be relaxed and eventually dismantled.

Detente perspectives in the 1970s incorporated these views, varying largely in the extent to which they foresaw the narrowing of fundamental differences and the degree to which they tolerated or urged reduction in arms and military expenditures. The Harmel Report approved by Nato in 1967 ushered in the era of detente. It defined detente as a "search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved." A series of international political agreements in the early 1970s—the Berlin agreement, SALT I, the Vietnam Peace Accords, etc.—coincided with the expansion of economic relations and seemed to suggest that some important elements of the conflict, especially in Central Europe, were on the way to being resolved. What is more, and where the detente perspective ironically went further in the United States than in Europe, the United States began to cut back significantly on military expenditures, using the so-called Vietnam peace dividend to expand welfare and other social programs at home.

In retrospect, the detente approach erred, not by believing that economic relations can ameliorate East-West tensions, but in expecting that these relations can resolve fundamental differences and thereby permit lower defense investments. In the course of the 1970s, it was the substitution of detente for defense, as the United States unilaterally cut back the modernization of its deterrent forces, that eventually eroded detente itself. As the military balance shifted, economic relations that may have begun by contributing usefully, if marginally, to better relations became instead a potential threat: By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union was aggressively seeking Western technology to help project its military power abroad and acquiring new sources of commercial leverage, to be used, perhaps, for pressuring the European allies on subtle political aspects of East-West relations.

This was the background against which the Carter administration after Afghanistan and the Reagan administration after Poland swung back toward policies of economic denial. The Carter administration consciously sought a conceptual middle road between denial and detente but failed to achieve a bureaucratic consensus. The sanctions imposed after Afghanistan lacked a coherent rationale. Initially, the Reagan administration was also deliberative. It formulated a so-called "prudent" approach, which pressed for tighter strategic controls while lifting the grain em-

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bargo. Though not intending to wage economic warfare, the Reagan administration eventually embraced a more aggressive policy of economic denial. It did so in part because of the pressures of the Polish events in December 1981 but also because, like the Carter administration, it was unable to discipline its interagency decision-making processes and, more importantly, lacked a clearly understood and accepted rationale for stopping somewhere short of policies of denial.

A DETERRENCE perspective might have helped. This perspective holds that fundamental political conflicts between East and West are deep-seated and unlikely to be affected significantly by economic relations for positive or punitive purposes, especially when the latter are viewed in isolation from larger political and strategic events. Thus, instead of being useful for *waging* or *resolving* conflicts between East and West, economic ties are primarily useful in *managing* conflicts. They play a role, in short, in the operation of deterrence.

Deterrence calls for both defense and dialogue, and throughout the postwar period has relied on U.S. and Western technological superiority in strategic systems to offset a Soviet and Warsaw Pact advantage in conventional systems. Consequently, in a deterrence perspective on East-West trade, defense imperatives require the consistent protection of Western strategic technologies, on which the West relies to deter Soviet conventional advantages, while dialogue encourages market-determined levels of trade as one element of continuing communications, also a vital ingredient of deterrence. Economic ties, however, do not lead to structural convergence or even to significant leverage in bargaining between East and West. They remain useful primarily as a means to communicate growing trust or distrust between the superpowers. And they are likely to build trust only to the extent that they take place on a foundation of strong defense and mutual strategic confidence. Indeed, the erosion of defense, according to this perspective, is precisely what leads to the use of economic sanctions, often as substitutes for other measures that are not available and in response to Soviet actions possibly precipitated, at least in part, by the prior lowering of Western defense vigilance. From a perspective of deterrence, the best way to ensure stable and useful economic relations between East and West is to maintain effective defenses.

The deterrence perspective as it applies to East-West trade policy is not well developed or understood. This was apparent in early planning of the Reagan administration. In preparations for the Ottawa summit, an interagency paper approved by the president drew careful distinctions between various aspects of East-West trade under differing assumptions and guidelines. In strategic trade, the paper sought a review and tightening of export controls to protect new investments in strategic technology provided for in the administration's defense plans. In foreign policy areas, it recognized economic sanctions as likely tools of deterrence in crisis situations but advocated contingency planning to ensure that these controls would be applied multilaterally if possible.

In a third area labeled economic security (involving possible Soviet foreign policy leverage over the West), the interagency study called for discussion and review of levels of Western dependence on Eastern resources and markets and development of collective measures to protect against vulnerability from such dependence. The study stated explicitly that this did not necessarily imply the restriction or even the discouragement of market-determined levels of trade and other economic transactions between East and West. Rather it involved building in redundancy to protect against the disruption of critical supplies from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by establishing back-up emergency supply arrangements among the allies and long-term allied cooperation for the development of alternative supplies. This was the perspective under which Europe's dependence on natural gas supplies from the Soviet Union was viewed. Finally, in a fourth

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area labeled economic influence, the study called for improved collective monitoring and review of East-West trade relations among the OECD countries to further the extension of Western rules (e.g., GATT rules) and market standards (e.g., eliminate credit subsidies) to economic relations with the East.

The prudent approach contained many aspects of a deterrence, rather than denial or detente, perspective on East-West trade. It recognized the imperative to invest in and protect strategic technological capabilities as the underlying guarantor of deterrence. It also recognized the potential use of economic sanctions to influence the political and psychological management of deterrence. At the same time, it did not deny general economic relations and actually allowed for expanding economic ties, as long as these ties did not contribute to a leakage of strategic technologies or to increased Western economic vulnerability in the face of Soviet blackmail.

The prudent approach offered the underlying conceptual basis on which the administration lifted the grain embargo in April 1981, opposed the Soviet gas pipeline in principle but not in practice at the Ottawa summit in July 1981 (rejecting explicitly at this point an embargo against pipeline equipment and advocating alternative Western energy development, explored by a U.S. mission to Europe in October 1981), and initiated contingency discussions with the allies about possible economic sanctions in case of Soviet intervention in Poland. The approach, however, did not survive. Under the pressure of events in Poland in December 1981 and the weakness and disarray in the administration's decision-making machinery (e.g., the national security adviser was on administrative leave during the Polish crisis), the administration moved increasingly back toward policies of more general denial.

The case for denial is powerful. Unlike detente, it does not envision economic and political ties eventually substituting for military defense. Instead, it calls for all policies, including economic ones, to reinforce and complement Western defense strategy. But it goes beyond deterrence when it foresees economic factors playing a significant role in helping to win the conflict with the Soviet Union. Two decades of denial of military and economic trade with the Soviet Union after World War II did not significantly affect the growth of Soviet military capabilities. Moreover, policies of denial are not sustainable politically, either within the United States or within the alliance.

Organizing for Deterrence

A DETERRENCE perspective, which views East-West economic relations in a more differentiated way, requires a stronger consultation process among the Western allies. Yet historically this process has been both weak and episodic. The United States and its allies have failed to take the subject seriously and to treat it consistently.

In 1980, the institutional infrastructure for East-West trade policy among the allies was, by any reasonable standards, inadequate. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the principal organ for controlling strategic trade and technology transfer, existed and acted in some measure to arrest the flow of strategic goods to the Soviet Union. But it had not met in high-level session since 1956, and ultimately was unable to stanch the hemorrhage of Western technology to the Soviet Union in the 1970s. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes neutral countries, considered the subject of East-West trade taboo; and Nato was inhibited from addressing the subject by some members (e.g. France) who rejected the extension of strategic cooperation into economic areas. There were no formal structures whatsoever to consider the imposition of trade controls for foreign policy reasons, other than bilateral consultations and periodic, secret meetings among the so-called Quad countries—the United States, France, Germany, and Great Britain.

Much of the responsibility for past failure to consider East-West trade issues seriously rests with the United States. Since the loosening of trade controls in the late 1960s,

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the U.S. has blown hot and cold on this issue, sometimes simultaneously. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger sought to promote trade and technology flows to the Soviet Union as part of the web of interdependence that would give the Soviet Union a heightened stake in the international system. Meanwhile, Senator Henry Jackson engineered sharp legislative restrictions on trade and credit to the Soviet Union, until or unless it relaxed emigration rules. In 1976 Secretary of State Kissinger asked the OECD to consider East-West trade issues on a more systematic basis, but the Carter administration showed little interest in the subject until Soviet mistreatment of prominent dissidents and eventually the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provoked harsh new trade embargoes against the Soviet Union.

Little wonder, then, that when President Reagan addressed the subject with new vigor at Ottawa, the allies were not inclined to take him seriously. They are more reluctant in any case to consider restrictions on trade with the East, except in the most significant military-related products and technologies. Hence, they are inclined either to ignore the subject—arguing that the subject is so sensitive domestically that it can only be handled if it does not receive high-level international attention—or to probe long and hard to see if the Americans are really serious this time around. Without minimizing substantive differences on the issues, the gas pipeline controversy reflected, in considerable part, the breakdown of mutual sensitivities to the intention and priorities of each side, which might not have occurred if there had been more regular institutional mechanisms for dealing continuously with East-West trade issues.

Since the pipeline issue, some progress has been made in strengthening institutional processes among the allies for considering East-West trade issues. COCOM has held three high-level sessions, concluded a far-reaching new list review and is undergoing long-needed administrative improvements. The OECD, Nato, and the International Energy Agency (IEA) have all conducted serious, and potentially ongoing, studies of East-West trade and energy issues. The allies may be in the best position yet to handle these difficult issues in the future—that is, if they and especially the United States do not suddenly, once again, blow cold on this issue. The improved consensus may be tested very early if the Soviet Union undertakes an aggressive strategy of acquiring Western capital and technology, particularly from Western Europe.

What lessons can the United States and its allies draw from recent experience, both to sharpen a sustainable deterrence rationale for East-West trade policy and to strengthen allied mechanisms for discussing and deciding these issues? The most important dimension of East-West trade policy remains the overall status of U.S.-Soviet relations and the role that economic cooperation or denial can play in them. Unless there is some congruence among the views of the allies on the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and the relationship of economic ties to strategic conflict, defining strategic controls in COCOM or cooperating with the allies on East-West trade in other international organizations (OECD, IEA, Nato) will remain difficult. Even then, the smoothness of multilateral decision-making in East-West trade areas depends heavily upon strengthened decision-making processes within each country. In the case of the United States, for example, conflicts between the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce have more than once delayed or compounded decisions to be taken in COCOM. Finally, the consequences of trade controls for industrial competitiveness are no longer matters of subordinate interest to national security. In the face of a massive U.S. trade deficit, unprecedented competition in international markets, and increasingly rapid technological advance, which often emerges in commercial applications before military ones, the U.S. government, indeed every government, must find less intrusive means to administer necessary export controls.

THE MOST DIFFICULT problem for the deterrence perspective is to define the gray area between policies of

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denial of strategic exports and policies of market-determined levels of non-strategic trade. In the first instance, this is a political not a technical problem. Export controls on any trade make sense only in a context of overall foreign policy conflict. The United States essentially has no export controls on trade with Canada because it has no fundamental political conflict with Canada (and Canada implements controls comparable to U.S. controls on exports to third countries). On the other hand, it has fundamental differences with the Soviet Union. Certain trade becomes strategic in the context of these differences. If the differences narrow, as they have somewhat, for example, in recent U.S. relations with China, it is reasonable to expect the definition of strategic trade to change. All export controls, therefore, are based on some perception of foreign policy conflict.[3]

The deterrence perspective assumes enduring conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. From this perspective, therefore, it should be possible to standardize the definition of strategic trade. But deterrence also calls for careful and continuous communications. In past U.S.-Soviet relations, this communication has sometimes been carried on by expanding or contracting non-strategic trade. So-called foreign policy controls have been used to signal increasing trust or distrust in superpower relations. If we evaluate these controls in terms of denial or detente criteria, that is, whether they significantly alter specific Soviet behavior, we would have to conclude that they have failed or that, at the least, their costs exceed their benefits. But what about their effects on the intangible political and psychological elements of deterrence? Did they communicate important limits of U.S. patience and vital interests? Did they convey an impression of growing U.S. concern with Soviet adventurism? Did they alert our allies and friends around the world to the continuing determination of the United States to compete with the Soviet Union in maintaining the balance of power and resolve? None of these effects is measurable. But it would be foolish to deny that communications of these sorts are the essence of a postwar nuclear strategy to deter war by threat rather than by actual military force.

The issue is whether political leaders could better signal such intentions with other means. Businessmen and farmers would obviously like to see other means used. But would it always be sufficient or prudent to react to Soviet provocations only with political, diplomatic, or military means? Political and diplomatic steps may be either too costly, such as walking out of important arms control negotiations or abrogating existing political agreements, or relatively meaningless if they are chosen precisely to avoid such costs (e.g., boycotting the Olympics). Military measures, on the other hand, such as unplanned military maneuvers or increasing the alert status of military forces, may be too dangerous. Economic measures have appealed to presidents of both parties in the United States primarily because they entail visible costs while not being militarily provocative. They convey seriousness but not bellicosity.

To impose such painful measures, however, presidents go on to claim too much for them. They promise that the effects on Soviet behavior will far outweigh the costs to U.S. citizens. Then, when the sanctions fail to alter Soviet behavior, presidents usually lift them, often under domestic pressures which convey weakness rather than strength. Moreover, if the allies fail to cooperate, the message to the Soviet Union may be muddled. So the measures as currently practiced are not ideal for any of the parties involved.

Improvements could be made by recognizing that economic sanctions are an instrument of low-level conflict for maintaining

[3]To that extent, the insistence of the European allies and Japan on limiting COCOM to strategic controls only, as if such controls had nothing to do with the state of overall foreign policy relations between the superpowers, is illogical. They fear, of course, that any admission of foreign policy considerations might open Pandora's box and broaden COCOM's reach beyond what they might consider strategic.

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deterrence in foreign policy crises. They should be used, however, only if the United States and its allies are psychologically prepared to back them up with sterner political or military measures, either to increase the pressure on the Soviets to desist from their immediate provocation or to complicate Soviet calculations in undertaking any further provocation. In this way, economic sanctions would not exist alone, but would be supported by the threat to escalate if Soviet provocations persist or proliferate.

Thus, in a deterrence perspective, the threshold for imposing sanctions would be raised, reducing the likelihood of "light-switch diplomacy." Ironically, sanctions, as often imposed now, usually apply in situations where the United States is not likely to do anything further if provocations persist. In these cases, if it is still necessary to make a statement even though escalation to higher levels of conflict may never be intended—for example, in the case of South African apartheid—ways should be found to spread the costs of sanctions by compensating affected domestic sectors from general tax revenues. But, because in some cases this could be very expensive, businesses may have to accept possible sanctions as an inevitable risk of doing business in countries whose foreign or domestic policies are potentially repugnant to the United States. The new U.S. export administration law makes these losses somewhat less likely by protecting existing contracts except where the president determines that there has been "a breach of the peace" which "poses a serious and direct threat to the strategic interest of the United States."

Encouraging the United States and its allies to view economic sanctions in an escalation or deterrence perspective is particularly difficult because no alliance mechanism exists whereby these issues can be discussed. Allied efforts in 1981 to consider foreign policy measures in anticipation of events in Poland failed. The European allies were reluctant to discuss firm measures for situations they considered hypothetical, and when the Polish crisis materialized the Soviet role was sufficiently indirect that the allies were unwilling to go along with stiffer U.S. sanction proposals.

The allies cannot have it both ways. They cannot resist more regularized discussions of such contingencies and still expect the United States to agree with them on the precise measures to be imposed when such contingencies arise. There is no guarantee that more systematic considerations of these issues would produce agreement. As leader of the alliance, the United States bears the greatest responsibility for direct relations with the Soviet Union and is therefore always likely to be more inclined to invoke stiffer measures than the allies. But there is no chance for agreement if these issues are never discussed or discussed only in the heat of an immediate crisis. Thus, the allies could do themselves a favor by arranging for regular contingency discussions on these matters, informally and outside Nato. The United States could contribute by stating that such discussions imply a U.S. determination to apply future controls only on the basis of multilateral commitments.

If economic relations have limited yet inevitable uses for conveying negative foreign policy messages, do they have more extensive uses for signaling positive purposes? Can expanded trade with the Soviet Union in the products of the information age (e.g. personal computers) be useful in liberalizing Soviet society? Is the traditional policy of differentiation toward Eastern Europe a useful one? Has rescheduling Polish debt helped to ease Soviet pressures in Poland in recent years? Is most-favored-nation treatment of Romania still warranted even though it has not produced positive changes in Romanian domestic (human rights) policies? Is reclassification of China as a friendly country, and even in limited areas as a partner for military technology cooperation, a prudent extension of the policy of differentiation?

In a deterrence as opposed to a detente perspective, economic cooperation, like economic sanctions, provides useful but limited benefits. Even then, as in the case of sanc-

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tions, cooperation offers such benefits only when economic measures are applied in relation to broader political measures (and as noted earlier when defense vigilance is maintained). For example, the policy of economic differentiation practiced by the United States toward Eastern Europe in the early 1970s was useful and probably effective because it went hand in hand with closer political relations in that period, not only with selective Eastern European countries but also with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, efforts to provide economic assistance to Poland in the more recent period may have been less successful because U.S. political relations with the Polish government and the Soviet Union were souring simultaneously. Adapting the policy of economic differentiation to the contemporary period will depend on the direction of political ties, both between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies and between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the meantime, policies of differentiation need not be abandoned, but neither should much be expected from them.

Economic cooperation appears much more useful at the moment in relations with China. Here economic and political ties are clearly moving in the same direction. But, just because of that, there may also be a tendency to slip too easily from a deterrence to a detente perspective and to expect too much from rapidly improving economic ties and, in some areas, military cooperation. Both the foreign and domestic policies of China are anchored too deeply in historical and traditional experiences to change *predictably* under the initial surface manifestations of economic liberalization. While recognizing the value of current levels of cooperation, U.S. officials would also be wise to avoid inflation of both official and private expectations concerning such cooperation.

It has always been a curious fact that those (particularly in the business world) most critical of the negative value of economic sanctions are most euphoric about economic cooperation. If cooperation is that valuable, would it not follow that denial of such cooperation is equally valuable? Expectations that personal computers or television sets will significantly alter domestic patterns of authoritarian control in China or the Soviet Union, about which the Communist parties in these countries care most, are even less credible than expectations that economic cooperation can permanently alter foreign policy behavior in these countries.

Two final observations apply to foreign policy aspects of East-West trade. The foreign policy benefits of non-strategic trade are never so great as to warrant subsidizing this trade. In this respect, the Reagan administration's recent offer to subsidize grain sales to the Soviet Union threatens to unravel all of the gains achieved among the allies in the past few years to curb competitive subsidies to the East, including credit subsidies. The credit issue, it should be recalled, was one of the key ingredients of the allied dispute at Versailles. It was settled within the context of the OECD arrangement on export credits only after long, hard discussions. Now the ill-considered, domestically motivated offer to subsidize grain calls into question all constraints on subsidies. Worse still, it occurs at a time when the Soviets need Western currencies more than ever before to sustain their commitments around the world.

Subsidies also pose a further threat. Left to market forces, Soviet exports to the West or Western exports to the Soviet Union are never likely to become large enough to expose the West to blackmail should the Soviets threaten to interrupt these exports. Without the earlier subsidies involved, Western companies recently decided to develop North Sea natural gas rather than import Soviet gas. Subsidies, however, can lead to excessive Western dependence on Soviet resources or markets, and that represents not only economic profligacy but political folly.

What to Control

SORTING OUT and perhaps lowering expectations concerning foreign policy manipulation of non-strategic trade will facilitate allied agreement on strategic controls.

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But gray areas still exist in defining strategic trade. While more technical, these differences also involve political considerations.

The allies recognize that delaying transfer to the Soviet Union of militarily relevant technology is possible and worth the effort. Within this broad agreement, however, views diverge sharply on what should be controlled and how. The allies, along with many groups in the United States, prefer to place "high fences around relatively limited areas" of controlled goods and technology, while the U.S. government, especially the Defense Department, seeks a broad definition of strategic goods. Moreover, the allies prefer informal and low-level multilateral controls, while the United States reserves the right to control items unilaterally and seeks to strengthen multilateral controls and even extend them to non-COCOM countries.

In 1976, a report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology, now known as the Bucy Report (after its chairman, J. Fred Bucy of Texas Instruments) recommended that controls be shifted from products and trade to militarily critical technologies and so-called active transfer mechanisms such as turnkey plants or joint know-how agreements. While the intention of the Bucy Report was to reduce the product controls emphasized by previous "commodity" control lists while refining technical data controls, the approach coincided with three subsequent developments that made it a particularly contentious subject in the United States and the alliance. The shift of U.S. East-West trade policy toward denial in the late 1970s coupled with the Reagan administration's desire after 1981 to protect new strategic investments led to a general reluctance in the U.S. government to reduce product controls, at least until the categories of militarily critical technologies had been refined and added to the control list in both the United States and COCOM. This attitude was particularly evident in the computer field, where disagreement over technology and software controls stalled COCOM agreement after 1977 even on relatively simple products (e.g., microprocessors in toys). A second development, the intensification of international commercial competition, cut in the opposite direction. The economic recession in 1981–82 and then the skyrocketing American trade deficit in 1983–86 placed a new premium on export competitiveness. America as well as the allies, it was argued, could no longer afford extensive product controls, let alone extend these controls to the transfer of capital and technology within the multinational company. Finally, on top of this intensification of both military and commercial priorities, the controversy over foreign policy controls on energy items sparked by the crackdown in Poland compounded the critical technology issue. Oil and gas equipment and technology came to symbolize the vast differences between the allies over what technologies should be considered critical.

Given the confluence of these events, it is little wonder that alliance procedures for deciding these issues did not suffice to contain the disagreements. Three high-level meetings of COCOM—in January 1982, April 1983, and February 1985—have helped to resolve some of these differences. In July 1984, COCOM agreed on new computer controls, tightened controls on other electronic and communications equipment, and established new controls on high technology items such as robotics, spacecraft, advanced printed circuit boards, manufacturing equipment for printed circuit boards, and advanced aero-engines technologies. COCOM also agreed to update these controls continuously, rather than every three years as in the past. At the same time, some product controls were relaxed. Personal computers with 8-bit and some with 16-bit microprocessors were decontrolled. Mainframes under 48 mbit/sec are no longer controlled, though in some cases subject to volume limits.

These decisions suggest that as COCOM is strengthened and more effectively used, compromise among the allies becomes more likely. Improving procedural mechanisms helps to facilitate resolution of policy disputes. COCOM is now undergoing a major

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renovation of facilities to enlarge its quarters, upgrade automation and increase its staff. At a meeting in October 1985, it also created a new Defense Expert Group which, while not a formal part of COCOM, will advise it on military uses and re-engineering of advanced equipment and technology.

These improvements are in the interest of all the allies, not just the United States. To keep COCOM small, ineffective and technically understaffed only insures that disputes, when they arise, will bypass COCOM and eventually escalate to the highest political levels. These disputes will not go away. The United States makes the largest defense investments in the alliance, and its forces perform more varied missions. Thus it has more technology to protect and more reasons to protect it. At the margins, it will always seek longer control lists than the allies. The best than can be done is to contain these disputes by strengthening the decision-making processes to encourage compromise.

Europe and Japan should commit themselves to a further strengthening of COCOM to the extent the United States indicates a willingness to compromise, as it did on computers in 1984. A stronger COCOM process, which also includes rather than excludes pertinent military expertise, can restore mutual sensitivities and trust among the allies and help avoid a repetition of the pipeline imbroglio. A strong COCOM does not necessarily mean more control; it means more timely and in some cases more limited controls, as the United States bargains off less sophisticated products for more critical products and technologies.

A stronger COCOM can also reduce the salience of controversial measures such as extraterritorial controls and national blocking legislation. The United States turns to extraterritorial controls and the allies to blocking legislation only when the bargaining mechanisms break down, as they did after Versailles. To the extent that bargaining mechanisms are strengthened and experience enhances confidence and mutual trust among the negotiators, the use of these controversial legal measures becomes less necessary and less likely.

STRENGTHENING national decision-making processes on East-West trade policy also facilitates compromise in COCOM. In recent years, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada have all strengthened their administrative and enforcement procedures for East-West trade controls. This includes enlarging the role of defense ministries. In the United States, legislation passed in 1979 gave the Department of Defense for the first time the right to review individual validated export licenses to controlled countries. The most controversial aspect of the 1985 legislation was the extension of this right to non-controlled countries within the West. In January 1985, the Reagan administration issued guidelines that eventually gave DOD the right to review East-West transfers to some fifteen countries in eight selective product categories.

This authority has been sharply disputed by American business, which fears obstacles to legitimate West-West trade, and by the House of Representatives, which refused to ratify this provision in the new legislation. After three years of bruising debate over the export control legislation, however, Congress and the executive agencies should bury the hatchet for a few months and let the new procedure work. The Defense Department has to prove its credibility in the process, both by handling case reviews as expeditiously as possible and by compromising as necessary within that process. If it does not, it risks having the process called into question again. Similarly, the Department of Commerce needs to share information as required with Defense and administer the appeal procedure as efficiently as possible, taking cases in which compromise proves impossible to the White House and the National Security Council. The latter chairs the interagency group charged to make the final decisions under the January guidelines. Through 1986, the NSC had not yet discharged this role with sufficient vigor.

COCOM has pushed hard in recent years to harmonize member nations' controls and to build confidence that no member is

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cheating to benefit its own industry. The possible leakage of strategic technologies through non-COCOM countries, however, has become a larger problem. The United States has expressed its concerns to non-COCOM countries; while resisting such U.S. pressures, some non-COCOM countries in Europe and Asia—Austria, Sweden, Spain, Singapore—have recently tightened their legal controls.

Though extremely sensitive, improvements and hence greater confidence in the controls of non-COCOM countries are critical. Lack of confidence in these controls feeds back into lack of confidence in COCOM controls. Re-export licenses become the only way to control the reshipment of items from COCOM to non-COCOM destinations. At the moment the United States has the most extensive re-export license requirements. This is regarded as a burden by U.S. industry and an impediment more generally to industrial ties within the West. While re-export licenses will continue to be required for most sensitive shipments, both within COCOM and with non-COCOM countries, the use of distribution and other licenses that do not require re-export authorization can be enhanced if greater confidence exists in government controls in the recipient country.

The industrial dimensions of East-West trade and technology controls have grown increasingly complex. Most high technology Western companies today operate within multinational structures. These companies transfer controlled technologies frequently among affiliates and subsidiaries within the Western world. They face potentially costly and time-consuming requirements to license such things as computer data or even the visit of company personnel to foreign subsidiaries in areas of militarily critical technologies. University scientists, often working closely with industry, also face new requirements to restrict access to certain types of so-called sensitive research.

Businessmen and scientists are inclined to argue that traditional controls applied to these modern industrial circumstances impede U.S. innovation and competitiveness and cause foreign firms to engineer U.S. firms out of future products in order to avoid potential U.S. controls. They would prefer to license only those items or activities that have been determined beforehand to involve classified work. But it is often not known beforehand what commercial developments may eventually produce military uses. Thus, the most promising options for U.S. industry may be licensing arrangements that rely on internal company controls.

The new U.S. legislation specifies two types of license that permit multiple transfers of goods and technology without requiring individual validated licenses—the distribution license and the comprehensive operations license. Both rely on company control mechanisms that are then audited and approved periodically by the government. Controls apply to the company system, rather than to individual transfers.

The distribution license (DL) authorizes the repeated shipment of goods to a foreign consignee (affiliated or non-affiliated) in a non-controlled country as long as that consignee has been judged reliable with respect to preventing diversion of goods to controlled countries. It was used extensively in the detente period but lost credibility in the period from 1977 to 1984 when Commerce conducted no audits of foreign consignees receiving distribution licenses, even though the last audits of 1977 turned up over 111 violations.

Since 1984 Commerce has hired twenty-five new people to conduct such audits, and Commerce officials have negotiated with France, Great Britain, and other countries to administer the audits.

The comprehensive operations license (COL) is new. It is designed primarily to deal with repeated transfers of technology, as opposed to products. It relies in the first instance on proprietary controls of the company and asks the multinational corporation or network of related firms to design an internal control process which is then audited periodically—every one or two years—to ensure compliance with government standards. This type of li-

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cense would be far less intrusive than review of individual technology transactions and would leave companies essentially free to move people and know-how around as needed within their multinational systems.

There are difficulties with both the DL and the COL. But multiple export licenses administered through internal company control systems may contribute both to improved protection against industrial espionage, which accounts for some 70 percent of strategic technology leakage to the Soviet Union, as well as to more effective administration of legal controls.

THE UNITED STATES and the Soviet Union stand on the threshold of a new period of negotiation and summitry. This development will eventually encourage expanded economic contacts. The question is whether this expansion will be accompanied once again by the euphoric expectations of detente and a lowering of defense vigilance or whether the United States and its allies can find a middle way to protect strategic trade while permitting market-determined levels of non-strategic trade.

Some signs suggest a swing again to detente. Over 400 U.S. businessmen, the largest group ever, visited Moscow after the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit, and prospects of major East-West trade ventures fill the newspapers again, particularly in Western Europe. Congressional support for defense spending has clearly peaked, and the new 100th Congress may actually reduce real defense outlays. The Soviet Union pursues a more subtle strategy to secure technological assistance from Western Europe, and a weakened Reagan administration offers subsidies on American grain and potentially on American energy exports.

The swing need not occur. Since 1982, the groundwork has been laid for a more deterrence-oriented approach to East-West trade policy, and the United States has demonstrated its willingness to compromise on strategic and foreign policy controls if it can secure strengthened processes for dealing with East-West trade issues in COCOM and other international organizations. Moreover, President Reagan has emphasized the fundamental differences between the United States and the Soviet Union and lowered expectations that political (e.g., arms control) or economic cooperation can substitute for military defense or quickly lead to resolution of basic conflicts.

There is an opportunity, therefore, to put East-West trade policy on a more stable and sustainable footing among the allies. Seizing this opportunity requires maintaining the strong defense efforts of recent years, establishing an informal mechanism among the allies to discuss the foreign policy dimensions of East-West trade, strengthening COCOM, avoiding subsidies and excessive dependence in non-strategic trade through regular consultations in the OECD and IEA, encouraging greater effectiveness and harmony in national export controls of both COCOM and certain non-COCOM countries, and finding less intrusive controls on industries doing business within the West. The objective should be, as the recent National Academy of Sciences study declares, to move in the direction of (even if one never fully attains) a "multilateral community of common controls," which would harmonize and coordinate controls with the East while replacing specific export and re-export controls in the West with more general licenses. Now is the time to demonstrate a continuing serious interest in East-West trade issues, or the balloon will assuredly go up again in the future on another bitter U.S.-allied dispute.

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NOPEC—The Future of Oil

S. Fred Singer

THE Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) can no longer control the world price of oil. This should not surprise anyone, for OPEC never did function as a true cartel, and it is unlikely that it ever will. Each member has an incentive to cheat by selling oil "under the table," at a lower price or through barter deals, in order to gain a larger share of the market. It should be clear by now that OPEC is no more than a heterogeneous collection of countries, ranging from Arabian peninsula states, with sparse populations and vast oil reserves, to nations like Indonesia and Nigeria, with large populations, small reserves, and urgent financial needs. The disparate interests of these states are shown dramatically during periods of excess production capacity and oil "gluts." Furthermore, OPEC has proved unable to convince non-OPEC producers, such as Mexico, Norway, Britain, and the USSR, to moderate their steadily rising output. (After the 1986 price collapse, to be sure, producers like Norway and the Soviet Union seemed willing to make small cutbacks in response to Saudi urgings, but it remains to be seen whether these are more than cosmetic and short lived.)

This does not mean, as some have suggested, that the price of oil will trend toward $5 per barrel, the marginal lifting cost for the bulk of present oil producers. M.A. Adelman of MIT has put forward such a scenario, but it is doubtful whether the competitive market he envisions can be maintained except for brief periods, since the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) desire to maximize profits over the long term.[1] These producers will act like monopolists even if the rest of OPEC decides to produce all out, and their "optimum" price is now between $15 and $20 per barrel.

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[1] Adelman's prediction came true with a vengeance in early 1986 when Saudi Arabia increased its market share by "net back" pricing; that is, by basing the price of its crude oil on the value of its eventual products. This pricing method not only removes all risk for the refiner—encouraging him to increase refinery runs and contribute to a glut of products—but also obscures the crude price at the time of transfer. The latter feature encouraged price competition between producers and collapsed the price of crude towards its competitive limit, below $10 a barrel. The Saudis did not anticipate such a development, although others did; that oversight may have contributed to oil minister Yamani's ouster last fall. In any case, pressure from other producers, especially Iran, led to a change in Saudi policy. The demonstration of an engineered price drop, and the threat of future price wars, could increase cartel discipline, at least for a while.

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Although the Persion Gulf oil region should become the world's major producer after the year 2000, there seems little reason to fear a repeat of the price jumps, embargoes, supply interruptions, and gasoline lines of the 1970s. For one thing, by the end of the century oil should no longer be the preeminent source of energy in the world. Heat and steam will be generated mainly by coal and natural gas, and electricity by nuclear reactors and hydropower as well. While embargo declarations created concern and sometimes panic, achieving political goals, the Arabs were never able to keep oil imports from reaching the United States; since oil is a fungible commodity, we simply bought it from other sources and probably ended up with some trans-shipped Arab oil. Gas lines were caused not by external events but by domestic price controls; there was no actual shortage. Unless such controls are reimposed by the U.S. government, gas lines will not reappear.[2] Supply interruptions are always possible, but these can be smoothed over by inventories and strategic stockpiles. Price jumps are possible only if there is panic buying or if the government mismanages the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. In short, we should see only a slow price increase to perhaps $30 to $40 per barrel (in 1986 dollars) by the end of the century.[3]

The way to reduce OPEC's power and the world price is fairly obvious, and has been known for some time: limit the consumption of oil by conservation, and encourage the discovery and development of new oil resources and alternative energy sources. To avoid a "crisis" situation, conservation programs must not resort to restrictive legislation with unrealistic goals, as they did in the 1970s. Gasoline purchase restrictions, federal speed limits (supplanting state limits), "gas-guzzler" taxes, and mandatory fuel-efficiency standards for automobiles are inefficient and unnecessary; conservation goals can best be achieved by market forces responding to the high price of oil. A higher state or federal gasoline tax, set to pay the full cost of road transportation, for example—like the user fees that pay for toll roads, bridges and tunnels—would be a good start.

To maintain conservation efforts during oil price collapses, a variable import fee (VIF) has been suggested, which would act as a floor to the domestic oil price. The VIF would be used on a stand-by basis, and would be phased out whenever the world price recovered to the target value of, say, $20 per barrel. (A variable fee should be distinguished from a straight tariff, which would simply add $5 to $10 to the price of imported oil; the latter would not stabilize domestic prices, but simply raise revenue and subsidize domestic producers.) Any income from the VIF could be used to augment the government's Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and reserve oil could be released during price jumps to stabilize prices.

When oil use reached its peak in 1981, only 35 percent worldwide was used for transportation (55 percent in the United States), the sector with few feasible alternatives. That means 65 percent of all oil use can in theory be phased out, by expanding the use of natural gas, coal, hydroelectric, and especially nuclear power in non-transportation applications. With greater conservation, that percentage can be increased. The market itself provides the ultimate protection from, and the central means of limiting, OPEC's power.

OPEC ENTERED public consciousness in late 1973 following the declaration of an Arab oil embargo and the quadrupling of oil prices from $3 to $12 per barrel. The cartel had in fact started to flex its muscles in 1970–71, when the "energy crisis" in the United States still referred to electrical "brownouts," an increasing natural gas shortage, and concerns about oil refinery capac-

[2]Regarding price controls and crisis situations, see B. Zycher, "Emergency Management of Oil," in *Free Market Energy: The Way to Benefit Consumers*, S.F. Singer, ed., Universe Books, New York 1984.

[3]For a technical discussion of the economics of oil prices, see the author's "The Price of World Oil," *Annual Review of Energy*, Vol. 8, Palo Alto 1983.

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ity—problems unrelated to OPEC. Beginning in February 1971, OPEC (specifically Iran and Libya), with the help of some inept State Department interference, managed to break the united front of the major Western oil companies. "The decline of the West started with the fall of Occidental," a small independent American oil company that first caved in to Libyan demands. It had little choice, since none of the majors would support it. By the summer of 1973, broken OPEC agreements had doubled the posted price of oil, with some oil concessions, in Libya for example, confiscated and nationalized. More conservative countries, like Saudi Arabia, simply "negotiated" a larger share of the take.

Developments within the U.S. made OPEC's power grab easier. U.S. oil production had peaked by 1971, and environmental concerns after the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill stopped most offshore development and delayed the Alaskan pipeline, which was eventually to increase U.S. output by 20 percent. Oil price controls imposed by President Nixon in August 1971 sapped incentives to drill, while existing price controls on natural gas had already created a worsening gas shortage. The Clean Air Act of 1970 forced electric utilities to switch from coal to oil, the only remaining clean fuel. Stringent automobile emissions standards lowered gasoline mileage, starting with the 1973 models. Naturally, oil imports soared.

By mid-1973, the threat of an oil embargo was being taken seriously by the media—so seriously that it became a self-fulfilling prophecy in October of that year. *Newsweek*'s cover showed a sinister-looking sheik clutching a gasoline pump hose. NBC featured a glowering King Faisal uttering guttural threats, an image undercut by his oil minister, who was explaining to Arab audiences why an embargo would not work. As it turned out, the Saudi minister was wrong—the embargo would work psychologically because of the fears that had been created.

The perception of Arab oil power dominated the West for over a decade. It was reinforced by the gasoline crisis in U.S. cities in early 1974, conveniently blamed on the Arabs or "Big Oil." Reality, of course, was different. Even though Arab producers declared an embargo against the United States and the Netherlands after Egypt and Syria invaded Israel in October 1973, nothing really happened—except a grand global swap. Oil destined for the U.S. went elsewhere, and non-Arab oil came to America. But panic buying increased demand and drove up the spot price, much to everyone's surprise. When the Arabs, frustrated by the exchange, cut their output by the amount of oil previously shipped to the U.S., they merely confirmed that oil is fungible: by cutting world supply they raised the world price. (Interestingly, radical Iraq did not reduce its production but took full advantage of the price rise.) To be sure, OPEC never "set" the world price for oil directly; it was set by the usual factors of demand and supply, with the latter controlled mainly by Saudi Arabia's decision on how much to produce. OPEC price "decisions" on oil contracts generally ratified the price on the spot market for non-contract oil.

The gasoline crisis, it bears repeating, was strictly a U.S. phenomenon, caused by price controls that required bureaucratic allocation of available fuel. The bureaucrats were naturally not about to blame the allocation process; they were convinced that with better data on gasoline use they could have managed the shortage perfectly. (They tried again in 1979 and failed miserably.) Countries without price controls had no "shortage." With the public convinced that the crisis was caused by the Arab embargo, the Nixon White House called for Project Independence, an extravagant plan to replace crude oil with synthetic oil from shale and coal and to eliminate imports entirely. Henry Kissinger invented the International Energy Agency, designed to share oil in the event of an Arab embargo or production cut, despite the fact that the market would share supply cutbacks automatically by simply raising the price.

The panic was palpable and was reflected in rather strange distortions of our foreign policy. (Some European nations and Japan

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were even more distressed and made even more concessions.) For instance, it took a few years before the United States declared illegal the efforts of Arab states to force American firms into a secondary and even tertiary boycott of Israel; other countries such as Britain are just reaching that stage. Efforts to respond decisively to Arab terrorism were made more difficult by fear, especially European, of the "oil weapon" and by single-minded pursuit of petrodollars. (France was perhaps most wedded to the practice of cultivating Arab favor in order to "guarantee access to oil." The pinnacle was reached when the French government under Giscard constructed Iraq's notorious Tamuz reactor, which used highly enriched uranium and could have led to nuclear weapons production.)

PARANOIA about oil shortages and oil security reached a peak during the Carter administration. The president's March 1977 speech resurrected the concept of an energy crisis, calling it the "moral equivalent of war." Jimmy Carter's "meow," predicting an oil shortage of unheard-of dimensions for 1983, relied in equal parts on faulty analysis and bad advice. It was suffused with a quasi-religious zeal, both for extreme forms of coercive energy conservation and for renewable energy—solar power towers, windmills, and schemes for tapping differences in ocean temperatures. At the same time, in keeping with the inconsistency that frequently marks government intervention, price controls were making oil cheaper, thus discouraging both conservation and alternate energy sources. In fairness to Carter, it should be remembered that he was only following in the footsteps of his Republican predecessors. Nonetheless, he nearly pushed the nation into a ruinously expensive scheme of synthetic fuels. If his crash program for synfuels development had gone into effect, U.S. consumers would have been locked into high-cost energy for decades to come.

Much has been written about the legislative battles involving Carter's several National Energy Plans, but his pronouncements on OPEC may have had a greater influence. These not only convinced OPEC, and especially Saudi Arabia, of coming higher oil prices—pleasant news indeed—but of a price ceiling set by the cost of synfuels and solar energy. Historically, that cost has always been higher than the price of crude oil, always out of sight and somewhere beyond the next research and development grant. Carter's misplaced deference towards Saudi Arabia—hat-in-hand trips by cabinet members and the F-15 arms sale were only the most visible signals—sent a message that oil prices could be raised with impunity.

The fall of the Shah in late 1978 and the virtual stoppage of Iranian oil exports triggered the crisis that many had awaited. While the shortfall was quickly met with excess capacity elsewhere, the panic had been kicked off, and excess buying and hoarding forced up oil demand and prices. To most participants, consumers and producers, the upward price spiral was the fulfillment of the second coming of the energy crisis, the long-awaited realization of Carter's apocalyptic visions.

A number of events during 1979–80—the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Iraq's invasion of Iran, the occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Russia's invasion of Afghanistan—contributed to the panic atmosphere and encouraged even more stockpiling of oil. Producers tended to withhold oil during the upward spiral, awaiting a higher price. Saudi Arabia, while filling in for the lost Iranian production, slashed oil production twice in early 1979, creating concern and price jumps. Almost everyone believed that prices would continue to rise, even after the price had tripled to over $36 a barrel by 1980.

Domestic events only seemed to confirm the general anxiety. With oil price controls still in place, the inevitable gasoline lines reappeared in the spring of 1979. Repeating the theme of the Nixon administration, Carter now got Congress to set up the Synfuels Corporation with an $80 billion spending authority. This was just the beginning. Vast amounts were spent by private oil

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companies to search for uneconomic oil and gas in the expectation of ever higher prices. Normally cautious bankers aided and abetted this madness, laying the groundwork for the eventual bankruptcy of many of these companies.

Yet, by late 1979, it had already become clear that oil was pricing itself out of major markets. Without waiting for synfuels, users of fuel oil replaced it with cheaper coal and gas, and with nuclear energy, to make steam and electricity. U.S. utilities reduced their use of heavy fuel oil by 70 percent between 1979 and 1985. Even though no more new nuclear plants are being ordered here, U.S. nuclear capacity will double during this decade. In other countries (for example, in France and East Asia), nuclear construction has accelerated; nuclear plants there replace oil-fired plants and thus have an even greater impact on world oil prices. During the 1980s, world hydrocapacity will increase by the equivalent of over 100 giant nuclear plants, displacing nearly five million barrels per day (mbd) of oil, close to one-tenth of free-world consumption. And high-tech refineries have been built in the U.S. and in Europe to turn the now-surplus fuel oil for boilers into higher-value gasoline.

The Saudis missed these important signals, blinded by a tripling of their annual oil income, which peaked at $110 billion in 1980–81. Like most Western experts, including those in the Department of Energy, the Saudis expected $50 to $100 oil by the year 2000, close to the price of synfuels. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia at that time made the strategic decision to defend the high oil price. They regarded the developing weakness in oil demand as only temporary, induced by worldwide economic recession and by destocking, i.e., the sale of excess inventories to the market. Accordingly, Riyadh gradually reduced its oil output from over 10 mbd in 1981 down to 2.5 mbd in mid-1985!

Even this drastic production cut couldn't save the price. In March 1983, OPEC for the first time reduced the official price of oil—to $29. World demand continued to fall, however, because of structural changes in oil consumption brought about by conservation and fuel switching. And the longer the high price prevailed—together with fear of future increases—the more consumers conserved and switched fuels. Once insulation is installed, it won't be ripped out, even if oil prices fall. The same is true of other investments in conservation and fuel switching; once the up-front capital cost is paid, whether for a nuclear plant, a gas pipeline, or a solar installation, it becomes a "sunk cost." For example, it doesn't pay to close down an existing nuclear power station unless the price of oil falls below $4 a barrel!

It became clear by 1981 that the Saudi decision to defend the price would produce both a financial disaster for them and a bonanza for other oil producers, including those in the U.S. Many of these had only small reserves and were therefore anxious to get the highest price in the short term—while their reserves lasted. The Saudis' decision also created a future political problem for themselves, now that their neighbors had become accustomed to higher prices. Yet when I discussed this issue frankly with officials in Riyadh in late 1982, their view still was that world oil demand would increase in the near future once the recession had ended, and that the world price would then resume its upward trend.

SAUDI ARABIA, and to a lesser extent the emirates and sheikdoms on the Gulf, form GOPEC (Gulf OPEC), the core of OPEC. Their actions, and what happens to them, will influence the world supply and therefore the price of oil. Until the West has economic alternatives to oil (so that supply interruptions do not raise prices too much), GOPEC's fate must be of immense interest to us. Their survival is conditioned by a complex Middle East environment dominated by a multitude of conflicts: the Iran-Iraq war; the Arab-Israel confrontation; rampant terrorism stemming from a multitude of sources and financed in most cases by oil money; the long-delayed integration of Palestinian refugees into Arab countries; the religious splits between Christians and Moslems and between Shi'ite Mos-

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lems and Sunnis; and the ideological split between Marxist dictatorships and conservative, theocratic rulers.

Within this context, the Saudi dilemma has been truly painful. Should they maintain their production at a low level and face both an eroding oil price and continuing financial deficits, or, rather, raise production drastically, thereby lowering the price while gaining revenue, but at the expense of other oil producers who may retaliate violently? Riyadh has the unenviable task of weighing external political risks against financial risks that eventually translate into internal political risks. This is a serious dilemma involving the survival of all the families ruling the Gulf states.

One can essentially discount the option of a reduction below 2.5 mbd in the Saudi oil output. In addition to the financial drain, such a reduction would cut further into the production of associated natural gas that sustains their multi-billion dollar investments in a gas-gathering system and in petrochemical plants. One can also discount the possibility that other producers, both in and out of OPEC, would be willing to share with the Gulf states the long-term cutbacks required to keep pace with the falling oil demand—which should continue to weaken as conservation investments started during the price peak of 1980–81 bear fruit. On the contrary, Iraq plans to put an extra 1 mbd of oil onto the world market during 1987, using a new pipeline across Arabia and an expanded pipeline through Turkey. Once their conflict ends, both Iran and Iraq will try to export more oil—perhaps in preparation for the next round of fighting. Syria and Egypt report discoveries that may lead to significant new production. The Sudan may finally start to export oil. Outside of the Middle East, Mexico and the North Sea will be increasing exports over the next few years before topping out, while the USSR can be expected to hold steady in the near term. (But U.S. output will decline quite sharply after 1990 unless new offshore areas are opened up for exploration and development.)

I would further discount the possibility that the Saudis will enter into a sustained price war. They are certainly capable of driving the oil price to $10 and below, as they showed during the first half of 1986 when they raised production to about 5 mbd. A temporary price war may make sense if it forces other producers to "join the cartel" by observing production quotas. A sustained price war makes no economic sense for GOPEC and, in addition, invites retaliation. GOPEC's future oil sales could benefit from occasional price collapses, however, if these discourage oil exploration and development throughout the world, and (as in the U.S.) lead to the permanent closing of marginal oil wells and subsequent loss of reserves.

RIYADH'S first alternative—keeping production low—requires substantial budget cuts and risks widespread internal discontent from businessmen, technocrats, and the military. Regional problems may arise—from the Shi'ites living in the eastern Hasa oil region and from the sophisticated urban dwellers in the western Hejaz. The Saudi family, originating in the central Nejd region, has displayed considerable resilience in the past, however, and may be successful in handling the public disaffection arising from the sharp reduction in expectations (not to mention cuts in subsidies and social services).

The economically sound alternative—aiming for an "optimum" price of about $18—will certainly incur the wrath of oil producers at their border, like Iraq, Iran, and soon also Syria, who would prefer a higher price. Fortunately for the Saudi regime and the Gulf sheikdoms, the six-year conflict has exhausted both Iran and Iraq; they may not want more military adventures no matter how weak the Arab Gulf states appear. The problem with Syria is more difficult to forecast; it is armed to the teeth by the Soviet Union, and dominated by Hafez Assad who not long ago did in 20,000 or so of his own countrymen in the town of Hama, a stronghold of Sunni Moslem fundamentalism. Assad has denounced his bitter rival and fellow

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dictator, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, as the "butcher of Baghdad," in recognition of the mass killing of Saddam's closest associates. Assad's views on the Ayatollah Khomeini are not a matter of public record, but Khomeini must certainly consider him a dangerous heretic, a member of a breakaway Shi'ite sect ruling a secular state.

In view of these rivalries, the Saudi rulers may be able to finesse even the external threat. In the process, they may have to adopt anti-American rhetoric and active opposition to any Arab peace overture toward Israel. Above all, they must try to maintain their legitimacy as Islamic rulers. (In 1986, King Fahd assumed the title "custodian of two holy mosques.") This may involve moves against members of the Saudi family and other influential Saudis who have followed a conspicuously un-Islamic lifestyle, at least while abroad.

It might also involve finding a scapegoat for the financial-political disaster brought on by reduced oil revenues, preferably outside the Saudi family. A convenient target is the oil minister, Sheik Yamani. Saudi princes in disfavor may be exiled and will enrich a large number of Western capitals. They could do worse. Other scapegoats will be found within OPEC, e.g., Nigeria, and outside, e.g., Britain. But there is already evidence that many educated Saudis blame their present misfortune on an organized war against OPEC, led "of course" by the United States.[4] This may have been an old dream of Henry Kissinger's, but it will strike many as hilarious. How does one explain to the Saudis that U.S. companies simply buy the cheapest oil available, and that Mexico can undersell OPEC, finding it cheaper to transport oil to Houston than to other destinations?

IN A SENSE, we should not care who owns the Arabian wells as long as they pump oil for the world market. After all, the West buys oil from Qaddafi. But any successor regime to the Saudis is unlikely to be friendly to the U.S. While we do not share "common democratic values"—to use the standard State Department gush—we do have a long-standing relationship with the Saudi rulers that should incline us to help them survive, if help is needed. The best help, however, may be quiet support rather than overt military assistance or loose talk about a Rapid Deployment Force for the Gulf. We should recognize that when it comes to their own survival, the Saudis are the experts.

The real threat to their survival may be terrorism, directed, or at least encouraged, by Iran, Libya, or Syria. The genie of Shi'ite fanaticism is out of the bottle. While seemingly directed against the United States (the "Great Satan") and Israel (the "Zionist entity"), the real targets are Arab monarchies, considered illegitimate from the fundamentalist Islamic point of view. Straws in the wind are the assassination attempt against the ruler of Kuwait, the murder of Jordanian diplomats, and the abominably cruel treatment of a senior Saudi diplomat kidnapped in Beirut. In the offing may be more of the same, around the world, as well as oil field sabotage and disturbances within the Gulf states. There could develop a strong commonality of interest between the Gulf rulers and the West, especially if terrorist acts are committed outside of the Middle East or harm Western citizens.

We can take consolation in the long view. That particular moment in history when the world was dependent primarily on oil for its energy, and thus was particularly sensitive to interruptions in its supply, is now receding. Oil embargoes are no longer credible as a weapon. And oil prices should in future be restrained by competition from other fuels and energy sources, including renewable energy sources. Meanwhile, we need to ensure that the Gulf oil, and its associated wealth, not fall in the hands of the Soviet Union or other nations that present a strategic threat to the United States and the other democracies of the world.

[4]The *OPEC Bulletin* (June 1986) has Yamani describe the price collapse as part of a Western plan to dominate OPEC.

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How to Proceed with SDI—Realistic Priorities

William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & James A. Schear

THE Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has become one of the most controversial American defense programs of the postwar period. Virtually all issues related to arms control, alliance security, and Soviet-American strategic relations are now linked to SDI in one way or another. Yet the future of the program is very uncertain. Even before the Reykjavik summit and the Republican losses in the Senate, SDI faced growing opposition and hard budgetary choices. President Reagan will leave office long before the full potential of many key SDI technologies is known. Research on the strategic defense technologies is clearly in our national interest. How, then, should we manage the serious tensions that persist between SDI and our other policy objectives?

President Reagan has ordered an investigation of the prospects of a high-technology shield against ballistic missiles that would enable the United States and its allies to move toward a strategy based on defense of homelands and away from deterrence through the threat of retaliation. Such a shift in strategies would be a radical one, for the near-perfect defense of population on which it is predicated would require large-scale defenses of a sort not hitherto seen as technically viable. Many strategists who support SDI believe that the president's goal is impractical. Some want to use SDI as leverage in negotiating deep cuts in Soviet ballistic missiles with "hard-target kill" capability. Others favor limited forms of ballistic missile defenses (BMD) on the grounds that such defenses would help protect our retaliatory forces or deny certain attack options to Soviet planners—in either case to enhance deterrence. Still others see SDI as a response to Soviet BMD programs. However, the optimal technologies for the president's goal and other rationales for SDI are often different, and public support for the president's vision seems stronger than it is for the idea of limited defense.

SDI's progress has been incremental to date. Innovations have been achieved in sensors, directed energy (beam) weapons, and kinetic energy (impact) weapons; but there have been no major breakthroughs. Because of survivability considerations, the idea of basing major SDI components in space is regarded less favorably by proponents than it was two years ago. Furthermore, develop-

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ment of large-scale power sources, economical space lift, and reliable computational capabilities are now seen as the most difficult challenges facing SDI over the long term.

By 1993, when SDI is expected to report its results, research on eximer and free-electron lasers (FELs) may yield important conceptual and possibly experimental advances. More will be known then about the X-ray laser, which in theory could generate very intense directed energy from a nuclear explosion. Further innovations on "adaptive" optics (to shoot laser beams through the atmosphere), relay mirrors for beam weapons, and "smart" kinetic energy rockets will move these concepts closer to weapons criteria.

It remains highly unlikely, however, that any of these developments will alter the fundamental challenges involved. Two important criteria that the administration has set for judging the desirability of SDI options—that any system be capable of surviving direct attack and that it be cheaper to augment than to overcome with more offensive missiles—will effectively rule out any deployment of space-based defenses, including those proposed under the Defense Department's early deployment plan, during the next decade. Moreover, while we should certainly expect scientific innovation, we cannot be certain that it will provide sought-after solutions.

Three general objections may be raised to the present orientation of SDI. First, many innovations that aid the defense can also help the offense. Some concepts now being investigated, like economical space lift, small terminal homing rockets, and the X-ray laser, would vastly improve the capacity of the attacking side to saturate or suppress the defense. Second, effective defense in the boost phase of missile attack seems problematic. The structure of boost phase intercept is such that space-based defense, whether composed of kinetic energy weapons in the near term or beam weapons in the long term, may be too exposed to sustain itself against a variety of technically feasible countermeasures. "Pop-up" systems might be less vulnerable but would pose severe operational problems. Third, effective terminal phase defense seems unlikely given the current "non-nuclear" terms of reference of SDI. Without nuclear warheads, which could work to the advantage of the defending side, the technology of maneuvering warheads may give an insurmountable bonus to the attacker.

Given these judgments, it is fair to ask whether SDI's present orientation is suitable for meeting the challenges thrust upon it. As it stands, the program is being stretched between competing priorities. Its compressed time scale to produce results clashes with its stress on basic research. In particular, its focus on component development and integrated testing in the near term is inconsistent with the goal of efficient technology development. Not only do large field experiments risk "freezing in" technologies prematurely, they appear to be driven significantly by political considerations—that is, sustaining support for the program—and not solely by the exigencies of a research program on exotic technologies.

THE SOVIETS have launched a major propaganda campaign against SDI and have played down their own involvement in strategic defense research. While aspects of the Soviet attack appear contrived, it is also very probable that they see SDI in a threatening light. Soviet leaders characterize SDI as part of a U.S. plan to acquire pre-emptive offensive capabilities, just as some in this country view Soviet defense programs as part of an effort to deflect a U.S. response to a Soviet first strike. Having worked to compete favorably with the United States as a military power, the Soviets evidently fear that SDI may drive the arms race into areas of high technology where they would compete at a severe disadvantage. Thus, it appears that the Soviets perceive SDI not as simply another problem within the normal array of threats they face, but as a fundamental rivalry between socioeconomic systems.

Nonetheless, dramatic Soviet reactions

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appear unlikely in the near term. Even after Reykjavik, Soviet strategy seems aimed at "fencing in" SDI through agreements. As it is, the Soviets already have many new weapons in development—especially bombers and cruise missiles—that would be suitable as offensive counters to SDI if talks fail to produce restraints. Soviet actions over the longer term are harder to predict, however. The Soviets will probably pay more attention to their own SDI program, but it is unclear whether greater investments would yield accelerated progress.

Although it seems highly unlikely in the present situation, some observers worry that the Soviets might launch a massive nationwide deployment of their own "conventional" (i.e., nuclear-tipped) BMD systems if they became convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the United States had decided to withdraw from the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and to deploy partial SDI defenses. The Soviets have a comparative advantage in conventional BMD. Any asymmetries resulting from major deployments on their side would be widely regarded as destabilizing in this country.

Generally, our allies have been cautious about SDI. Fears have been voiced abroad that SDI will unravel the ABM treaty and damage the prospects for arms control; that strategic defenses will make Nato's strategy of flexible response harder to sustain; that expenditures on SDI will starve conventional force improvements; that two-sided BMD deployments might reduce the effectiveness of British and French nuclear forces; and that SDI would harm the allies' overall technical competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States. For the most part, though, the allies are taking a "wait and see" attitude so long as SDI does not involve the alliance in any immediate questions of new weapons deployments. Some allies have displayed interest in the idea of an anti-tactical missile defense (ATBM), but this need not fall under the rubric of SDI research. However, if SDI is seen as impeding arms control, consensus in the alliance could well be pushed to the breaking point.

The SDI program has been criticized as a barrier to arms control. However, many programs under SDI were ongoing at the time of the president's March 1983 speech (some of them begun under previous administrations) and drew little or no attention. Moreover, the regime of existing agreements was already under stress before 1983. Some provisions are being bypassed by new technologies for missions like space surveillance, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and ATBMs. To make matters worse, both sides have become embroiled in a dispute over treaty compliance. None of the current issues is significant in a military sense, but all are troublesome politically.

Nonetheless, SDI does pose complications. The program suggests that the United States has already made a conditional policy judgment (pending technology development) to modify significantly or to withdraw from the ABM treaty at a future date. Lending credence to this perception are the Defense Department's proposals for early deployment of partial defenses and a series of SDI experiments whose consistency with legal obligations is measured by criteria that we would probably reject if the Soviets used them to justify their programs.

The administration has also attempted to redefine the ABM treaty in a way that would allow the development and testing of exotic technologies for non-fixed ABM systems. This reinterpretation looks implausible when set against the strategic context of the treaty. Under this reading of the treaty, for instance, the Soviets could develop high-energy laser components for BMD systems and proliferate them across their territory, provided only that the components were transportable and declared for testing purposes. This would not be in our interest. It cannot be what either side intended to achieve in the ABM talks.

Our primary concern is with Soviet offensive forces—especially their large ICBMs—while the Soviets seem more concerned with our potential defensive capabilities. Thus, it is fair to conceive of a "grand compromise." At the same time, this would not involve our

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simply "trading off" our defenses for their offensive forces. SDI is not a bargaining chip, but a lever. We should aim to develop an integrated structure of restraint that provides the Soviets with some "breakout" insurance on the defensive side in return for cuts in multiple-warhead ballistic missiles to levels significantly beneath those that were deemed negotiable in the past. Both sides appear reasonably close to agreement on offensive arms. But as Reykjavik pointed out, gaining agreement on permitted BMD research is going to prove difficult. It is the present U.S. position to maintain an unlimited right to develop and test SDI systems in accordance with its reinterpretation of the ABM treaty. The Soviets initially countered with a much more restrictive reading of the treaty, which would effectively limit all SDI research and testing to the laboratory. Fortunately, the ABM treaty does provide a path for compromise if both sides are ready to show flexibility.

Historically, the United States has understood the ABM treaty's ban on "development" and "testing" to apply to the stage at which prototypes of ABM systems or components are moved from laboratory testing to field testing. Even under its traditional interpretation, however, the treaty allows development and testing of fixed, land-based systems and components, including important SDI-related technologies like "adaptive optics" for ground-based lasers. It also permits some small-scale testing in space. What the treaty does not allow are large-scale tests in space of major components. Thus, if the United States is prepared to modify its position that all development and testing of space-based systems are allowed, and if the Soviet Union is willing to drop its demand that nothing beyond laboratory research is allowed, major progress toward a new agreement should be possible.

It is important to note that adhering to the ABM treaty in its traditional form would not seriously hamper a sensible research and development program for another decade. The technologies with potential for providing survivable and cost-effective space-based defenses will remain in the research stage into the mid-1990s. Thus, if there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining major cuts in "heavy" Soviet ICBMs—and Reykjavik suggests that there is—it would be very much in our interest to accept a reaffirmation of the ABM treaty for a ten-year period.

CLEARLY, our national interests require that we have a strategic defense research program. Yet the program we need must be shaped around realistic goals and a reasonable time frame, and it must command broad support of the public and our allies. SDI in its present construction does not meet these criteria. While the president's vision is both clear and desirable, it is not realistic within any operative time frame. *We see virtually no prospect of building a significant and effective population shield against a responsive enemy inside of this century, and there is great uncertainty about the long term.* Correspondingly, while limited forms of SDI may be more plausible, it is unlikely that they will meet the administration's own criteria of cost-effectiveness and survivability. If they do not meet these technical criteria, premature efforts to deploy a system could stimulate a costly offensive and defensive arms race and reduce stability at a time of crisis. Both effects would reduce rather than enhance our security.

How, then, should we relate our interests in strategic defenses to the broader policy context? In our judgment, a balanced approach could be shaped around the following five priorities:

1. The creation of a more plausible near-term agenda for BMD research and development. In thinking about our strategic defense needs, it is useful to draw a careful distinction between short-term and long-term work programs. In the near term (up to the early 1990s), our principal interests in strategic defenses are to help deter and if necessary respond to a Soviet breakout from the ABM treaty; to preserve options for a selective defense of portions of our retaliatory forces—including fixed and mobile targets—against

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emerging new threats on the offensive side; and to investigate limited stabilizing defenses. SDI as now constituted is not suited to these tasks.

A near-term agenda would focus on three important areas of research and development:

- *Investigation of conventional BMD systems.* Although the United States developed a variety of technologies for terminal BMD in the 1970s, these efforts stopped short of integrating the basic systems components—radars, computers, interceptors—into a fully functional prototype test complex. Such a facility would help to close the "lead time" that the Soviets now enjoy in deployable BMD technologies, and it could serve as the test bed for more advanced technologies for tracking and intercept of sophisticated maneuvering warheads. Above all, we need to know much more about the prospects and limits of mounting a cost-effective terminal BMD defense.

- *Sensing technologies for early warning, tracking, and target acquisition.* We can do much in the near term to improve our missile launch and space surveillance capabilities. For instance, better early warning and attack assessment, utilizing infrared sensing systems, would be supportive of our present strategy and of any type of defenses we might pursue. Likewise, optical and long-wave infrared tracking of space objects (warheads and satellites) would improve our knowledge of mid-course surveillance and the other side's military space activities overall (or restrictions on such if ASAT limits were to be agreed upon in the future).

- *Countermeasures technology.* To comprehend better the cost-effectiveness of ground-base defenses and to provide a valuable near-term response to expanded Soviet defenses (especially relying on upgraded surface-to-air missiles or ATBMs), we need to revitalize our efforts to develop effective penetration aid (pen-aids) technology. Our work on pen-aids atrophied during the 1970s. We should be investigating the potential of simulation, anti-simulation (making warheads look like decoys or varying the appearance of each), and signature suppression technologies. Work on pen-aids would reinforce—and be reinforced by—the fielding of a functional BMD test complex (at a place like the Kwajalein test range), against which new pen-aid systems could be tested.

Of these initiatives, only sensor technology is receiving sustained attention from the SDI program. All of these steps could be carried out in strict compliance with the ABM treaty. However, they should not be seen as prejudging a decision to move terminal BMD programs into engineering development and deployment. Quite apart from arms control considerations, any deployment of "conventional" ABM defenses beyond those permitted under the present regime would play into areas of Soviet advantage. In military terms, the number of additional surviving intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warheads we could gain with terminal defenses might well not be worth the offsets resulting from the reduced ability of our offensive forces (both ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles) to penetrate unconstrained Soviet defenses. Essentially, what we want from a near-term R&D program is the sort of capability and testing experience that would reduce any asymmetries that the Soviets might exploit if they decided to attempt a breakout in the near term.

2. A sharpened focus of the SDI technology program on long-term goals. As a long-term objective (through the late 1990s), we should continue to explore technological initiatives for effective wide-area defenses that would substantially limit damage to our military forces and society. We should do this to understand the prospects for achieving a form of deterrence with a larger component of defense than at present; to judge the survivability, cost-effectiveness, and stabilizing (or destabilizing) attributes of such a defense; and to avoid technical "surprises" resulting from breakthroughs by the other side. The focus here would not be on "conventional" ABMs but on new technologies with prospects for high leverage over emerging threats

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on the offensive side. Given that some of the more mature SDI technologies, like chemical lasers, are unlikely to meet weapons criteria, greater attention should be paid to less mature but more promising technologies. General categories of work would include:

- *Advanced surveillance, acquisition, tracking, and kill assessment (SATKA) technologies.* Basic research should be pursued on more advanced optics, radar imaging, and directed energy technologies that may contribute to solving space surveillance problems at mid-course, especially decoy discrimination.
- *Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) systems and concepts.* Work should focus on ultraviolet/visible, free-electron, and X-ray laser concepts that seem to hold the greatest potential over the long term as weapons for boost or post-boost phase intercept. Work on existing space-based laser concepts should be limited to exploration of design innovations that might reduce their inherent limitations on brightness and other performance attributes.
- *Optical technologies for DEWs.* New optical technologies could, if further developed, contribute to progress across an array of directed energy systems, including atmospheric compensation (i.e., adaptive optics) and beam relay (i.e., space mirrors) for ground-based lasers, and phased array concepts for improving the intensity of chemical lasers.
- *Kinetic energy weapons.* Work should be continued on developing technologies for lightweight KEWs, especially on infrared homing systems that might substantially reduce the weight of guidance systems on missile interceptors.
- *Survivability enhancements.* Even rapid and successful technology development cannot change the defense's prospects if an answer is not found to the vulnerability of space-based components. Further exploration of technologies to protect space-based systems (including sensors) against nuclear effects, DEWs, and projectile attack is well warranted and would have desirable spin-offs in other areas (such as satellite protection). A specific challenge would be to determine the survivability requirements of large ground-based laser installations, since they would in theory be very vulnerable to an array of aerodynamic threats or unconventional threats.

Again, the overall direction of this program would be toward high-payoff technologies, with less emphasis on boost phase concepts and more on solving the mid-course challenge. Also, for at least the next ten years, the focus should remain on basic research. It is very unlikely that any sort of wide-area BMD system we could put into full-scale engineering development before this point—whether directed or kinetic energy—would be worth having. Certainly it would not meet the president's criteria for effectiveness, cost advantage over the offense, and survivability.

3. The focusing of experimental work on technology development, not engineering development or field demonstrations. Field experiments are a sensitive issue in the SDI program. Many experts argue that such tests are not really of an experimental character, but designed as "spectaculars" to generate political support for the program. In fact, near-term testing of large-scale mock-ups of SDI hardware is not advisable and should be avoided. First, as mentioned earlier, such testing may "freeze" technologies prematurely. Second, it would further erode confidence in the ABM treaty, which is not in our interest. There are definite risks in applying a standard that says testing may be treaty compliant if the demonstration hardware cannot meet the power or performance criteria of ABM systems or components, or that the orbital target has the attributes of a satellite, not a warhead. Such criteria are too subtle and spark political controversy. A better criterion would be: would we raise objections if we saw the Soviets conducting the same test?

4. Continued adherence to the traditional interpretation of the ABM treaty. The larger policy context of our research efforts ought to be shaped by the continuance of the ABM treaty as traditionally defined to include both conventional and exotic systems. There are several reasons why the treaty is in our interest. First, we do not wish

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to release the Soviets from constraints on their BMD programs. Although we could in time respond effectively with pen-aids and more warheads to stem any military impact, the political consequences of Soviet breakout (or "creep-out") would be very destabilizing. Second, the treaty serves as the conceptual basis for offensive arms control and, in this sense, provides important reassurance that options for offensive arms reductions are not foreclosed as we investigate longer range options for defenses that might prove stabilizing for both sides. Third, the treaty is important as a political symbol and is vital in sustaining public and alliance support for balanced defense policies. If we contribute to further unraveling of the treaty, the threat we face would increase while domestic support for our responses might well decrease.

Beyond these considerations, it is worth stressing again that a sensible research program can be conducted within the traditional interpretation of the ABM treaty for at least the next ten years. Put another way, we would forfeit very little in technical terms by remaining in the treaty and thereby continuing to reap its contributions to our security.

5. The establishing of a framework accord with the Soviets for deep cuts in offensive arms and restraint on defense as part of a comprehensive package. Because our primary concern is Soviet offensive forces—especially their large ICBMs with hard-target kill capability—while the Soviets seem more concerned with our potential defensive capabilities, it is reasonable to speak of a "grand compromise." On the defensive side, a number of issues must be sorted out. We need progress toward solving outstanding compliance issues, like the Krasnoyarsk radar, that carry political burdens of their own. We also need to clarify the distinction between permitted research and prohibitions on development and testing. Over the longer term, we should seek common positions to make the ABM treaty more relevant to current technologies in the areas of anti-satellites, anti-tactical ballistic missiles, and surveillance technology. To structure and give impetus to these negotiations, our object should be to seek early agreement with the Soviet Union on a general framework statement. Both sides could agree to: adhere to the ABM treaty in its traditional interpretation and reaffirm that any decision to depart from its provisions must be subject to negotiation; refrain from exercising the withdrawal provision for a period of ten years; begin discussion on the prospects of a possible transition to defensive systems at a specified time in the mid-1990s (possibly at the 1997 ABM review conference); and commit to a consultation on existing compliance problems with a view to their resolution.

These general points should be buttressed by some additional clarifications. First, both sides would acknowledge that articles III and V of the ABM treaty apply to exotic as well as to conventional ABM systems (thereby establishing the traditional interpretation of the treaty). Second, they would recognize that continued work on ATBMs, ASATs, and space surveillance systems raises questions of overlap that require clarification. Third, the parties would agree that the significance of technology testing is measured in relation to existing forces. The proper criterion is that tests should not make either side feel anxious about its existing arsenals. Fourth, as noted earlier, we would agree to discuss definitional issues (i.e., "components") and ambiguities raised by future technologies in the Standing Consultative Commission. Overall, our objective should be to make the existing defense arms regime more durable and to adjust our R&D strategy to that reality, at least until it could be demonstrated that some other mix of offensive and defensive forces would provide significantly enhanced stability.

On the offensive side, our overriding goal is to obtain substantial cuts in highly accurate multiple warhead ICBMs. In this sense, the real or apparent leverage we gain from our comparative advantage in SDI technologies must be used to gain cuts in heavy Soviet ICBMs, in particular their SS-18 force, which poses a serious threat to stability. The

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offensive weapons portion of the package could also be specified in a joint statement following the broad outlines of the proposals on 50 percent cuts discussed at Reykjavik. In general, both sides would agree to: denominate their reductions in weapons (warheads or bombs, not launchers) covering ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, with sub-limits on delivery systems, as appropriate; allow no more than a specified percentage of these weapons on ICBMs; and assure that reductions in weapons, however carried out, would lead to a substantial reduction in throw weight.

As with the defense, a number of important clarifications would have to be included—for example, to ensure access to data necessary for verification of existing limits and to agree to discuss separate limits on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) as part of follow-up talks. A separate agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) would also be highly desirable.

TAKEN TOGETHER, the points outlined above suggest a positive direction that has the potential for sustained bipartisan support in a key area of our national security policy. We offer these ideas not as categorical directives, but as general guidelines for managing the tensions between our ballistic missile defense R&D strategies and our other policy goals in the context of great technical uncertainties and rapid change.

As this analysis suggests, there are two good reasons to carry out a significant BMD research program: to hedge against Soviet breakthroughs in the short term, and to understand the options for the long term. Even if scientific and technological innovations solve the key problems of system effectiveness, cost advantage to the defense, and survivability that the administration has identified as necessary conditions for an effective system, there will still remain important problems in managing a stable transition to a greater reliance on defensive systems. In this respect, the United States has enormous stakes in re-establishing a framework for restraint and dialogue with the Soviet Union. We cannot, in any sense, "go it alone" with SDI and expect technical fixes to solve our security problems.

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How to Proceed with SDI—Deploy Now

Jack Kemp

BY SAYING NO at Reykjavik, President Reagan became the first president in history to walk away from a bad arms control agreement—an agreement that would have spelled the death of SDI—and the American public overwhelmingly supported his decision. Yet the question lingers whether he can also be the first president to pull away from a seriously wrong turn in arms control negotiations. The future of SDI, and of our security and peace, hangs in the balance.

In the preceding article, Messrs. Perry, Scowcroft, Nye, and Schear pose the question, after Reykjavik "how . . . should we manage the serious tensions that persist between SDI and our other policy objectives?" Indeed, there are tensions—but they are not the ones the authors suggest. The real tensions are between defining SDI as the core of our defense effort, and then binding it within a research straitjacket; and between declaring our commitment to defend American lives and our ability to ensure the peace, and then advancing arms control proposals that would pledge our continued adherence to a failed ABM treaty.

If the Soviet strategic buildup were reported with the same fascination for detail that has marked the coverage of the Iranian arms sales, the newspages and airwaves might begin to reflect the true measure of the threat to peace. Instead, America's relative defensive power is eroding little by little, largely unnoticed by a public that would be enraged if presented with the full picture.

Back in 1983, the Scowcroft Commission concluded that "The Soviets . . . now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead yields to destroy almost all of the 1047 U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own ICBM force." Since that time, our strategic position has deteriorated further. Just this year, intelligence confirms twenty-eight new Soviet SS-25 ICBM bases, supporting about 100 mobile launchers—while some in Congress and DOD are counting the ways to impede a sensible small missile program. The Soviets are poised to deploy a rail-based multiple warhead SS-24—while some in the Congress are rejecting out of hand the president's request for additional MXs. In addition, the secretary of defense now reports that three new Soviet ICBMs are being developed: a silo-based follow-on to the SS-18 heavy ICBM, a follow-on to the SS-24, and a new, possibly MIRVed, version of the SS-25. We have no plans whatsoever that begin to compare with this.

At the same time, the Soviet Union is laying the infrastructure for nation-wide strategic defenses—precisely what the ABM treaty was intended to prevent. Indeed, ever

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since the ABM treaty was signed, the Soviets have invested as much in strategic defenses as they have in their nuclear offensive forces. Just this year, three more Soviet ABM radars were discovered, bridging the final gap in their battle-management radar network which now covers the full extent of the USSR.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress has frozen spending on SDI, forcing the cancellation of SDI contracts and slowing the pace of success.

IT IS THE CONSENSUS of the scientific and technological community working on SDI that advances have been much more rapid than anticipated four years ago, when President Reagan made his visionary speech to the nation. From the wellspring of American ingenuity, we have made great progress in the basic technology for intercepting missiles, both outside and inside the atmosphere, that only awaits a production decision. Laser research is much more mature than generally appreciated, with derivative radar and discrimination devices projected in five years, and an anti-missile laser weapon should be in hand before the next decade is out. Outside studies, such as that conducted by the respected Marshall Institute, confirm that we have sufficient knowledge now to make an initial deployment decision. And at this writing, the Department of Defense is readying deployment options for the first stage of SDI.

Technology is not now—nor has it ever been—the stumbling block holding up strategic defenses. To the extent DOD has established unrealistic criteria for SDI that cannot be met, it has given critics much to criticize—and Perry et al. are correct to point this out. But this is a straw man. There are many things we know how to do today, with proven technology, that could provide some measure of defense against Soviet missiles. The question is, should we or should we not defend against a missile attack?

Some say it's not worth doing anything now, because the Soviets can readily find ways to defeat limited defensive systems. Indeed, it is not possible to conceive of a defense so effective that one cannot conceive of an offense to overcome it. But lacking such an ultimate defense, does this mean we should abandon the effort to protect ourselves?

Perry et al. have not made this argument. Indeed, they stress the importance of placing more emphasis on near-term BMD options and I second this recommendation—but with an important distinction. The Strategic Defense Initiative Office should not be assigned simply to investigate near-term BMD; it should be given a new mission: to deploy.

From a political perspective, a commitment to deploy is the *sine qua non* to sustain support for SDI. The American people, and their elected representatives in Congress, are from Missouri when it comes to how their money is to be spent. They want to be shown what they will get for it. Congressional support for SDI is waning because to date SDI has been portrayed as a research-only program that might be put off indefinitely under an arms control agreement. Public opinion polls show that Americans support SDI overwhelmingly. They want to be defended. But that mandate is not served by limiting our national effort to research. We need to commit ourselves to building the devices we need, and putting them in the field.

Incremental deployment—one step at a time—is the only way we can get there from here. A fully mature, multilayered SDI system cannot be erected overnight. But even limited deployments can complicate a Soviet attack, force the Soviets to divert resources to counter them, and thus strengthen deterrence. And from modest beginnings, we will learn the necessary lessons about command and control and system integration to develop and deploy the latest devices technology may supply.

For instance, as a first step I would support the construction of a BMD test facility, such as Mr. Perry and his co-authors suggest. Expanding our work at Kwajalein on penetration aids as they recommend is impor-

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tant, to be sure; but I would place an even higher priority on building an operational BMD facility in North Dakota, which could be integrated into a future defense network. And I have joined a list of distinguished Americans, including Edward Teller, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Congressman Jim Courter, and a score of others, in a letter urging President Reagan to direct that such a working laboratory be constructed at Grand Forks.

We can start production and deployment now. Or, in the name of arms control or unilateral restraint, we can confine SDI to research only—which is another way of saying we can elect not to defend against a missile attack.

THE SOVIET UNION'S principal objective at Reykjavik, and throughout the Geneva negotiations, has been to kill SDI. In rejecting Gorbachev's offer, the president made it clear that we will never trade SDI away.

By contrast, the United States's principal arms control objective has been to promote stability by reducing the Soviets' strategic arsenal, which is composed primarily of large, MIRVed ICBMs designed to destroy U.S. retaliatory forces. Throughout the history of arms control, the Soviets have refused to accept effective constraints on these systems; where they have been legally bound to observe limits they deemed inconvenient, they have simply ignored them.

Still, Mr. Perry, his fellow authors, and a substantial number within the State Department and in Congress argue that there is common ground after Reykjavik for an agreement. They suggest that the U.S. offer to adhere to a "traditional" interpretation of the ABM treaty under which we would agree not to deploy strategic defenses and to limit SDI testing, in return for offensive reductions on both sides.[1]

The fallacy in such thinking is that arms control can possibly undo the damage it has caused. For it was just fifteen years ago, in SALT I, that we agreed to defensive limits—the ABM treaty—in return for follow-on offensive restrictions that later proved illusory. Because we traded our right to defend ourselves for the hope that the Soviets would reduce the threat against us, we now find ourselves vulnerable to a growing Soviet offensive force.

The proposed "grand compromise" would only compound this error. Constraints on our defenses will never contribute to stability. If there is one thing we should have learned from our experience with SALT, it is that in an arms control regime where the defense is constrained, the advantage accrues to the offense—which principally benefits the would-be aggressor.

In short, the ABM treaty, contrary to its champions' rhetoric, is not and never has been an end in itself. It was a gamble in pursuit of stability—whose result has been less stability.

THIS YEAR, the ABM treaty by its terms is up for review. We have the opportunity, indeed the obligation, to review how that treaty has been observed or

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[1]In particular, the authors want to extend articles III and V of the treaty to cover "exotic systems"—but they do not suggest how they would propose to verify Soviet compliance with a pledge not to test directed energy weapons or other new technologies.

What evidence we have suggests the Soviets have never felt constrained by what some in the U.S. call the "traditional interpretation" of the treaty. As a 1985 CIA memorandum on Soviet directed energy weapons concluded, "The Soviets are believed to have progressed beyond the stage of pure or basic laboratory research in directed energy technologies; the Soviets have begun to develop and test laser weapons. The Soviets already have a ground-based laser capable of damaging some U.S. satellites and which may be used to investigate the feasibility of lasers for ballistic missile defense applications."

To insist that the U.S. observe the restrictive interpretation is an example of unilateralism at its most shortsighted.

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broken and whether it continues to serve our national security interests or poses an obstacle to protecting our nation and ensuring stability.

Messrs. Perry, Scowcroft, Nye, and Schear argue in favor of extending the ABM treaty. Their major assumption appears to be that it has been and is a block to Soviet strategic defense deployments. But where is the evidence for this? As noted above, the Soviets yearly spend as much on strategic defenses as they do on offensive forces. They have fielded a nationwide battle management radar network; they have expanded the rings of ABM installations around Moscow; they have a dense air defense system including the mass production of mobile SA-12 missiles which have ABM potential; and the intelligence community reports they have a massive building program associated with strategic defense. It's difficult to see how the Soviets could have done much more had there been no ABM treaty.

The authors observe that "the Soviets have a comparative advantage in conventional BMD." Why? Because for them, the ABM treaty has been the smokescreen behind which they have pressed ahead with strategic defenses, while the United States has honored the treaty even more scrupulously than required by law. So far, the Soviets have found they can field everything but the kitchen sink in strategic defense, and there will still be influential voices in the United States arguing the merits of the ABM treaty.

Now some would argue that, precisely because the Soviets are ahead in ballistic missile defenses, to end the treaty would be disadvantageous to the United States. In other words, because the Soviet Union has violated the letter and basic intent of the treaty, they would argue we are compelled to extend it or else we will be at a strategic disadvantage. This is the equivalent of a drowning man clinging to an anchor in an effort to keep afloat.

If the Soviets are acting today in violation of the treaty—and no one outside of Moscow disputes they are—what reason is there to expect that they will honor an extension of the treaty to cover SDI? For our part, what would such an extension mean—that we will tolerate no more violations except the ones we already know about and have become accustomed to?

To reaffirm the ABM treaty would be to sweep aside Soviet violations, lending credibility to Soviet assertions of compliance and undermining the credibility of our objections to Soviet cheating.

The reality is that Soviet violations of the ABM treaty go to the very heart of the agreement. And those violations, seen in the context of the overall Soviet strategic buildup, should force a searching re-examination of our own strategic requirements and arms control policies.

In short, more research and a strict adherence to the ABM treaty is no answer. It is a strategic and moral imperative that we commit to the earliest possible deployment, step by step, of SDI, and that we modify—or withdraw from—the ABM treaty as necessary. Then and only then will we have a real ability to deny the Soviets a first-strike capability by protecting our defenses, our populace, and our allies.

No generation has ever solved a problem merely by studying it. Some may argue that we should not build SDI. That is their prerogative. But let them argue their case on the merits. Let them explain what they would have us do about the growing strategic imbalance and the growing Soviet superiority. An "SDI research only" solution is no solution at all.

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Good Old Boys

Midge Decter

THERE COULD HARDLY be a more resonant moment in which to reflect on the golden age of the American foreign-policy establishment—the decade or so following World War II that witnessed the consolidation of efforts by the United States to reconstruct Europe, contain the Soviet Union, and convert former European empires into free and independent nations. And this we have now been invited to do by a new book with the intriguing title *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made*,[1] written by two young editors from *Time* and *Newsweek*. To be sure, the coincidence of the book's appearance with our latest gaudy string of mishaps in the conduct of foreign affairs could not have been foreseen by its authors: judging from the mass of documents, books, and interviews cited in their notes, and the obviously delicate care with which they have managed to interweave the details of several separate lives and careers, they must have been at their labors for a fairly long time. Still, since the national imbroglio over the Iran-*contra* scandal is merely today's flare-up in a continuing confrontation between the presidency and Congress over the issue of American interventionism, an excursion into the origins of that interventionism was bound just now to take on an added measure of reverberation.

Moreover, Messrs. Isaacson and Thomas succeeded in inventing for themselves a notably entertaining way into their subject, which is no mean feat in this (or indeed in any other) field. The "Wise Men" of their title (the term derives from the Johnson White House; it was coined by McGeorge Bundy, with more irony than he would no doubt currently wish to acknowledge) not only came as close as mortal men might do to personifying the various constituents of American power in their day—social, financial, military, and even to some extent political—they assumed this role in full consciousness of what it meant. The names Robert Lovett, Averell Harriman, John J. McCloy, Charles Bohlen, George Kennan, and last and very far from least, Dean Acheson—you might call them the book's collective hero—by themselves could serve as the very definition of the word "establishment." The elegant Mr. Lovett, the cagey Mr. Harriman, the doughty Mr. McCloy, the clever Mr. Bohlen, the ever-fretful Mr. Kennan, the brilliant and sparkling Mr. Acheson, and others of their circle brought into this story,

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[1]Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (Simon and Schuster, $22.95).

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together composed both the words and the music in which for a few short but absolutely fateful years the United States sang to the outside world.

For the most part these men and their friends and associates were either high-born or immensely wealthy, and often both. Moving effortlessly between government service and attendance to their private interests, they troubled themselves little with the notion that there might be any very serious difference between the two. They laid down their opinions before the rulers of the earth with a calmly assured sense of their entitlement to do so. If their training-ground in clubbiness was a group of institutions called Groton, St. Paul's, the Hill School, Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, and youthful gathering-places with names like Skull and Bones and Porcellian, their sense of what they had been brought up to think of as "service" was to be given mature expression in a club called the Council on Foreign Relations. By and large they scorned both the mundane world of politics and the politicians who peopled it, though they sometimes engaged quite passionately in the former and in fact depended quite heavily on the latter.

The full dimension of this establishment was first made manifest in the third, that is, wartime, administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt when, through the good offices of such of its elders and mentors as Henry L. Stimson and Felix Frankfurter (Stimson was the man who was to object to the idea of covert intelligence on the ground that "gentlemen do not read one another's mail"), they were summoned to Washington. Kennan and Bohlen, the two professional foreign service officers in the group, were by that time already in government, poised and itching for the influence about to be conferred on them by their association with the others.

THE WAR YEARS provided these men with a unique opportunity to distinguish themselves in the world of public affairs as effective, trustworthy, and knowing in the ways of governance, born diplomats and cabinet members, so to speak. It was undoubtedly also their war experience that sealed their collective vision of a new international order dominated by Western values backed by American power—though they prided themselves most particularly on being "practical" men[2] and except in public speechifying would no doubt have wished to eschew the term vision.

In any case, if America's postwar assumption of responsibility for the stability and safety of the West was a task not so much voluntarily embraced as dictated by historical necessity, it is nevertheless no very great exaggeration to say that without such a complement of men as these, groomed both by birth and circumstance to serve as its advance guard, the country might have performed far less adequately than it so inadequately did. The subtitle of *The Wise Men* is, of course, nonsense; these men made no world. But they were at a critical time very much open to being made by one, and that is story enough (especially in these days, when those who might be thought to qualify as a new gener-

[2]The one exception here was George Kennan, a figure perhaps more immediately familiar to literary intellectuals than to men of affairs: chafing to be listened to and at the same time profoundly irritated at being held responsible for what he said, forever impelled to put pen to paper and at the same time forever aggrieved at those who were so gross as to take his words at face value, and above all, entirely out of sympathy with the American political order, seeing "greater possibilities for good" in the kind of benevolent despotism he had found in Austria in 1935. Had he been, say, a literary critic rather than a foreign service Soviet expert, his testiness at being asked to arrive at workable conclusions to the problems put before him would have seemed to his colleagues an ordinary virtue rather than, as was so often the case, a confounding refusal to commit himself. Nor would his gloom about his country's penchant for accommodating its lower orders have shocked anyone, as, we learn from this book, Kennan's did Joseph Alsop.

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ation of wise men are so busy closing themselves down).

Not that *The Wise Men* really tells this story. While the book certainly distinguishes itself from earlier similar efforts—David Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest*, for example—by its reliance on books and documents rather than merely those endless cross-referenced interviews with people whose authority depends on their willingness to talk to journalists, it remains fundamentally a work of highly engrossing chatter. Indeed, one could have read a thousand pages more of the stuff with pleasure. Its portraits are lively; its gossip is good, and some of it even new; and the way it keeps all its balls in the air simultaneously without any clumsiness is positively admirable. But whatever genuine illumination is to be derived from the book the reader must provide for himself, as a by-product of ideas and memories accumulated elsewhere. What is missing is an authorial idea, if you will, a theory, about the relation of the book's subject to anything outside: in other words, a context. We see a group of extremely interesting and important characters reacting in extremely interesting and important ways but we are given no correspondingly textured picture of what they are most importantly reacting to. They are moved along by a series of events, but a series of events does not by itself constitute a historical background. That requires not only a narrative but an underlying judgment about the nature and significance of what is being narrated. Such a judgment the authors do not begin to supply, perhaps because to do so would lead them into terrain dotted, for two young liberal journalists, with landmines.

The story of Acheson, McCloy, and company, if it is anything, is the story of the rise and fall of the policy of containment, or to put it more baldly, of the cold war. The cold war is something about which this book remains wrapped in defensive neutrality. The plot, when properly spun, begins with the discovery by America's governing elite and the politicians they served—a discovery made with somewhat differing speed and leading to somewhat differing conclusions for different individuals—that the Soviets were scoundrels, masters of an ugly, brutal system at home and untrustworthy, aggressive conspirators abroad. It ends with the decision by that same elite, now including the hand-picked younger protegés of the original band of Wise Men, to extricate the United States from its engagement in Vietnam. In between, there are major successes and major failures, held in a kind of perfect balance: Europe saved/China gone, the Berlin airlift/the Berlin Wall, and so on, in a kind of perpetual see-saw between firmness and temporizing, a fluctuation contributed to by hundreds of factors and pressures, internal and external, economic, political, and social. It is, in sum, the story of a democratic society stuck, in a dangerous world, with the singular responsibility for holding off what it has been forced against its will to recognize as an implacable and barbarous enemy and yet—after the fashion of democratic societies—given wherever possible to cheating on that responsibility and fudging on that recognition.

To both sides of this balance, both the assumption of the burden and the fudging, the Wise Men and their associates made some important contribution—though in this they were certainly not alone; the politicians and the people had more than ample share in it. But since they were for so long the major formulators and implementers of policy, and by today's standard so largely unobstructed in their activities,[3] their problem with adhering to a consistent sense of what they were after carried a special weight of consequence.

Key to this problem was the quality of their comprehension of the Soviet Union. As

[3]What, for instance, would the press and Congress nowadays make of a high official who, like Averell Harriman, once took the occasion of a mission to Moscow to settle a long-standing private dispute with the Soviet government over Harriman mineral rights in the Soviet Union? Or who, like John J. McCloy, in private life continued freely to represent Arab oil interests while he just as freely continued to advise President Truman not to recognize Israel?

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practical men, engaged from day to day, both in their own affairs and those of their country, in "getting things done"—winning wars, making deals, arranging financing, persuading associates, creating outcomes—probably it could not have been given to them truly to understand the nature of an ideological force. What could they really know, for example, about a non-negotiable ambition to revolutionize and jealousy for power wherever power could extend? The world as they knew it was undoubtedly a place full of bastards, but after all with the right application of pressure, as any banker or lawyer or businessman knew, even the worst bastard could sooner or later be brought to heel. Hitler may have demonstrated to them that there are things in heaven and earth not dreamt of in their philosophy, but everything in their experience conspired to limit the case. George Kennan was the one among them who best understood the Soviets, though he underestimated their staying power; but he had a problem of his own, a problem, moreover, which has resulted in his willingness at last to identify himself with a hard-and-fast position: he has become forthrightly hostile to an activist American foreign policy. His particular problem was not with his comprehension of the Soviets but with his contempt for the United States. How could he have remained loyal to a policy based at bottom on the premise that the United States embodied a superior political culture?

The others, who could literally accomplish miracles of constructiveness and who, along with Harry Truman—a critical player, about whom this book does not have nearly enough, by miles, to say—authored a policy perhaps unprecedented in the history of nations for the grandeur as well as the ingenuousness of its intentions, were nevertheless in the last analysis unable to shake off the conventional belief that the Soviets would one day deal as others do. That belief, to put it mildly, remains with us to this day. (In a brief interval before push came to shove, John Foster Dulles, whom the Wise Men despised, affected to believe otherwise, but his affectation quickly gave way in the face of "reality"; he, too, was a man of the world, and in service to an ever-prudent leader.)

LOOKING BACK on it now, we can see that in general the policy of the Wise Men, appropriately, was based on skills at keeping peace but stood at a dangerously wrong angle to war. Korea was a mess, partly because MacArthur blundered in failing to see all those Chinese hiding behind the bushes but also because the political ends of that war were muddy to begin with. And about Vietnam, what is there to say that any ten people will agree on? One thing, perhaps: we had no aims for that war that were commensurate with what it would have cost us to prosecute it successfully. Thus when the Tet offensive rolled around, the establishment funked—the Wise Men along with all the rest—and has remained in a funk ever since. Nowadays the energies of the representatives of Skull and Bones and Porcellian, the best universities, the banks, the investment houses, the law firms, the foreign service, are mainly invested not even in keeping the peace but simply in getting the United States out of the fray. Such people clearly understand the bravery of success but are not, it seems, equipped with that ultimate gift of temper—call it iron in the soul, it is possessed by all great leaders—that would enable them to face down and overcome the reality of failure.

The book concludes with the reflection that we may not look upon the like of Acheson and Lovett, Harriman and McCloy, Kennan and Bohlen, again. That is probably true; it is difficult to imagine that American society from within and the world from without will ever again come together in just that confluence of conditions needed to produce men like these. Nor is there any question that we will have lost something of immense and irreplaceable value. But any nostalgia occasioned by this reflection ought not to blind us into trying to make do with some pale *ersatz*.

Nor, for that matter, if we were miraculously to be offered the power to bring back some figure of our choosing from those postwar years, should we be in any doubt about

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whom to call forth from the shades. The Wise Men were an extraordinary group and a more than pleasing one to contemplate, but what the world really needs now is someone rather different: Harry S. Truman, haberdasher, graduate of the Kansas City School of Law, clubman of the Pendergast machine, who wore bow ties with white polka dots and almost wasn't elected to the presidency in 1948.

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Too Kind to Castro

Hugh Thomas

MR. TAD SZULC, a well-known journalist who used to work for the *New York Times*, has written an interesting, uneven, and, in the end, unsatisfactory study of Fidel Castro. The chief weakness of the book is the author's softhearted admiration, even affection, for his subject.

Fidel: A Critical Portrait[1] is not without merit. The account given of Castro's childhood and youth is interesting and fresh. It brings together a lot of material previously unknown or neglected. Castro's schools and his struggles at the University of Havana are well described. The early days of the campaign against Batista, including the attacks on the Moncada barracks (1953) and the first of Castro's two years in the Sierra Maestra (1957) are made to seem exciting. Mr. Szulc is also persuasive and subtle about the extent to which Castro was influenced by Marxism-Leninism when at university and as a young lawyer; he plainly interested himself in that subject more than has been appreciated, though he never joined friends, such as Leonel Soto or Alfredo Guevara, in taking up membership in the Cuban Communist party. Mr. Szulc describes the delivery of $50,000 by the Central Intelligence Agency's representative in Santiago de Cuba to Castro's movement in 1958. When taking into account the comparable sum given to Justo Carillo, another opponent of Batista at that time, this makes the CIA one of the chief financiers of the 1959 revolution in Cuba.

Mr. Szulc has also had some revealing interviews with elderly survivors of the party, such as the legendary Fabio Grobart (who was present as a young Polish immigrant in 1925 at the founding of the party), and Blas Roca (the secretary general of the communists during the critical years, 1958–1962). This has enabled Mr. Szulc to describe, more accurately and fully than has before been done, the subterfuge practiced in 1959 by Castro, his brother Raúl, and "Che" Guevara. The three men pretended to serve a democratic, liberal government, but were in fact seeking to establish a totalitarian socialist regime by building up the Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) and the rebel army.

Keeping particularly in mind Mr. Szulc's sources and the above-mentioned $50,000, the last section of the book provides more useful material for refuting the grotesque idea that Castro was "pushed" into communism by negligent or hostile Americans. That myth, though, is so well established, and has been instinctively believed by so many (who for whatever reasons want to believe ill of the

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[1]Tad Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (Morrow, $19.95).

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Eisenhower administration), that I doubt whether even now it will so easily be dislodged: what Jean Paul Sartre, C. Wright Mills, and Herbert Matthews wanted to think is already part of the myth.

Mr. Szulc does also convey something of the size of Castro's personality: his energy, abundant optimism, eloquence, memory, and charm—qualities which, as Mr. Szulc suggests, might have carried him to the top of the Cuban political tree even if there had been a democracy there. Moreover, though Mr. Szulc does not stand far enough back to see, they also make Castro a formidable enemy of law-abiding democrats in the United States (and therefore, one must presume, of Mr. Szulc himself).

This lack of objectivity is what gives the work its flaw. Mr. Szulc recognizes that Castro has engulfed his country in tragedy, and brought untold tedium where he has not brought misery. He notices the fact that Castro has, through his intolerance, created a "cultural wasteland" where the favorite books are not those of Cuban writers of today, but those of North Americans such as Hemingway or Chandler; he touches lightly on the brutal repression of homosexuals; he marks the existence of the Cuban gulag; he mourns the international dependence of Cuba on the Soviet Union; he does not seek to deny Cuban support and training of international terrorists, though he refers to them as "revolutionaries"; nor does he deny the debacle of the Cuban economy under Castro—a debacle that has made the country more dependent than it was before 1959 on that decreasingly sought after crop, sugar. But all of these admissions are spoken of in a low tone, almost as asides. The main theme is the grandeur of Castro's personality. What, he has brought iniquity and evil? That, it is almost suggested, is inevitable if you are dealing with a man of Castro's herculean proportions. There is a passage at the end of the book which almost suggests that, since Castro at least is a free man, the country which he runs as a despotism must also be free.

The superlatives begin at the beginning and continue to the end. Thus we are told on the first page that Mr. Szulc proposed a collaboration to Castro; he wanted help from his subject in the form of interviews and the provision of material: "I remarked that, since *we were both honorable men*, his ideology and mine, differing in the most absolute fashion as they did, should not interfere with the writing of an honest book" (italics mine). One would like to know the reaction to this admission by the thousands of democratic Cubans who opposed Batista, but who are still in prison or in exile because they believed Castro's early protestations in the Sierra in 1957 (as in the manifesto of the Sierra Maestra). The reflections on honor in Cuba of a Gustavo Arcos—one-time companion of Castro in the assault on the Moncada barracks, but now in prison for trying to escape the island—would be interesting. Then, far later on in the work, Fidel Castro and John Kennedy are both said to have had "superb minds and a vision of history," and "were fascinated by each other as adversaries." This may be what Castro and Szulc now think, but the idea of placing a great democratic president on the same level as a major subverter of liberty is farfetched.

We are told at the very end that the sixty-year-old Castro, for all his loneliness, is "still enormously popular (and even loved)." Mr. Szulc does not, and cannot of course, give any authority for this appreciation, which would be contested by those who listen to "Radio Martí"—which the author quaintly, and surely ingenuously, refers to as a "hostile radio station." Cubans normally do not discuss Castro's private life out of respect, Mr. Szulc assures us; but since there is no free press, where and how could they discuss it? On page 591, Mr. Szulc says that the Cuban national party newspaper *Gramma* "now rivals *Pravda* in quality": since there is not much evidence of a sense of humor in this book, it would be rash to assume that this must be ironical.

Mr. Szulc quotes, with apparent approval, Castro's own exalted account of his

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part in the riots of 1948, known as the Bogotazo: "I think that what I did there was really noble . . . I am proud of what I did . . . I think that my decision to stay there that night when I was alone, and it all seemed like a great tactical error, was a great proof of idealism, a great proof of quixotism in the best sense . . . I behaved with principle, with correct morality, with dignity, with honor, with incredible altruism." This account dates from 1981. But in that riot Castro was not, as might be assumed from this story, helping the wounded, driving children out of danger in rickety cars, or insisting that the crowds show mercy to unarmed civilians. He was, on the contrary, having an exciting time haranguing soldiers, stirring up trouble whenever he could, and permitting himself an enjoyable bout of what he himself called "revolutionary fever." There are so many passages like this that one tires. The supreme example is a comparison Mr. Szulc makes between Castro (during his march on Havana in 1959) and Christ: "Every five minutes, at every intersection of the highway, women stopped him, the old women kissed him, telling him that he was greater than Jesus Christ." That is the memory of Raúl Chibás—the brother of Castro's predecessor as the would-be heroic reformer of the nation, Eddy Chibás. Mr. Szulc finds it necessary to comment: "Castro himself must then have felt a profound kinship with Christ."

By way of contrast, one need only refer to Armando Valladares and his extraordinary memoir of life in Castro's prisons, *Against All Hope*. Valladares, a student working in the Postal Savings Bank, talked indiscriminately against the communist takeover of Castro's revolution and, in the nervy days before the Bay of Pigs, was arrested in his mother's flat, given a summary trial, condemned to thirty years, and so began a long calvary through some of the island's, and the world's, worst prisons. The suffering which Valladares describes, the iniquities which he experienced or observed, the courage, the faith (in God, as in himself) and capacity for endurance which he showed and which he saw in others (often rewarded by murder) make this account comparable to those of survival in Nazi concentration camps. Although there are as yet no gas chambers in Cuba, there have been experiments of a criminal biological type designed to see how far an individual can survive starvation, beating, solitary confinement, and various kinds of ill treatment. Valladares's heroic period of imprisonment lasted for 22 years, from 1960–1982, and it may be no accident that the bulk of Szulc's biography concerns the years before this.

IN EXPLANATION of Mr. Szulc's frequent use of soppy expressions in his portrayal of Castro, it is right to admit that totalitarian leaders are notoriously difficult to deal with. Even democratic politicians exert a wholly spurious charm just because they are powerful. All-powerful men of the twentieth century have fooled the best of us. Some of the most distinguished men of their time, including Lloyd George and Arnold Toynbee, found Hitler beguiling. Churchill and Roosevelt often spoke of Stalin in the same way as Mr. Szulc speaks of Castro; even more unreservedly, and even though (as they knew from what they had read and from what Stalin himself told Churchill with respect to the agricultural revolution in Russia) Stalin had been responsible for killings on a scale unknown in history. Mr. Szulc, however, is well-meaning, liberal, progressive, and friendly, though plainly resigned to the failure of all relations between Latin America and the United States; perhaps it is small wonder that Mr. Szulc should have surrendered some part of his sense of proportion to Castro. Think of Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir twenty-five years ago.

Mr. Szulc could have been saved from some of these complaints by a ruthless editor. The book itself is ill-balanced; and severe pruning of the hagiographical passages would have served the reader in many ways. After all, the work begins with nearly a hundred pages of general appreciation, "The Man," which is scarcely a good apéritif because it is too heavy in relation to the main body of the

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text. There follow nearly 400 pages on the time of war, 1952–1959, which constitute the interest of the work; however, the account of the critical year 1958 is oddly scrappy, and the reader does not actually get a clear idea as to why Castro's movement defeated Batista's government at that time. (There is, as might be expected, a neglect of the activities of other opponents of Batista, particularly of Frank País, the leader of the civic resistance in Santiago; he is mentioned, but Mr. Szulc forgets to tell us that death prevented him from being a possible rival to Castro.) There follow 130 pages about the years 1959–1963, whose *pièce de résistance* is the description of the so-called secret government of Coijímar, in which the Bay of Pigs incident is well rechronicled, if from the Cuban point of view. Finally, the twenty or more years since Castro's coming to real power, at the head of a communist regime of his own making, is dealt with in a mere sixty pages. It is as if Mr. Szulc instinctively knows that "Fidel," as the title has it, was really eclipsed at that time, along with that illusion of communism "with an audacious face," known as "Fidelismo." The harsher personality that served as the replacement thought nothing of keeping many innocent men, such as Matos (and of course Valladares), in prison for twenty years; the examples of such men stand as powerful testimony against "Fidel," and his apparent belief (derived from his own brief and relatively mild imprisonment) that enforced darkness and the "humiliation of the shadows" were "the most absurd of all human barbarianisms I can conceive."

I have, I fear, some other complaints. At one point, Mr. Szulc implies that normal usage in Cuba makes use of the "*Usted*" for "you" rather than the colloquial "*tu*"; whereas my impression is that the Cubans are quicker into that short monosyllable than any other Latin Americans. Mr. Szulc speaks of Rómulo Betancourt and quotes Castro's dislike of him; but he neither notices Castro's unsuccessful attempt to draw Betancourt into his "anti-yankee" crusade in January 1959 (as described by that statesman), nor the fact that Betancourt has created in Venezuela and in Latin America a far more resilient and just tradition. The character of the peasants in the Sierra Maestra is well treated—indeed the description of the support given by them for Castro in 1956–1957 is one of the best parts of the book. But the distinction between squatters and legally well-established farmers might have been explored. Finally, Castro's adventures in Africa and elsewhere since 1975 are not really considered in the depth that they surely deserve in a book purporting to be a full life of this Cuban leader. The only point at all developed here is Castro's own argument (accepted by Mr. Szulc), that the support of the Angolan MPLA was his, not the Soviets' idea. That may be so, but the implication that the commitment, and the other major Cuban one in Ethiopia, could have been carried through without Soviet logistical help and financing seems to me to be absurd.

This review is bound to seem hostile to Mr. Szulc's endeavors. That is so because the author has not grasped the horrific scale of the tragedy that Castro personally visited on the "ever faithful island." *Fidel, A Critical Portrait* contains so many reminders that Cuba could, in the 1960s, have experienced a real national regeneration that it is tragic to have to read on and see why it did not happen. The country was not a poor one by the standards of Latin America. It was full of talent. All those brave young men, so optimistic, so enthusiastic, so resolute, so full of ingenuity! What disillusion, what misery, what cruelty, followed—and all of it could have been prevented by Mr. Szulc's hero had he had a drop of human kindness. Aie! As it is, the entrepreneurs of that missed recovery are in Florida, the artists in London, Paris, or Madrid.

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Surveying at a Slant

Lauren Weiner

"A SURVEY of Press Freedom in Latin America, 1985–1986" was released in January by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) and the Newspaper Guild of the AFL-CIO. The survey, which has been prepared annually by these two organizations for the past four years, displays a bias that is not surprising given that COHA is a think-tank that counts among its board members the former Carter official Peter Bourne, Michael Harrington, former Congressman Robert Drinan, Senator Tom Harkin and other prominent men of the left. As news about the news, this year's report has attracted the attention of journalists both here and abroad. *La Prensa* of Panama, perhaps the most fiercely oppositional paper currently printing in Latin America, gave it front-page coverage and complete credence. So even though not much in the COHA-Newspaper Guild report is surprising, as a potentially influential document it bears a good going-over.

The report singles out five extremist governments as the region's worst offenders against freedom of the press. In order, they are: Chile, Cuba, Guyana, Paraguay, and Suriname. Narrowing further, Chile and Cuba comprise the short list of major transgressors. Yet while the details given about Chile condemn that country in the strongest possible terms, those mustered to describe Cuba's situation deliberately try for some mitigating effect. The dictator of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet, imposed a new state of siege last September after an attempt was made on his life. That government action, and the killing of a prominent opposition magazine editor, José Carrasco (as well as the twenty-eight other reported incidents of official silencing of the Chilean press, whether violently or otherwise), do not bode well for civil liberties in Chile. The totality of the Cuban government's control of the media, on the other hand, made for a more tranquil two-year period there. Only two incidents are cited for Cuba during 1985 and 1986. The authors of the survey convey the underlying reason for this comparative tranquility: "privately operated media do not exist in Cuba." They even go so far as to describe the state-controlled news coverage in Cuba as consistently anti-American and pro-Soviet. But their sole example of anti-American journalism is an interesting one: Cuba, unaffected by a U.S.-imposed news blackout in the Caribbean in October of 1983, provided the only accurate reporting of the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Inverting Alexander Pope's famous aphorism, that's called praising with faint damnation.

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Dutifully, the survey criticizes the leftist tyrant Lt. Col. Desi Bouterse of Suriname. Dutifully, again, it registers disapproval of the late Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham and his successor Desmond Hoyte, both of the People's National Congress (PNC), a "self-designated Marxist party." Among other offenses, Burnham and Hoyte have particularly targeted for censorship the single remaining autonomous paper in Guyana, the outspoken *Catholic Standard*; the PNC has restricted the *Standard's* allocation of newsprint[1]; during "elections" in November 1985, it allotted itself the lion's share of broadcasting time; and an angry mob of PNC supporters set upon a British reporter.

But criticizing Marxism evidently comes hard for the authors, for they felt the need to re-categorize Guyana's ruling party before getting down to the particulars of repression. Thus, an introductory statement asserts that the PNC, though "a self-designated Marxist party, in reality had more in common with right-wing military regimes than with Moscow."

The authors don't pull quite the same sleight of hand in their discussion of Nicaragua. Instead, they merely observe, by way of a quick history of the Nicaraguan revolution, that the Reagan and Carter administrations "chose to perceive Soviet-style communism in the ascendance of the FSLN." Though a distinctly weak sally, the point does serve its purpose: it paves the way for a succession of blunted criticisms, sympathetic elaborations of motive, and outright falsehoods about Nicaraguan life under the Sandinistas.

CLEARLY NICARAGUA is a natural for the worst press offenders list. Yet it does not appear there. Each of the offenses committed by the Guyanese PNC mentioned above has also been committed by the Sandinistas. In addition, the Sandinistas share with dictator Alfredo Stroessner's Paraguay the dubious distinction of being the only two governments cited in the report for penalizing an information outlet for what it did *not* broadcast. The Paraguayan government added to its many physical and juridical assaults on the media (there is even, apparently, a law against the talk-show format on TV and radio) one instance of suspending a radio station's broadcasts when it did not air municipal election returns emanating from the ruling Colorado party headquarters. The Sandinistas, looking for a pretext to close down entirely the recalcitrant Radio Católico, found one when the station bucked the national requirement to air President Ortega's New Year's message.

"Managua's bark often seemed worse than its bite," says the survey. The treatment of the Catholic media in the country and of the newspaper *La Prensa*, heavily censored and finally closed down in June of 1986, definitely suggests more bite than bark. But since *La Prensa* "often baited the censors," as the authors claim, did not this newspaper deserve what it got? Provocation by *La Prensa* is a charge one typically hears only from fervent supporters of the FSLN. (I first read it in an interview with an expatriate American employee of the Sandinista Ministry of Labor.)

One is led to wonder how much of the information gathered by COHA and the Newspaper Guild on Nicaragua came from the FSLN itself. For example, a casual comparison is made between U.S. congressional funding of *La Prensa* (through the National Endowment for Democracy) and CIA funding of the anti-Allende paper in Chile, *El Mercurio*, prior to Allende's assassination. The comparison might seem unremarkable—but not if one knows a little background. Jaime Chamorro, the editor of *La Prensa* at the

[1]This is a common tactic that knows no particular politics. According to the COHA-Newspaper Guild report, state manipulation of newsprint supplies and advertising accounts for political reasons goes on in Guyana, Mexico, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. As the report fails to mention, it was a feature of Argentina under the generals and has been continued by the democratically elected Alfonsín administration.

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time of its closing, has written of an FSLN-funded pamphlet, distributed early in the revolution, which planted the suggestion that *La Prensa* was advised by members of the *El Mercurio* staff in techniques of "counterrevolution." It would seem that the Sandinistas' campaign to link the two papers has succeeded.

One must, of course, consider all of the "inside dope" produced by sympathetic observers very carefully, because some of it might be more accurate than intelligence gathered by outsiders. COHA and the Newspaper Guild say that the official censor of *La Prensa*, Capt. Nelba Cecilia Blandón, was replaced in October of 1985 by Capt. Charlotte Baltodano. They give no information about Baltodano, except to say that the purported personnel change "appeared to indicate an impending relaxation of censorship." The U.S. State Department, for its part, confirms Baltodano as an important Interior Ministry official but not as a censor of *La Prensa*. According to other observers, she is a militant Sandinista and an intellectual as well, so she would be a plausible choice for censor, having a better feel for publications than Blandón.

Whoever is correct here, the State Department or this survey, the latter's sanguine interpretation is completely unfounded. The replacement, if it did occur, could just as easily indicate the same or *greater* press control by the Sandinistas—who better to comb printed matter for subtle signs of counterrevolution than a member of the literati?

The report allows that, despite its "compromised journalistic independence . . . none of *La Prensa's* actions could justify the repeated muzzling of this opposition voice." But after stressing that a) the Sandinistas often pulled their punches and b) the Sandinistas were manipulated into punching when they *did* punch, the authors have uttered a condemnation that cannot be seen as anything but equivocal.

ANOTHER GROUPING of countries emerges from this report, not because the authors explicitly distinguish them, but because their situations appear similar. Colombia, Peru, and El Salvador have centrist governments trying to cope with armed insurgencies and (in the cases of Colombia and Peru) violent drug activities that threaten the survival of democracy in their countries. Their attempts to treat these problems bring them into conflict with the press.

Former Colombian President Belisario Betancur began a political opening to rebels and terrorist groups on the right and left in 1984, only to be answered with more violence. The survey praises Betancur for liberalizing the working conditions of the press, but when, late in his term, he publicly opined that the media was being used by leftist guerrillas, he "sounded an ominous note . . . Although he vowed to respect freedom of information, it was believed that he was under military pressure to rein in the press corps."

"Formally democratic" Colombia took another turn for the worse, in the authors' estimation, with the election of Virgilio Barco Vargas as Betancur's successor. Barco Vargas' administration passed a law to combat drug trafficking that "limits the free flow of information on the subject." The authors tell us that paramilitary, drug-mafia, and guerrilla forces threaten the Colombian press from all sides. Yet they cry foul at the government's attempt to strike back at the drug-mafia. Would it not have been more sensible to recognize that there are times when a temporary abridgement of press freedom ultimately serves the cause of press freedom, inasmuch as that freedom is secure only within a legitimate and ordered political structure?

Peru had almost as many transgressions against the press as Chile and Paraguay did during 1985 and 1986, but the pattern of violations is strikingly different in the Peruvian case. In 1985 there was a rash of incidents in which Tupac Amaru revolutionaries seized radio and television stations to make speeches. These episodes were punctuated by bombings and murders by Maoist Sendero Luminoso guerrillas. The list for 1986 contains mostly violence and confisca-

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tions perpetrated against the media by the police (and one police action against rebels inside a broadcasting studio). Again the authors make clear, as they did with Colombia, that the principal threats to the press are the guerrillas and rogue elements of the armed forces, not the government. But that does not stop them from including as an "incident" the action of socialist President Alan Garcia, who "met with six television station directors to ask for their cooperation in restricting news reports on guerrilla attacks."

The Salvadoran President José Napoleón Duarte has often expressed the view that leftist insurgents are able to manipulate sympathetic journalists to serve their cause. He too is implicitly criticized in the survey for asking the media to restrain itself in order to aid the authorities in maintaining public order. Hidden among cases of official detainments, arrests, and confiscations of film in El Salvador is yet another citation guaranteed to make one lose one's patience with the upholders of freedom of information. In October of 1985, when President Duarte's eldest daughter was kidnapped, a news blackout was called by the government. After Inés Guadalupe Duarte was released, the clandestine Radio Farabundo Martí (the propaganda arm of the FMLN) accused the government of censorship in denying the press access to her. It was a faction of the FMLN that performed the kidnapping.

It is often said by members of the fourth estate that to make a politician look the fool, all you have to do is quote him accurately. The members of the Newspaper Guild should take this truism to heart. The press, when it speaks up for itself, tends to sound self-righteous; when to that tendency are added intolerance toward embattled centrism in Latin America and indulgence of extremist adversaries of the United States, what results is a very noxious brew indeed.

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Fouling Up

Robert W. Tucker

THERE HAS BEEN no lack of explanations of the crisis that has engulfed the Reagan administration. Each has some merit. Clearly, the Iran-contra affair must in part be accounted for by the character of the men who conceived, authorized, and carried out the operation. Clearly, the scandal must also be seen in terms of the structure within which it arose and persisted for so long. And clearly, the scandal has something to do with the general outlook and broad policies of the administration that is responsible for it.

It is the last of these explanations that has received the least attention. This is the case even for those hostile to the administration and its policies. Among supporters, an effort has been made to deny any intrinsic or logical connection between the policies and the scandal. To the extent the scandal is not accounted for in terms of personality or bureaucratic malfunctioning, it is largely attributed to the present relationship between the executive and legislative branches and to the greater role today of Congress in foreign policy. This role is found to be increasingly obstructive.

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Nor is this all. If Congress is seen to play an obstructive role today, this must in turn reflect a general public disposition that is at least partly sympathetic to this role. At the root of the crisis that besets the administration is the endemic conflict—a conflict that has grown worse in recent years—between democracy and foreign policy. "This affair," Charles Krauthammer has written, "is not a Reagan crisis nor a presidential crisis, but a recurring American crisis, rooted ultimately in the tension between America's need to act like a great power and its unwillingness to do so." Having shed its historic isolationist outlook and disposition for a brief period after World War II, Krauthammer argues, the nation has now partially returned to its past. Congress is paralyzed by those who faithfully represent that past. The result is crisis. "Either the Executive accedes to congressionally mandated passivity, the result being a geopolitical crisis . . . [or] the Executive tries to circumvent its constraints, the result being a constitutional crisis."

Is this indeed the deeper meaning of the current crisis? Perhaps. But if it is, why is it that we are again reminded of the conflict between democracy and foreign policy only in late 1986 rather than in earlier years of this administration? After all, the world the administration inherited from its predecessor in

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1981 was certainly a more threatening one than is the world of the mid-1980s. The improvement in our fortunes that occurred in the intervening years was in some measure a matter of plain luck. In part, though, it was the result of policies—foreign and defense—undertaken by the Reagan administration. These policies were attended by a good deal of criticism, within Congress and without. But this criticism did not prevent the administration from pursuing most of the major policies it had set out on. One exception was Central America, and even here the administration was able to do part of what it had wanted to do. True, the Sandinistas were not driven from power. By the end of Reagan's first term, however, the government in Managua was very much on the defensive. In El Salvador, the critical Central American country during these years, a once near-victorious Marxist insurgency was rapidly declining in strength.

Judged by the modest standards one is driven to apply when measuring achievement in foreign policy, the administration's record for the first term appeared quite good. In the 1984 election, due advantage was taken of this record. If the administration's fortunes seem quite different today, is this because geopolitical necessities drove men to take actions required for the nation's security, measures that were denied by Congress (and, indirectly, by the nation) or is it because the administration, driven by ideological conviction and a confidence that historical forces were running strongly in our favor, could not leave well enough alone?

In the case of Iran, the question seems almost irrelevant. Neither geopolitical necessity nor ideological conviction nor overconfidence in our power moved the Reagan administration to take the measures that have resulted in its present predicament.

The Iranian initiative has been misleadingly described as a policy that was sound in principle but badly implemented. Instead, it is a case of a policy that could not be implemented at all. Whatever else may be said of it, a policy that cannot be satisfactorily implemented can scarcely be described as sound in principle.

Arms for Iran may be partly accounted for by the president's compassionate instincts. But even when due weight is given to those instincts, much remains to be explained. Compassion cannot account for the bizarre implementation of the arms for hostages deal. When all is said and done, and the immensely labyrinthine tale is mastered, what stands out above all else is the breathtaking incompetence characterizing the Iran initiative. Nor do the presidential intentions that prompted the initiative mitigate this judgment. As a textbook example in how not to conduct foreign policy, it will be hard to improve upon. (Reykjavik almost did so though. Coming at the same time that the Iranian scandal broke, it has prompted more than one otherwise sympathetic observer to wonder whether the administration is still able to conduct a coherent and effective foreign policy.)

If there is a deeper lesson to be learned from the Iranian debacle, it is surely not that there is an inescapable conflict between the processes of democracy and the demands of foreign policy. Had more been known about the Iranian initiative by those who were entitled to know and should have known, had there been more democracy in this instance, it seems safe to say that disaster would not have occurred. While there is no safeguard against incompetence, this is an instance where democracy would have provided some insurance against error.

THE IRAN SIDE of the present affair must be sharply distinguished from the *contra* side. The Iranian initiative is surely the more interesting, given its *dramatis personae* and exotic setting. It may even be more significant in terms of its lasting impact on public opinion at home and the image of this administration abroad. The Iran arms sales have dealt a stunning and perhaps irreparable blow to this image. Certainly, the American public will never again see this administration as it once was seen and this is likely to be the case for the world as well.

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Still, in terms of policy it is the *contra* side that is the more instructive, if only for the reason that it cannot be considered an aberration. The secret diversion of funds from the Iranian arms sales to support the Nicaraguan rebels was made on behalf of a policy the administration has pursued, by one means or another, since coming to office. The importance of this policy to the administration has often been underestimated. From the policy of supporting the *contras* has come the Reagan doctrine, considered by its supporters as the answer to what they have long seen as the shortcomings and even the perils of containment. In contrast to containment, which was always defensive and which left the initiative to the adversary, the Reagan doctrine promises to reverse communist gains in the Third World, thereby exploding the communist claim that it represents the tide of history. And while Nicaragua is only one application of the Reagan doctrine, it has always been seen as by far the most important application. Nicaragua is the *locus classicus* of the Reagan doctrine. Failure there, its supporters have insisted, would cast grave doubt on the viability of this general policy elsewhere. For if the promise of the Reagan doctrine cannot be realized in Nicaragua, the argument goes, where can it be realized?

The Reagan doctrine represents a broad commitment to support groups engaged in armed struggle against communist governments. Given this goal of overthrowing established governments, the means of policy are, in large measure, of necessity covert. Indeed, one may say that the logic of the Reagan doctrine is the logic of the covert operation. This need to rely on covert means cannot but give rise to difficulties. Whether it is always and everywhere the case that democratic processes and covert operations in foreign policy are difficult to reconcile, is another matter. But it is quite clearly the case that for this country, at least, the two are difficult to reconcile. This was so, though in lesser degree, even in the period of the classic cold war. Today, the difficulties are evidently much greater.

Still, these difficulties may be accommodated if there is otherwise broad public and congressional support for a given policy. A present case in point, all the more relevant since it falls within the ambit of the Reagan doctrine, is Afghanistan. Here, there has been a good deal of support for helping a resistance movement, and this with little prompting by the administration. By contrast, a Congress that has been quite willing to approve of substantial covert assistance to the Afghan rebels has been resistant to doing the same for the Nicaraguan rebels.

The point is often made by the supporters of the *contras* that the administration has not enjoyed broad public support for its Nicaraguan policy because it has not made the effort required to gain such support. But it is hard to see what might have been reasonably done that was not done. The administration has not been remiss in its efforts to marshall public and congressional support. It is simply that the efforts made have not had the desired effect. In the face of a response to these efforts at persuasion that remains skeptical of and opposed to its Nicaraguan policy, the administration has doggedly persisted in this policy. It has done so by virtually any means, whether the means involve the privatization of foreign policy, the appeal to the Sultan of Brunei or, it may well be, the violation of law.

Given this pattern of action, sooner or later a scandal was inevitable. Its time of occurrence depended from the start on how fast and how far the administration might push, how careless or indifferent to discovery it might become, and how bold or how cowardly Congress might be in responding to the challenge. In marked contrast to the Iranian side of the scandal, the motivation on the *contra* side requires no special explanation. To those who acted on behalf of the *contras*, the interests at stake evidently appeared very great. These interests have long been seen to comprise not only the warding off of a conventional security threat but the defeat as well of an ideological claim of the first order of importance.

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What, then, is the deeper lesson of the *contra* side of the scandal? Clearly, it is a lesson in what can happen when an administration is determined to pursue a policy the public refuses to sanction and Congress, at best, only inadequately supports. Whether this lesson also illuminates the conflict between democracy and foreign policy depends on the judgment one makes of the policy. If the administration's Nicaraguan policy indeed responds to vital security interests of the nation, the scandal illuminates the conflict. If Nicaraguan policy does not so respond, the scandal illuminates no more than this government's determination to pursue its chosen policy come what may.

My judgment is that the administration's policy does not so respond and that, even if it did, it is not designed to achieve its ends. If anything, those ends appear today more distant than ever. To say this, however, is in no way to deny the potential conflict between democracy and foreign policy. In a number of ways, that conflict has become more acute today than it was in the earlier postwar period. It has become more acute because there is no longer the consensus there once was over foreign policy and because not only Congress and the media, but the public as well, are no longer nearly as deferential to the foreign policy views of the executive as they once were. Only the thoughtless or the hopelessly partisan will dismiss the dangers these changes may one day hold out.

At the same time, a nation less deferential to the executive in foreign policy may have advantages. Those who do not think so today, thought so in the late 1970s. There is no guarantee that a government will be wiser than the nation, even in foreign policy. On more than one occasion, it has not been, and this seems clearly to be one of those occasions.

Correction: Irving Kristol's article " 'Human Rights': The Hidden Agenda" (Winter 1986/7) was originally presented at a symposium in honor of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency jointly sponsored by ACDA, the United States Institute of Peace, and the Lehrman Institute. We apologize for the omission.

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